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 This thesis studies the discourse of food sovereignty in Maine, a coalition of small-scale 
farmers, consumers, and citizens building an alternative food system based on a distributed form 
of production, processing, selling, purchasing, and consumption. This distribution occurs at the 
municipal level through the enactment of ordinances. Using critical-rhetorical field methods, I 
argue that the discourse of food sovereignty in Maine develops a ‘constitutive’ rhetoric that 
composes rural society through affective relationships. Advocates engage the industrial food 
system to both expose its systemic bias against small-scale farming and construct their own 
discourse of belonging.  Based upon agrarian values such as interrelatedness, secular grace, and 
trust, food sovereignty proposes a vernacular law by which to regulate local food systems.  
Advocates perform a ‘grassroots diplomacy’ to gain access to the decision-making process and 
to create space for themselves within the existing regulatory structure.  
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INTRODUCTION 
           I have asked myself many times during this project if, as an advocate, it would not be 
more effective, more of a contribution to food sovereignty, to analyze the discourse of industrial 
food production. Would not such a focus provide a way to show the systematic subordination of 
small-scale farming communities in Maine to the hegemony of industrial farming? Perhaps. But 
in deciding to focus on and describe the discourse of food sovereignty—and how it constitutes 
itself—I think I perform an important shift in thinking about how it relates to the industrial food 
system: rather than critiquing the industrialist discourse, I help to compose the discourse of food 
sovereignty in Maine. In other words, I do not attempt to show the economic, political, and 
cultural deficits of industry—these emerge through my analysis. I do, however, try to show the 
surplus, the capacity, the potential of food sovereignty to compose our world along relational 
lines.  
           As Bruno Latour suggests,1 composition offers an alternative to critique that takes 
seriously the task of building a world in common with the things around us. I come to this 
project with a perspective that sees the industrial food system (and the accompanying mythical 
narrative of ‘progress’ through standardization, mechanization, and, above all, commodification) 
as already in ruins and in need of re-composition. Food sovereignty, as I see it, works with the 
rubble left in its wake, with the “dusty tools of democracy”2 to build places that provide hope for 
pluralist democracy and resilience for an uncertain future.  
          These tools are linguistic and create political definition through their symbolic action.3 
One such dusty tool resides in the Maine State Constitution that grants authority to municipalities 
                                                          
1 Bruno Latour, “An Attempt at a Compositionist’s Manifesto.” New Literary History 41 (2010): 471-490. 
2 Heather Retberg, letter to the editor, Bangor Daily News, March 27, 2017. 
3 Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966): 14. 
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to ensure the welfare of their residents as “a valid exercise of…home rule authority.”4 Since 
2011, food sovereignty advocates have exercised this authority by composing and passing 
municipal ordinances in towns across the state in response to what they perceive as the 
increasing pressure of federal and state regulations on their way of life. Although economic and 
directed by industrial agricultural influence, this pressure is also cultural. In the Local Food and 
Community Self-Governance Ordinance (LFCSGO), food sovereignty acknowledges that the 
integration of “economic, environmental, and social wealth” forms the basis to a stable “rural 
way of life.”5 These forms of wealth mutually constitute each other; to isolate or deplete any of 
them destabilizes rural communities. The relationships formed between neighbors, friends, and 
families—“non-corporate entities”6—grounds this wealth, which grows through the investment 
of time and energy into each other.  
         Throughout this study, I discuss this mutually constitutive wealth as ‘affective relations’ 
that gain political currency through the embodied set of demands made by food sovereignty. 
There are people and places that compose food sovereignty; as a grassroots discourse, it cannot 
be imposed through a ‘juridical,’ or administrative, structure. Nor should it be. An article by 
Thomas Linzey has significantly influenced this research by directing my attention to the 
rhetorical potential and power of constitutions. As the co-founder of the Community 
Environmental Legal Defense Fund (CELDF), Linzey works with communities throughout the 
United States to build “a new framework of governance in this country” based on rights and 
nature rather than property and commerce.7 Characterized as “collective nonviolent civil 
                                                          
4 §3001. “Ordinance power.” Maine State Constitution, Title 30-A, Subpart 4, 1989. 
5 LFCSGO, 2014. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Thomas Linzey, “Of Corporations, Law, and Democracy: Claiming the Rights of Communities and Nature,” 
Annals of Earth, 24, 1 (2006): 11. 
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disobedience through municipal lawmaking,”8 CELDF’s work—and that of food sovereignty in 
Maine—seeks to redefine the public trust as based in people, organized at the town level.    
          Through analyzing the discourse of food sovereignty in Maine, I recognize this municipal 
work as the expression of ‘vernacular values,’9 or the perception of public goods and services as 
a “means for ever inventive activities”10 rather than products consumed as an end unto 
themselves. Expanding vernacular values requires a renewed and creative relationship to the 
tools of democracy so that such expression can gain legitimacy as a source of governing 
authority. This study demonstrates how the discourse of food sovereignty in Maine gains such 
legitimacy.  
         In chapter one, I review the relevant literature to food sovereignty. I divide the chapter into 
three principal ‘frames’ of thought that form the discourse. First, a review of agrarian philosophy 
focuses on interrelatedness between agriculturalists and the landscape and how this relationship 
develops rhetorically. Agrarian claims to tradition, ecology, and local control form a base from 
which food sovereignty calls for legitimacy within existing structures of governance. Second, 
this process of local ‘legitimation’ unfolds in contrast to the increasingly global extent of 
agricultural systems. I review literature on ‘international food regimes’ from scholars who have 
documented the integration of industrial practices with international policy. This integration 
develops an industrial discourse whose ostensible goals of ‘food safety’ and eliminating hunger 
come at the expense of variable and adaptive methods of food production and concentrates 
capital resources into increasingly fewer corporate players. Third, agricultural globalization 
sparks questions of how state power and authority get exercised. I look at a final frame of 
                                                          
8 Ibid, 7. 
9 ‘Vernacular values’ here, and throughout the study, refer to Ivan Illich. “Vernacular Values.” Philosophica, 26, 2 
(1980): 47-102. 
10 Ibid, 52. 
4 
 
 
sovereignty to understand how discursive definitions as much as material realities produce 
agricultural concentration. The hegemonic discourse of industrial food production defines as 
illegitimate small-scale farmers who cannot or wish not to conform to the regulatory structure. 
Such definition materializes as state power, exercised on the farms and in the stores in Maine 
towns. Recognizing this state power is nothing new; how communities respond to it by drafting 
ordinances is. 
        In chapter two, I review the methods used in this study that consist of an approach known as 
critical rhetorical ethnography. As critical research, this study engages in a critique of power 
relations. The relations in question have formed between small-scale farming communities on 
the one hand and the regulatory system—as informed by industrial interests and enforced by 
federal and state governments—on the other. Studying rhetoric draws my attention to the 
reflexive capacity of language in how advocates both use and get used by the discourse of food 
sovereignty. Ethnography influences the study with its emphasis on thick description and 
participatory research. I consider myself a participant and advocate of food sovereignty; as such, 
I see my position as a researcher not as an objective perch, but rather as a source of influence on 
the discourse of food sovereignty. I interview members of the community as a primary form of 
data collection in addition to analyzing additional texts such as testimony and legal documents.  
       Chapter three analyzes these texts, from which I argue that food sovereignty has developed a 
form of ‘grassroots diplomacy’ with transformative potential to compose a new form of 
governance. As a primary form of organizing, advocates deploy a ‘constitutive’ rhetoric for the 
purposes of identification with one another through variable conceptions of sovereignty, 
rejecting political corruption or the appearance of corruption, and through affective relations. 
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Identification enables the construction of a ‘minoritarian’11 discourse through the effective use of 
tactical rhetoric. Systemic or structural bias that disadvantages small-scale farmers emerges as a 
primary concern for advocates, specifically how this bias obscures their livelihoods as forms of 
“subjugated knowledge.”12 I suggest that there arises a tension in ‘the farm’ existing as both a 
public and private place, ultimately manifesting as a social entity that straddles these two as a 
site of embodied community tradition and values. De-subjugating their knowledge as small-scale 
farming communities has proven a transformative process that continues today.   
       As a result of this process, food sovereignty actively changes the political conditions that 
exist in Maine in two ways. Primarily, advocates demand political transparency as it relates to 
agricultural regulations by pluralizing access to the decision-making process. Secondarily, this 
demand generates support across a wide range of political positions through an equally broad set 
of arguments. As laid out in the municipal ordinance, advocates demand economic, 
environmental, and social wealth—a combination which appeals to many who might 
traditionally oppose one another politically, from fiscal conservatives to environmentalists. The 
problems facing our society at this point in time do not have ‘left’ or ‘right’ solutions, but require 
collective action for effective decision-making.13 As an example of ongoing grassroots 
diplomacy, food sovereignty sets an admirable example for how, as a society, we might compose 
our world going forward rather than only critiquing decisions gone wrong. I hope that this 
project furthers such composition. 
 
                                                          
11 Gilles Deleuze and Fèlix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1987. 
12 Michel Foucault. “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76. Ed. Mauro Bertani 
and Alessandro Fontana. Trans. David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003. 
13 I draw off of Elinor Ostrom’s theories of collective action to elaborate how food sovereignty’s political logic and 
discursive tactics enable cooperation. See Elinor Ostrom. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
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CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
  2016 saw a series of acquisitions and mergers between multinational agrichemical 
corporations that restructured the over-100 billion US dollar market in seeds and pesticides—
DuPont merged with Dow; China National Chemical Corporation bought Syngenta; and in the 
biggest merger yet at 57 billion US dollars, Bayer purchased Monsanto.14 The consolidations 
come in the hopes of cutting costs and maintaining profit margins after three consecutive years 
of decreasing prices of commodity crops, but the mixing of pharmaceutical, chemical, and 
agricultural firms should give anyone who eats pause. The companies celebrated a future of 
“integrated agricultural offerings [and] enhanced solutions for growers”15 while others warned of 
massive concentration in the seed and pesticide markets.16 While these mergers may be 
exceptionally giant, such restructuring of the globalized industrial food system has unfolded for 
decades, affecting not only the agricultural sector but also governance structures at the national 
and international levels. The fact that this concentration of wealth and resources occurs in this 
moment of neo-populist politics should draw the attention of critical scholars of all disciplines to 
gauge the consequences of such a mixture.  
 This literature review contributes to such a gauge through a critical analysis of the 
discursive frames at work within an agrarian resistance discourse in rural Maine. Food 
                                                          
14 J. Bunge and C. Alessi. “Bayer lands seed giant Monsanto.” Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2016; J.F. Peltz. 
“Bayer, Monsanto in $57-billion merger; the deal would create a pesticide and seed giant.” Los Angeles Times, 
September 15, 2016.  
15 “Bayer and Monsanto to Create a Global Leader in Agriculture.” PR Newswire, September 14, 2016. 
16 D. Welle. “What the Bayer-Monsanto merger means for food, farmers and the environment.” Daily News Egypt, 
September 15, 2016.  
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sovereignty has emerged as a “transnational agrarian movement”17 since its inception in 1996 as 
a grassroots response to a globalized political economy that “crystallize[s] national policies”18 
into alignment with capital accumulation.19 As a political discourse, food sovereignty argues for 
decentralized forms of government that recognize “the land belongs to those who work it.”20 As 
a subject for critical scholarship, it offers much in the way for rhetorical analysis of how 
formations of power and knowledge unfold in particular places. Concerns for the materiality of 
food sovereignty come to the fore through the emergent paradoxes present in the perspectives of 
its three principle frames: agrarianism, food regimes, and sovereignty. The paradoxes discussed 
within each frame perform a generative function within the discourse as a whole; grounded in 
local political resistance to excessive agricultural regulation, food sovereignty serves as an 
example of the “materiality of discourse” found in how “turbulence resists the development of 
generalizations.”21 To speak of paradoxes as ‘generative,’ I refer to a fundamental tension, as 
Kenneth Burke sees it, between the ‘nonsymbolic motion’ of our experience in life and the 
‘symbolic action’ of language to describe experience.22 A discourse of resistance emerges from 
the ‘patterns of experience’23 that food sovereignty advocates have as small-scale producers and 
consumers within a regulatory landscape biased towards industrial food production. Regulatory 
bias serves as a ‘motive,’ or generative force, for food sovereignty’s discourse.  
                                                          
17 Saturnino Borras Jr., Marc Edelman, and Cristóbal Kay. “Transnational agrarian movements: Origins and Politics, 
Campaigns and Impact.” Journal of Agrarian Change, 8, 2-3, (2008): 169-204. 
18 Philip McMichael. The Global Restructuring of Agro-Food Systems. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994. 
19 Richard Le Heron. Globalized Agriculture: Political Choice. New York: Pergamon Press, 1993. 
20 La Via Campesina. The Right to Produce and Access to Land, 1996. 
http://www.acordinternational.org/silo/files/decfoodsov1996.pdf 
21 Richard A. Rogers. “Overcoming the Objectification of Nature in Constitutive Theories: Toward a Transhuman, 
Materialist Theory of Communication.” Western Journal of Communication, 62, 3 (1998): 244-272. 
22 Kenneth Burke, “(Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action,” in On Human Nature, Ed. William H. Rueckert and 
Angelo Bonadonna (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003): 140. 
23 Kenneth Burke. A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969): 44. I use ‘patterns of 
experience’ and ‘practices’ interchangeably throughout this study. 
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 The sociopolitical disruption both effected and made possible by the statewide discourse 
grows through the practices of small-scale farming communities to which many of the activists 
belong. A major element of this literature review follows the conditions that have led to the 
emergence of food sovereignty as a legitimate social and political force in Maine. Global in 
extent, these conditions trace the incremental integration of policy and macroeconomics since the 
end of World War II.24 Additional conditions include the ways in which small-scale farming 
communities identify with each other and the socio-ecologically embedded patterns of 
experience they hold in common, and how policy does not always share these motives with local 
communities. Thus, this paper highlights the paradoxes, or the points of resistance, immanent to 
the relations of force exerted by the state through the regulatory apparatus. In line with critical 
rhetorical theory, food sovereignty “finds its conditions of existence in those virtual breaks or 
structures of excess opened up by practices performed within the already established lines of 
making sense that constitute the…social apparatus.”25 Here Biesecker refers to a social apparatus 
composed through the everyday interactions that cannot be controlled or defined through an 
imposition of power. This relates to my work in how I focus on the ‘vernacular values’26 of food 
sovereignty in Maine, or the embedded values that compose the discourse and that, increasingly, 
serve as the source of a resistant micropolitics.  
                                                          
24 See McMichael, Global Restructuring; Le Heron, Globalized Agriculture; Philip McMichael. “Historicizing Food 
Sovereignty.” The Journal of Peasant Studies, 41, 6 (2014): 933-957; Madeleine Fairbairn. “Framing Resistance: 
International Food Regimes & the Roots of Food Sovereignty.” In Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature 
and Community, edited by H. Wittman, A.A. Desmarais, & N. Wiebe, 15-32. Oakland: Food First, 2010. 
25 Barbara Biesecker. “Michel Foucault and the Question of Rhetoric.” Philosophy & Rhetoric, 25, 4 (1992): 357. 
26 In using this phrase, I am referring to Ivan Illich’s essay called “Vernacular Values,” which argues for a renewal 
of that which is “homebred, homemade, derived from the commons, and that a person could protect and defend 
though he neither bought nor sold it on the market.” This vernacular reality, he argues, opposes the “commodities 
and their shadow,” or the “shadow work” that goes unacknowledged yet is required for the capital-intensive wage 
economy to function. See Ivan Illich. “Vernacular Values.” Philosophica, 26 (1980): 47-102. 
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 Tensions between practice and force, knowledge and power, tell this story of food 
sovereignty’s resistance against the inertia of the state. Contingent relationships, or relationships 
of proximity, constitute this resistance. I choose ‘contingent’ deliberately here to invoke its 
etymological sense of touch and its need for close proximity to connect. To be contingent 
demands a dependency on someone or something else; uncertainty inheres to contingency as 
well as our conditioned ability to respond in a cooperative way. Metaphorically, contingency 
embraces the dynamics emphasized by food sovereignty in Maine, where trust and community 
bonds form the value relations with which the discourse seeks to supplant the commodified 
relation to food that so many communities have. Face-to-face transaction constitutes the 
principal form of economic exchange promoted by food sovereignty, the most effective way to 
democratically participate and exercise voice in the local food system.27 Food sovereignty offers 
a way out of the agrarian crisis of globalized agriculture through an ethic of contingency.  
 Occurring at the outer limits of state power (in rural Maine), these relationships have also 
come to define the limits of the food sovereignty discourse through the institutionalization of 
contingent relations in the form of a Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance 
(LFCSGO).28 In assuming these formal relations, the neighbors, colleagues, and kin that 
comprise small-farming communities in the state have developed a coherent set of obligations 
both “subjectively felt and institutionally guaranteed.”29 As a call for the localization of food 
systems in order to address systemic power imbalances between states, their citizens, and 
agribusiness, this ordinance contests the state’s authority and ability to regulate farming practices 
                                                          
27 Alliance for Democracy. “Local Rules for Local Food: Communities Hold On To Food, Tradition, and 
Democracy.”Justice Rising 6, 3 (2015): 1-21. 
28 See Appendix D for a template of this ordinance. Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance 
(LFSCGO), 2014. http://localfoodrules.org/ordinance-template/ 
29 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, 
ed. John G. Richardson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 248-249. 
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at the municipal level. Since 2011, it has acted as a material discursive link connecting disparate 
small-scale farming communities in Maine, leading to its passage in eighteen municipalities in 
the state as of April 2017.30 Through a grassroots organizing that demands regulations account 
for the smallest of producers, food sovereignty not only challenges the rigid regulatory structure 
of the state that assumes a ‘one size fits all’ approach to food producers, but changes it in order 
to account for the dynamics of place-based food production. 
 Maine has the conditions to enable such dynamism. It is the only state in the US whose 
average farmer age trends downward.31 A younger generation of farmers see Maine as a site of 
opportunity, where low land prices and a strong base of local food advocates makes the prospect 
of farming less daunting. Food sovereignty seeks to build on this opportunity by also articulating 
Maine’s rural farming communities as sites of engagement.32 Engagement here not only refers to 
in-situ and contemporary fights against excessive regulation of small-scale farming, but also to 
the longer-term project of contesting the subjugation of agrarian knowledges and practices that 
are “differential, incapable of unanimity and which derive [their] power solely from the fact [that 
they are] different.”33  
 To realize such a project in Maine, food sovereignty engages with the three frames 
mentioned above that enable activists to navigate political boundaries through the cultivation of 
                                                          
30 This town-by-town approach is a deliberate strategy by food sovereignty in Maine to gain a ‘critical mass’ of 
constituents in order to pressure state legislators to recognize food sovereignty at the state level, either in the form of 
legislation that changes enforcement of agricultural regulations or in the adoption of food sovereignty language into 
the state constitution. For related efforts that have gone through the legislature, see LD 783, 2015; LD 1282, 2013; 
LD 475, 2013.  
31 See Abigail Curtis. “USDA farming census: Maine has more young farmers, more land in farms.” Bangor Daily 
News, February 23, 2014. See also USDA. Census of Agriculture: Maine, 2012. 
https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_State_Level/Maine/. 
32 Priscilla Claeys. Human Rights and the Food Sovereignty Movement: Reclaiming Control. New York: Routledge, 
2015.  
33 Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, ed. Mauro Bertani 
and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003): 8. 
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social connections. These connections construct a worldview that encompasses a sensibility for 
local food while also extending it to engage with the macropolitical frames that affect 
agricultural production.34 While this project employs rhetorical and political theory to analyze 
local situations, it also has bearing on environmental communication as a ‘crisis discipline,’ 
particularly as ‘crisis’ relates to the threat of industrialized food production to traditional ways of 
living.35 A piece of evidence invoked by food sovereignty in Maine to this end points to FDA 
testimony in an Iowa US District Court case from 2010 that denies citizens “have a fundamental 
right to obtain any food they wish.”36 The implication drawn from statements like this by small 
farmers in Maine does not parse words, stating that such a position held by the federal 
government “will threaten the very existence of our farms, our families, and our rural way of 
life.”37 Food sovereignty in Maine and elsewhere has made clear that it not only seeks redress 
from the social, economic, and political inequalities that have exacerbated the plight of the small-
scale farmer or peasant,38 but also addresses the ecological instability that results from an 
                                                          
34 Regina Birner and H. Wittmer, “Using Social Capital to Create Political Capital: How Do Local Communities 
Gain Political Influence? A Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evidence from Thailand,” in The Commons in the 
New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptations, ed. Nives Dolsak & Elinor Ostrom (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 2003): 291-334. 
35 For a discussion on environmental communication as a ‘crisis discipline,’ see Robert Cox. “Nature’s ‘Crisis 
Disciplines’: Does Environmental Communication Have an Ethical Duty?” Environmental Communication, 1, 1 
(2007): 5-20. See also Steve Schwarze. “Environmental Communication as a Discipline of Crisis.” Environmental 
Communication, 1, 1 (2007): 87-98.  
36 FDA. “Brief in Support of United States’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.” Farm-To-
Consumer Legal Defense Fund, et al. v. Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, United States Department of Health and 
Human Services, et al., 2010. In this brief, the FDA supported an Iowa District Court ruling to dismiss a case 
brought forth by the Farm-to-Consumer Legal Defense Fund challenging the FDA’s ban on interstate distribution of 
raw milk. In the brief, the authors claim, “there is no ‘deeply rooted’ historical tradition of unfettered access to foods 
of all kinds…To the contrary, society’s long history of food regulation stretches back to the dietary laws of biblical 
times.”  
37 LFCSGO, 2014. 
38 In using the labels of “small-scale farmer” and “peasant,” I am responding to specific preferences for 
distinguishing between producers from the US and UK (small-scale farmer), and producers in a similar social, 
political, and economic position in Asia (peasant). In Spanish, the term campesinos/as is used; in French, paysan, 
paysanne, or petits producteurs. See Claeys 2015. For this review, I will refer to food sovereignty activists as small-
scale farmers, and will refer to their allies, when appropriate, as consumers or legislators. 
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industrialized agriculture based upon external inputs to maintain its level of production.39 It seeks 
to improve the resiliency40 of food and social systems to respond to the crises of climate change 
and human rights abuses.41  
 Conceived as a project that contributes to the field of EC, this thesis, in addition to 
acknowledging the sense of crisis as a force for change in food sovereignty, attends to the 
potential of the discourse to facilitate an environmental democracy, or one in which the notion of 
a political community is permeable enough to incorporate nonhumans.42 This shift to a 
transhuman perspective is necessary in a world of increasing ecological instability. As several 
participants in my study acknowledge, food sovereignty takes just one step towards building 
more resilient socio-ecological webs. Such resilience must address the hegemonic ‘juridical,’ or 
administrative, framework of law that contributes to the sense that a bureaucratic regulatory 
structure privileges uniformity at the expense of equal access to resources, both political and 
otherwise. Food sovereignty provides ample space for a reconceptualization of the socio-political 
sphere through the generative capacity of paradoxical logic and practice.43 In describing the 
events in Maine, this paper also confronts the paradoxical political climate of today, where the 
                                                          
39 Hugh Campbell, “Breaking New Ground in Food Regime Theory: Corporate Environmentalism, Ecological 
Feedbacks and the ‘Food From Somewhere’ Regime?” Agriculture and Human Values, 26 (2009): 309-319. 
40 See LFSCGO 2014.   
41 Claeys, Reclaiming Control.  
42 M.N. Peterson, M.J. Peterson, and T.R. Peterson. “Environmental Communication: Why This Crisis Discipline 
Should Facilitate Environmental Democracy.” Environmental Communication, 1, 1 (2007): 74-86. 
43 For commentary on the “paradoxical logic” of practice and its informal concerns, see Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic 
of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990): 91-95. Bourdieu suggests that by 
embracing the logic of practice we make the necessary move from ‘ergon,’ or the performance of a function, to 
‘energeia,’ or the actualization of a potentiality. This move, for Bourdieu, happens “on the basis of acquired 
equivalences.” Thus, the paradoxical nature of practical logic also resonates with the “equivalential” logic that 
undergirds democratic politics as proposed by Chantal Mouffe. In what she terms the “democratic paradox,” Mouffe 
claims that there is an “irreducible tension between equality and liberty, between the ethics of human rights and the 
political logic which entails the establishment of frontiers with the violence that they imply.” This tension 
constitutes the political terrain of democracy and, I claim, is the same tension constituted through the discourse of 
food sovereignty. See Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (New York: Verso, 2009): 140. 
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democratic impulse for equality threatens the liberal impulse for the rule of law.44 Food 
sovereignty sustains itself on the democratic ideals of equality and the individual sovereign, but 
with the formalizing of the discourse in Maine through ordinances, a “constitutive tension” 
emerges between the need for local legitimacy and the need for institutional organization.45 
 To explore these tensions, I look at three principle frames of food sovereignty, 
articulating how these serve as the governing principles that organize perception and 
involvement of the discourse in Maine.46 The first frame, agrarianism, acts as the value system 
that gives meaning and shape to the small-farming communities where food sovereignty takes 
root. Through an ethic of interrelatedness, these values demonstrate an affinity with the concerns 
of a “transhuman, materialist rhetoric” regarding “what is nearest,” or the embeddedness of the 
human condition with the earth and its myriad forms of life.47 The second frame, the concept of 
‘food regimes,’ confronts the historically embedded conditions of food sovereignty. As a 
structural critique of macropolitics, it addresses the globalized structuring processes that align 
capital accumulation and policy, aptly demonstrated in the agrichemical company mergers in 
2016.48 The third frame looks closely at how the concept of sovereignty works in a paradoxical 
relationship to both the state and the municipalities. Agrarianism enables small farmers in Maine 
to rhetorically constitute behavioral norms that fragment the ‘discourses of discipline’49 
                                                          
44 Mouffe, Democratic Paradox, 2-5. 
45 Ibid, 5. 
46 Erving Goffman. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1974. 
47 Rogers, “Overcoming,” 263. 
48 There are numerous studies of the globalization of agriculture and of ‘food regimes’ in particular. See, for 
example, Philip McMichael. “A Food Regime Genealogy.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 41, 6 (2009): 139-169; 
Madeleine Fairbairn. “Framing Resistance”; Farshad Araghi. “Food regimes and the production of value: Some 
methodological issues.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 30, 2 (2003): 41-70. 
49 Foucault, Society.  
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promulgated by state regulatory agencies, but only in response to the ‘state of exception’50 that 
the state creates for non-compliant farms.  
 Norms accrue social capital51 to the discourse and enhance their political purchase as 
municipal ordinances, increasing their capacity to negotiate positionality within the state’s 
political hierarchy52 using the ordinance as a ‘boundary object.’53 The ‘home rule’ clause in 
Maine’s constitution provides the shared legal structure, while interpretive flexibility emerges 
through the agrarian frame to generate an ‘organic infrastructure’ that allows farmers and 
consumers to adapt to an otherwise inflexible regulatory environment. Star’s description of 
boundary objects as ‘n-dimensional’54 resonates with the efforts to conceive of collectives as 
blind yet composed through the continual negotiation of cultural habits.55  
 In closing, I agree with Mouffe that such negotiation needs to be seen as 
“contamination,”56 where the liberal discourse of human rights challenges and maintains the 
democratic impulse to advocate for equality at the expense of an ‘other.’ To understand how 
food sovereignty has used existing legal and cultural structures to grow its political presence in 
the state, keeping intact the generative tension between populism and the rule of law, is to 
recognize that social habit conditions any articulation of collective becoming. By emphasizing 
social habit, I again draw a parallel to Illich’s comparison of the ‘vernacular’ to the industrial.57 
                                                          
50 Giorgio Agamben. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. D. Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998; Giorgio Agamben. State of Exception. Trans. K. Attel. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2005. 
51 Bourdieu, “Forms of Capital.”  
52 Elinor Ostrom. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
53 Susan Leigh Star. “This Is Not a Boundary Object: Reflections on the Origin of a Concept.” Science, Technology, 
& Human Values, 35, 5 (2011): 601-617. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Bruno Latour. The Politics of Nature. Trans. by C. Porter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. 
56 Mouffe, Democratic Paradox, 10. 
57 Illich characterizes this as an opposition between homo habilis and homo economicus. See Illich, “Vernacular 
Values,” 50. 
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Social habit emerges from the differential capacities that people have to invent and exist in the 
environment, whereas the industrial standardizing of habit acts as a normalization of social 
needs. Food sovereignty’s discourse acknowledges that needs depend on context; to have needs 
imposed from outside one’s environment is to perform the dislocation that underlies the 
discursive construction of social division.58 This division depends on the formation of 
“contingent articulation[s],”59 or identifications along lines of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ that emerge from 
a sense of rootlessness. Food sovereignty attempts to discursively re-root the patterns of 
experience of small-scale farming in Maine. 
The Agrarian Frame: Interrelatedness 
 Agrarianism has a rich history in the US, rooted for many in the moralism of Thomas 
Jefferson’s writings that stress the capacity for citizens to govern themselves.60 Agrarian rhetoric 
has also served as a mythical basis for claims of the moral superiority of farming or rural 
living.61 The tradition has additionally claimed a more ‘natural,’ or ecologically-sound, 
connection to the earth through agricultural ‘stewardship.’62 In the context of a globalized 
industrial food system promoted through government policy, such claims develop into a strategy 
of “legitimation” within existing frames of governance.63  
                                                          
58 Ernesto Laclau. On Populist Reason. New York: Verso, 2005. 
59 Ibid, 231. On page 250, Laclau offers what I interpret as a concise articulation of my research question: How can 
we “reconceptualize the autonomy of social demands, the logic of their articulation, and the nature of collective 
entities resulting from them” in such a way as to become more resilient while maintaining civil liberties and civil 
rights? In my analysis chapter, I argue that the discourse of food sovereignty points in a compelling direction to the 
power of ‘vernacular law’ to do just this.  
60 Andrew M. Holowchak. “Jefferson’s Moral Agrarianism: Poetic Fiction or Normative Vision?” Agriculture and 
Human Values, 28 (2011): 497-506. 
61 Ross Singer. “Visualizing Agrarian Myth and Place-Based Resistance in South Central Los Angeles.” 
Environmental Communication, 5, 3 (2011): 344-349. 
62 Randal S. Beeman and James A. Pritchard. A Green and Permanent Land: Ecology and Agriculture in the 
Twentieth Century. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001.  
63 Jeff Motter. “Yeoman Citizens: The Country Life Association and the Reinvention of Democratic Legitimacy.” 
Argumentation and Advocacy, 51 (2014): 1-16. 
16 
 
 
 Singer’s analysis provides an example of attempts to rhetorically legitimize alternative 
agricultural practice. Through analyzing a documentary film about urban community gardening, 
Singer argues how the mythical quality of agrarianism depends on the discursive trope of “an 
enduring cultural belief in the morality of farming.”64 An urban immigrant community, in this 
case, uses the “malleable discursive frame” of American agrarianism to inspire “place-based 
resistance” and democratic participation in a shared “concern for the commons.”65 Similarly, 
Beeman and Pritchard trace the rhetorical roots of ‘sustainable’ agriculture to the “soil 
jeremiads” of conservationists during the Dust Bowl years of the 1930s.66 The concern for 
ecological health drove the rhetoric of ‘permanent agriculture’ and stressed, akin to the strong 
moralism of agrarian rhetoric, that this type of agriculture demanded “an ecological worldview 
that required reverence for life and respect for nature… [and] the perpetuation of rural culture.”67 
Advocates for permanent agriculture actively sought to connect ecological ideals with agrarian 
ones, including the idea of “the farmer as guardian of republican virtue.”68   
 Ecological ideals of environmental holism and agrarian ideals of engaged democratic 
citizenship run throughout the literature in complementary ways. Wendell Berry, the leading 
figure in contemporary agrarian thought, has detailed such ideals through philosophical essays, 
poetry, novels, and literary criticism. Emblematic of this agrarianism is what Berry calls a 
“fundamental premise…which is both democratic and ecological: [that] the land is a gift of 
immeasurable value.”69 From this premise he draws together an “agrarian standard,” or that the 
                                                          
64 Singer, “Visualizing Agrarian Myth,” 345. 
65 Ibid, 346. 
66 Beeman and Pritchard, Green and Permanent, 65. 
67 Ibid, 75. 
68 Ibid, 57. 
69 Wendell Berry, Citizenship Papers: Essays (Washington: Counterpoint, 2004): 152. By focusing on land as 
invaluable and gifted, Berry immediately places agrarianism within the realm of symbolic capital that Bourdieu 
discusses. See Bourdieu, “Forms of Capital,” and Bourdieu, Logic of Practice. 
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principle of “local adaptation” governs the agrarian conscience and community.70 Drawing from 
Berry, other authors articulate similar ideas, emphasizing an individual or community’s 
proximity to land as providing “an enormously useful set of metaphors for understanding what it 
takes to keep society going.”71 Such agrarian metaphors include the farm or field as having a 
moral significance,72 “secular grace,”73 and that ‘good farming’74 emerges from recognizing 
limits as necessary to counterbalance devastation from a globalized economic system.75  
 The agrarian emphasis placed on limits or restraint echoes the calls within the field of 
environmental communication as well as the common boundary negotiation involved with 
rhetorical theory. Peterson, et al.76 build off of Cox’s77 call for environmental communication to 
develop ethical commitments by arguing that the discipline can best maintain these commitments 
“by repeatedly increasing the permeability of its boundaries.”78 Following Aldo Leopold’s idea 
of a ‘land ethic,’ the authors suggest that by destabilizing anthropocentric boundaries to allow 
nonhuman actors into a broader ‘land community,’ environmental communication scholars 
strengthen “the paradoxical nature of participatory democracy.”79 This paradox consists in the 
continuous rhetorical power negotiation between hegemony and dissent,80 in the continual 
drawing of a political “frontier between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ those who belong to the ‘demos’ and 
                                                          
70 Berry, Citizenship, 152. 
71 Paul B. Thompson, The Agrarian Vision: Sustainability and Environmental Ethics (Lexington: The University 
Press of Kentucky, 2010): 3. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Eric T. Freyfogle. Agrarianism and the Good Society: Land, Culture, Conflict, and Hope. Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2007. 
74 William H. Major. Grounded Vision: New Agrarianism and the Academy. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama 
Press, 2011. 
75 Norman Wirzba, ed. The Art of the Common-Place: The Agrarian Essays of Wendell Berry. Berkeley: 
Counterpoint, 2002. 
76 Peterson, et al., “Environmental Democracy.” 
77 Cox, “Crisis Disciplines.”  
78 Peterson, et al., “Environmental Democracy,” 77. 
79 Ibid, 80. 
80 Ibid, 83. 
18 
 
 
those who are outside it.”81 By “generating and debating multiple legitimate answers to the 
question of how to achieve a just and healthy Earth,”82 those with power (humans) must 
negotiate with those who have little to none (nonhumans), we must incorporate the earth into the 
demos. To do so would embrace the moral imperatives and secular grace advocated for by 
agrarianism. For example, such negotiations might produce new material-discursive 
arrangements based on a sense of humility, or “dialectical irony,” a recognition of the 
“fundamental kinship”83 between those in opposition—in this case, humanity and the earth, or 
‘nature.’ Boundaries do not absolutely divide, but overlap and merge in ways that enable 
creativity. 
 Herndl and Brown similarly call for boundary negotiation, although they restrict their 
analysis to the human realm. Situated along disciplinary boundaries that span scientific, 
regulatory, and literary discourses, environmental rhetoric has “immense” variety, connecting 
“almost every part of our social and intellectual life.”84 These boundaries often converge in 
politics, with rhetoric offering “a way to help citizens participate in their government.”85 
Participatory governance, then, remains a central theme in the construction of environmental 
rhetorical theory as well as agrarianism, as Berry has articulated, a theme that enables 
environmental communication to effect social change through a destabilizing presence in 
contested negotiations. Environmental communication offers much for social activists focusing 
on food sovereignty, especially in understanding social change as “successful when groups can 
link new values to accepted political positions in a society.”86   
                                                          
81 Mouffe, Democratic Paradox, 4. 
82 Peterson et al., “Environmental Democracy,” 83. 
83 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969): 514. 
84 C.G. Herndl and S.C. Brown, Green Culture: Environmental Rhetoric in Contemporary America (Madison, WI: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1996): 4. 
85 Ibid. 
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 Such rhetorical theory advocates for what Singer calls “place-based empowerment 
praxis,” or the social construction of “environmental subjectivities.”87 Empowerment resonates 
with the rights-based arguments of food sovereignty that seek to overcome the “double crisis” of 
regulation and the marginalization of emancipatory politics.88 Agrarian rhetoric’s place-based 
empowerment appeals to a desire for regional “self-determination” through democratic 
participation and civic responsibility, intangible community attributes that cannot materialize 
through regulatory enforcement.89  
 Agrarianism as such resembles a set of attitudes, or “loose garment[s],” with the capacity 
to change according to need.90 As an orientation, agrarianism maintains flexibility for 
communities to identify the inequalities produced by globalization as problems of improper 
resource use and a lack of care.91 Rhetorically, such concerns resemble Foucault’s ruminations 
on chrēsis, or the concept of ‘proper use,’ which emphasizes the role of practices in the 
formation and collective following of morals.92 As a frame, food sovereignty advocates in Maine 
deploy agrarianism as a chrestic guide, or a set of value-based practices (both in terms of 
agricultural production and consumption), that actively critiques the excesses of modern life93— 
foremost of which are the regulations that de-legitimize small-scale farming practices.94  
                                                          
87 Singer, “Visualizing Agrarian Myth,” 346. 
88 Claeys, Reclaiming Control. 
89 Norman Wirzba, ed. The Essential Agrarian Reader. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2003.  
90 Maurice Telleen. “The Mind-Set of Agrarianism…New and Old.” In The Essential Agrarian Reader. Ed. Norman 
Wirzba. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2003: 53-61. 
91 Major, Grounded Vision, 24. 
92 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality, trans. R. Hurley (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1990): 62. Foucault describes morals as “general principles [that]…would guide action in its time, 
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93 Major, Grounded Vision, 123. 
94 As a struggle for political legitimacy, food sovereignty can thus be said to rely on agrarianism as means to 
articulate discursive relations of oppression. The naturalized relations of subordination between the state and 
municipalities has transformed into oppressive relations with the onset of globalization as a “discursive exterior 
from which the discourse of subordination can be interrupted.” See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy (New York: Verso, 1985): 154. With the political goals of the state aligning more closely with 
those of agribusiness interests, regulations make it clear that local interests do not have a stake in the decision-
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 Such a rhetoric acutely lacks for the growing category of ‘environmental problems,’ for 
which agrarianism and conservation biology share a concern.95 With an emphasis on proper land 
use and a Leopoldian land ethic, however, the small-scale farm has potential to serve as a 
symbolic counterpoint to the globalized industrial food system and to modern industrial society 
as a whole. Numerous authors take up this perspective (with its acknowledged parochial 
tendencies) and articulate an agrarian values system “embedded in the field.”96 Focusing on the 
rhetorical construction of place-based values and ‘environmental subjectivities’ attends to the 
sets of practices that constitute agrarian experiences of small-scale farmers.  
 These practices gain their social legitimacy through the daily interactions between 
farmers, the landscape, and consumers. In what follows I review the literature on ‘food regimes,’ 
which serve as a historical frame to the cultural practices that constitute agrarianism. Anti-
industrialism runs throughout agrarian literature, articulated consistently as a perversion of the 
economic order, or “the art of household management.”97 In contradiction to values of 
accountability, right use, care, and interrelatedness, values in the global and industrial food 
system align with whomever has accumulated the greatest reserves of capital. The subversive 
quality to the food sovereignty discourse emerges through the inequality in this moral terrain: the 
values are fundamentally different between agrarianism and ‘food regimes,’ but in this difference 
lies the potential for change.  
                                                          
making process. This play between empowerment and chrēsis, or the ‘proper’ development of social norms, 
generates the process of identification that occurs in food sovereignty and which I discuss in depth in my analysis 
chapter. In order to identify what a community’s ‘self-determination’ means—in distinction to the regulatory 
norms—it is necessary to use rhetorical invention to stress what makes the community different. Ironically, 
however, this rhetorical effort composes itself in “catachrestical” ways that resemble Burke’s “Paradox of 
Substance.” See Burke, Grammar, 21-32. For a discussion of ‘catachresis’ as the “common denominator of 
rhetoricity,” see Laclau, Populist Reason, 71-72.  
95 For evidence of this shared concern, see Freyfogle, Agrarianism and the Good Society; Berry, Citizenship; Cox, 
“Nature’s ‘Crisis Disciplines’”; and Schwarze, “Discipline of Crisis.”  
96 Freyfogle, Agrarianism and the Good Society, 8. 
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The Macropolitical Frame: Food Regimes 
 Food sovereignty has evolved in response to the globalization of agro-food systems.98 
Increasingly integrated systems of regulation and flows of industrial capital99 have developed 
into what scholars designate as ‘international food regimes’ (IFRs),100 or global relations of food 
production and consumption attached to the accumulation of capital. Global political emphasis 
focused on the exchange-value of agricultural products between nation-states subordinates the 
use-value of food that relies on the inherent regionalism of agricultural production.101 This 
change in value relations leads to agricultural specialization to meet the supply and demand of 
global trade. For example, as agricultural consolidation increased in Maine over the course of the 
20th century, distinct agricultural regions emerged to produce food for an international market, 
including the potato country in Aroostook county, blueberry barrens in Washington county, the 
‘milk belt’ in the southern half of the state and poultry (primarily eggs) in the mid-coast 
region.102 
 The international dynamics of trade affects political relations, both between and within 
national borders, with the supply and demand of markets acting as a governing force rather than 
only an economic one.103 Globalization shapes policy with far-reaching consequences in terms of 
socioeconomic inequality,104 ecological stress,105 and political representation.106 An important 
                                                          
98 See Philip McMichael. “Historicizing Food Sovereignty.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 41, 6 (2014): 933-957. 
99 For in-depth discussions of this integration, see Harriet Friedmann and Philip McMichael. “Agriculture and the 
State System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present.” Sociologia Ruralis, 29, 2 (1989): 
93-117; Le Heron, Globalized Agriculture; and McMichael, Global Restructuring.  
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facet of food regime theory for this paper consists in its historicizing of global food systems by 
identifying historical junctures that “produce crisis, transformation, and transition.”107 With 
increasing awareness of threats posed to humanity by loss of biodiversity and the ‘planet of 
slums’108 effect attributed to industrialized food systems, McMichael suggests that the globalized 
production of commodity food has reached a “fundamental crisis point.”109 
 To understand the discourse of food sovereignty in Maine as historically conditioned by 
food regimes, I turn to Foucault’s articulation of how the relationships between power, right, and 
truth develop and organize in particular ways.110  Food regime theory’s structural perspective 
attempts to expose the arbitrary order of how food and farming practices circulate across time 
and space, specifically how these orders shift through paradoxical moments in which processes 
of capital accumulation and sociopolitical legitimacy diverge.111 These moments encourage 
“counter-logics”112 that expose institutionalized dispossession of collective capacities such as 
decision making in food production and distribution.113 Food sovereignty in Maine presents one 
such counter-logic whose sociopolitical legitimacy develops as a call for alternative value 
relations between communities and food. The tension between accumulation and legitimacy 
manifests as a shift from institutionalized “regulationism” to value relations in the local food 
system, with affective connections (such as trust) between small-scale farmers and consumers 
replacing regulatory requirements as a basis for ‘healthy’ or ‘secure’ food systems.114   
                                                          
107 McMichael, “Food Regime Genealogy,” 139. 
108 M. Davis. Planet of Slums. London: Verso, 2006. 
109 McMichael, “Food Regime Genealogy,” 147. 
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 Attending to the contextual relationships of food systems enables a Foucaultian analysis 
of food regimes and their relationship to food sovereignty as a local phenomenon as one of 
domination that has multiple forms and occurs through “subjects in their reciprocal relations.”115 
Understanding the effects of power requires examining its extremities, the “outer limits…where 
it becomes capillary…in its most regional forms and institutions, and especially at the points 
where [it] transgresses the rules of right.”116 In Maine, the outer limits consist in the small farms, 
slaughter sheds, and milking parlors where the state seeks to normalize practices according to 
industry standards. These standards, however, do not account for the common “specialty farms” 
in Maine, where the micro-dairy farmer milking only one cow or the homesteader who 
slaughters less than one thousand chickens per year comes under sanction for non-compliance 
with the law.117  
 Food sovereignty’s counter-logic articulates how this use of state power constitutes an 
institutionalized transgression of ‘the rules of right.’ Excessive use of regulatory power on small-
scale producers constitutes a process of subjugation, whereby the state designates the 
‘knowledges,’ or systems of inherited practices on small-scale farms in Maine, as illegitimate or 
disqualified.118 Paradoxical relations of state power emerge at the small farm extremity of the 
regulatory system; the act of domination (regulation) occurs at the farm yet the practice of 
regulation remains centralized and systematized in the form of the state. Such distant 
centralization of power generates the scientific, erudite discourse that Foucault labels as 
                                                          
115 Foucault, “Society,” 27. 
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‘disciplinary’ and which establishes “a basic link between relations of force and relations of 
truth.”119 
 Food sovereignty’s rhetoric articulates how the state’s discourse of discipline claims both 
power and truth, but that this does not make the state right. Thus, advocates emphasize the 
dispossession of small-scale farmer rights under a regulatory system influenced by a global food 
regime. Focusing on the process of dispossession necessarily focuses on the politics of social 
processes at play in food sovereignty, specifically that of the small farm and home as a space of 
transition for local and global food systems. This transition could be thought of as moving from 
sites of engagement between the state and farmers to ones of governance and decision-making.120 
 Food sovereignty in Maine performs a double-move with relation to this process, as not 
only does the transitioning metaphorically move from disempowerment to empowerment, but 
literally back again in the form of municipal ordinances. This double-move constitutes a 
resistance to the current de jure to de facto process—where force exerts through law to inform 
on-farm practices—and an embrace of a new and different de facto to de jure process—where 
the agrarian practices of small-scale farmers inform the drafting of law.121 In performing this 
move, food sovereignty advocates invoke the element of ‘right,’ or of their sovereign capacities, 
effecting a material and symbolic rhetoric that resists the dominant discourse of scientific and 
legal practices that impart legitimacy to industrial agriculture.122  
 Moving into a discourse of rights that resists a disciplinary discourse of industrialized 
food is relatively new ground for any level of juridical schema.123 As a legal norm, many nations 
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have adopted the right to food, but little structural change has occurred that would realize the 
right as envisioned by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food: 
The right to food is the right of every individual, alone or in community with 
others, to have physical and economic access at all times to sufficient, adequate 
and culturally acceptable food that is produced and consumed sustainably, 
preserving access to food for future generations…Thus the normative content of 
the right to food can be summarized by reference to the requirements of 
availability, accessibility, adequacy and sustainability, all of which must be built 
into legal entitlements and secured through accountability mechanisms.124   
Food sovereignty is one of the ‘transnational agrarian movements’ invoking rights to fill the 
legal gaps left behind by states’ inaction to enact a right to food on a broad and comprehensive 
scale.125 The above statement from the UN resonates strongly with that of La Via Campesina 
(LVC), an organization comprised of farm workers, peasants, and farm and indigenous peoples’ 
organizations, whose statement that food is a basic human right includes that “everyone must 
have access to safe, nutritious and culturally appropriate food in sufficient quantity and quality to 
sustain a healthy life with full human dignity.”126 Coupled with the right to food, LVC also 
advocates for agrarian reform, protecting natural resources, reorganizing food trade, ending 
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globalized hunger, social peace, and democratic control of agricultural policies.127 Efforts to 
institutionalize the right to food and policy based on food sovereignty principles demonstrate the 
perceived need for systemic change to food policy. Food sovereignty in Maine weaves into the 
municipal ordinances principles from these various discourses and deploys the ordinance as an 
attempt to subvert the disciplinary discourse of industrial agriculture as perpetuated in the state. 
The groundwork lain by these discourses serves as practical examples of the attempts to expose 
the dispossession effected through policies influenced by ‘food regimes,’ policies that associate 
capital accumulation with political legitimacy at the cost of small-scale farmers and their 
agricultural practices.  
 In the next section, I discuss how behavioral norms like those in agrarianism,128 
constituted through discourse, afford food sovereignty advocates in Maine social capital, which 
activists in turn use to gain political capital129 in the passage of municipal ordinances defending 
the right to produce and consume foods of their choice.130 The theoretical construction of 
sovereignty and its fragmentation within dominant discourses brings attention to the importance 
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of positionality for local resistance to the political-economic hegemony of a globalized food 
system. 
The Sovereign Frame: Political Abandonment 
  Food sovereignty views farming as a social practice, with its economic impact as a 
secondary concern to the development of a just and democratic mode of governance.131 But as a 
foundational analytical framework, the concept of ‘food regimes’ offers a structural critique of 
the industrial food system as a coordinated devaluation of small-scale farming and agrarian ways 
of life. Globalization has profoundly impacted the internal political relations in the US, and food 
sovereignty seeks to change these relations at the grassroots level.132  
 To use this critique in a study of the discourse in Maine, however, focuses attention on 
how the globalized industrial food system impacts local food through a ‘discourse of 
discipline.’133 Regulatory structure at the federal and state levels in the US exercise the 
discursive power of ‘food regimes’ through licensing fees and processing standards that pressure 
small-scale farmers to ‘get big or get out.’134 Governments establish the “context of norms” 
through regulation,135 but the disciplinary discourse they enforce “define[s] a code of 
normalization” that subscribes to an industrialized set of expectations.136 
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 Normalizing industrial expectations can have destabilizing effects on intra-community 
cooperation, as Elinor Ostrom has shown.137 Social norms serve as affective regulatory webs that 
community members themselves spin and produce their moderating effects through “shared 
understandings about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden.”138 Constituents set the 
parameters of ‘cost-benefit’ analyses according to mutually shared values like reciprocity, 
fairness, and trust. In other words, endemic or grassroots norms compose a regulatory 
environment, rather than an external authority impose behavioral controls.139 
  In Maine, such imposition of norms means that small-scale farmers cannot meet 
regulatory requirements without incurring significant debt or getting locked into modes of 
production that contradict efforts to keep the food produced in a community within said 
community. In response, local farmers and consumers emphasize the self-regulating quality of a 
food system built upon trust rather than systematic inspection that has failed to prevent the 
outbreak of food-borne illnesses at the national and international levels.140 It is bad business, so 
the logic goes, to sicken your neighbors. If you do, they will let you know when it happens and 
the responsible farmer will then enact the necessary changes to their sanitation practices or just 
as likely go out of business from the erosion of trust in the safety of their food products.  
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(2000): 137-158. 
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foodborne illness affects an estimated 600 million people per year; the World Health Organization attributes the 
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 That food safety depends on the affective links of community relations as opposed to 
legislated regulatory measures offers a possible “perspective of incongruity,” or a novel way to 
characterize seemingly disparate events in an attempt to change social behavior141 ‘Food safety 
through community trust’ contradicts the disciplinary discourse of regulatory norms and has led 
to the grassroots development of the LFCSGO as a means to articulate a resistant conception of 
Maine’s local food systems. Food systems developed along lines of trust seek to not only redirect 
the flows of capital and financial burden, but also to shorten the distance between consumer and 
producer.  
 Closer proximity, in theory, establishes a stronger sense of accountability on the part of 
the farmer and leads to more durable community links in both space and time. These 
relationships form the basis of social capital, increasing the availability of and access to potential 
material resources (i.e. local raw milk) through the practice of exchange, in the form of money 
for food or otherwise.142 These exchanges, as elements of the daily routines of local Maine food 
systems, have an explicit goal to change relationships that unfold contingently—or due to close 
proximity—to obligatory relationships that last because of their emotional ties between 
community members.143 With these affective links rooted in place, institutionalization of the 
subversive practices can take effect in the form of the LFCSGO. Articulated in opposition to 
international food regimes, these sets of practices constitute an agrarianism through attending to 
the “rhetorical force of place.”144  
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 Food sovereignty’s place-based rhetoric has material consequences that emerge through a 
“fluid tension”145 with the symbolic capital invested in the simple yet foundational acts of face-
to-face exchanges that occur in the community. In emphasizing the location of these transactions, 
food sovereignty adopts the potent symbolism of ‘home’ and the intimacy that it represents. As a 
protest, this rhetorical maneuver attempts to effect a disruption within the regulatory system by 
positioning the home and its activities under threat from the state. Regulators inspect farms, but 
if the farm is also the home and a community center, then the regulatory impact becomes 
personally invasive. The home, then, emerges as a place of protest and confrontation, as a ‘site of 
engagement,’ and the chosen location in which to open “an ephemeral fissure in place.”146 The 
opening of such a fissure does not act only as a form of protest, but also as a form of cultural 
inheritance—acts of resistance serve as moments of cultural evolution, the fragmenting of what 
appears whole, only to once again enfold the dissent in a heterogeneous process of 
acculturation.147  
 Selecting homes as the site of confrontation does not reflect the preferences of food 
sovereignty advocates, but it provides insight as to how the relationship between state regulatory 
agencies and small-scale farmers establishes a particular social order of power and rights. When 
the small farm and homestead ‘threaten’ this order, a formal displacement occurs, namely that 
the non-complying farm becomes a “non-place” in the eyes of the state.148 The subversive 
potential of affective food systems emerges from this displacement in the form of a paradox of 
power lying at the center of these discourses.  
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 As discussed earlier, sovereignty moves between subjects as a discourse of rights and 
fragments the notion of a unified power into “a multiplicity…[of] capacities, possibilities, [and] 
potentials.”149 This “democratization of sovereignty,” however, occurs coincidentally with 
systems of law that concentrate force and exercise power between “a right of sovereignty and a 
mechanism of discipline.”150 Multiple sovereignties exist among the body politic, but the notion 
of an individual sovereign condenses into the state. This idea resembles the notion of a “unity in 
diversity”151 that food regime theorists use to describe the global restructuring process of capital 
and governance.152 
 Confrontation between the concentrated sovereignty of the state and the democratized 
version dispersed throughout society also generates the dispossession discussed earlier that sites 
the farm and home as undergoing a process of transition. Such dispossession or displacement 
materializes as a juridical “state of exception,”153 constituting the border between the political 
and the legal and as a form of legal “abandonment.”154 This paradox manifests for the small farm 
in Maine at farm stands and farmer’s markets, sites that the state exempts from regulation while 
still “retaining a ban against unlicensed dairy product sales.”155 The outright ban demonstrates 
the legal exception whereby the law applies by designating that to which it does not apply, which 
it refuses to regulate.156 Thus the paradoxical generation of a displaced home and a banned 
product “defines [the] law’s threshold or limit concept”157 in the state of Maine. As noted earlier 
in the macropolitical frame of food regimes, this analysis of the sovereign frame brings food 
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sovereignty to the limits of power, to the extremities of the state where power effects are felt and, 
in the case of sovereignty, abandoned. 
Municipal Ordinance as Boundary Object: Cooperation without Consensus 
 It is in this state of exception and abandonment that the potential exists for the municipal 
ordinance to function as a boundary object; in its position as a boundary object the ordinance has 
its greatest liberal-democratic effect. Such potential actualizes in the form of recent legal 
decisions that legitimize the food sovereignty discourse in Maine. Taking advantage of a 
provision in the state constitution that enables municipalities to adopt, amend, or repeal 
ordinances, food sovereignty in Maine invokes “home rule” to presume authority over “the right 
to produce, process, sell, purchase, and consume local foods.”158  
 In a “test case” for the ordinance, the Maine Supreme Court validated the central premise 
that exempts producers or processors of local foods from license or inspection so long as “the 
transaction is only between the producer or processor and a patron.”159 This stipulation avoids a 
situation where the state “pre-empts” the local authority imparted through the passage of an 
ordinance.160 Pre-emption enacts the state of exception described by Agamben, where the 
legislature “can weaken local lawmaking ability in favor of groups—such as the business 
lobby—that may have superior access to and influence over state legislators” through a judicial 
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“occupation of the field.”161 Thus, in passing the ordinance and having subsequent judicial 
precedent upholding local authority, food sovereignty in Maine legally ‘occupies the fields’ that 
the farmers literally grow on and call home. The ordinances serve as a means for a community to 
“reclaim control of its local food exchanges” and “to protect a right to foods of [their] own 
choosing and [their] traditional foodways.”162  
 Invoking rights to protect agrarian values attempts to fill the void of power left behind 
through the process of de-legitimation for small-farmers at the hands of the state. In the case of 
Maine, legal means exist to exempt small-scale farmers from the industrial impulse of the state 
regulatory structure informed by global food regime values and interests. As purveyor of those 
means, the ordinance satisfies a vital information need for small farmers by identifying the 
constitutionally-sanctioned authority given to municipalities and how to deploy this power to 
negotiate a farming community’s political status. While focusing on the ordinance as a boundary 
object enables a certain tangibility to this conceptualization, I stress that the ordinance also 
performs its boundary work as a condensation of “a set of work arrangements that are at once 
material and processual.”163 As such, the concept of boundary objects and boundary work is 
consistent with Foucaultian notions of discourse. In particular, this concept can help guide the 
analysis of subject formation—such as what it means to be a small-scale farmer in Maine—
shaped in relation to things like the food sovereignty ordinance as an object that circulates within 
this context.  
 These arrangements consist of the agrarian practices, attitudes, and motives discussed 
throughout this thesis, but give materiality to the ordinance as a boundary object in the daily 
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activity and rhythms of the small-farming communities that have passed it. Significantly, these 
practices occur on farms, in farm stands, and markets that double as boundaries that, as seen 
through the legal history in Maine, exist as “shared space[s], where exactly that sense of here and 
there are confounded.”164 In this sense, the ordinances as constituting protective zones along 
socio-political boundaries are “n-dimensional,” or temporal, active, and open to interpretation at 
the local level in order to fill the power void left through the regulatory state of exception.165 
 Elaborating on the material-discursive constitution of the ordinance-as-boundary object, 
these documents have the capacity to function as concurrent archives to the agrarian values they 
seek to protect. Informed by “stories from the field,”166 the interpretive flexibility of the 
ordinances from town to town enables local processes of social and political legitimation to 
unfold within the larger state political landscape concerning “how people imagine they know 
what they know and what institutions validate that knowledge.”167 A central component to the 
legitimacy of small-scale farming in Maine in the face of industrial regulatory measures,168 the 
ordinance helps further contest the “subjugated knowledges” delegitimized through the dominant 
discourse of regulatory norms.169  
 As a document that begins a process of institutionalizing the agrarian values present in 
the food sovereignty discourse in Maine, the ordinance navigates the boundary between 
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“codified and tacit knowledges,” or the terrain in which a “politics of knowledge” plays out.170 
The “organic infrastructure”171 of boundary objects allow for the type of local permutation and 
adaptation that agrarianism seeks to maintain.172 This adaptability receives further purchase 
through the shared space of policy and agrarian knowledge in which it resides. Potential for local 
food systems to take root and grow relies on shared knowledge spaces173 rather than laws of 
abandonment because of the implicit accommodation for “embedded social relations…which 
facilitate the development of trust between actors.”174  
 Affective relations like trust play a pivotal role in food sovereignty’s discursive potential, 
especially as it relates to the decision-making process at local levels, facilitated by the municipal 
ordinance. For example, in discussing what makes public decision-making processes effective, 
Senecah concludes that “it all leads to trust.”175 This emphasis resonates strongly with what food 
sovereignty identifies as missing in industrialized food systems. Focusing on the face-to-face 
exchange between farmer and customer, the trust needed for such a transaction to succeed serves 
as a built-in regulatory process. External regulation disrupts the potential for such 
neighborliness—as the cost of regulation encourages a larger scale of food production, the level 
of intimacy diminishes between not only the farmer and customer, but between the farmer and 
their fields as well. The focus on trust as a key element to any public points to the importance of 
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developing “patterns of practice” through which any given public can resolve issues in 
dispute.176   
 Ostrom emphasizes how such patterns of practice lead to stable community institutions 
that do not depend on outside regulation for their stability.177 To connect with food sovereignty 
in Maine, I focus on how these practices depend on systems of social obligation to effectively 
self-regulate. Ostrom stresses how “the appropriators themselves make all major decisions” 
about the use of a commonly held resource.178 Self-governance occurs through regulation 
structured by users or owners themselves. Ownership and governance are closely linked in these 
systems of long-term resource management. In these contexts, community members tailor their 
decision-making “to the specific environment,” taking into account the dynamic conditions in 
which they find themselves.179  
 Such conditions extend beyond the physical limitations of the immediate landscape; 
collective rules are maintained through systems of social obligation, or “locally designed rule 
systems.”180 Infractions are met with fines in the form of donations to social institutions or of 
goods to the community for their collective use. Whatever the discipline, the lesson remains that 
regulation emerges from within the community itself through structures of social obligation. 
Such structures allow for change over time to meet the demands of current conditions—
institutional rules are not fixed.181 Attempts to impose uniformity and obeisance from outside the 
community can undermine the established norms of behavior that depend on intangible qualities 
cultivated over long periods, such as trust.  
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 As an intangible quality, trust builds social capital182 within the community as a form of 
“radical investment”183 in affective relations. Subjects form through affect, or the embodiment of 
a pattern of experience. By sharing in these practices, identification occurs along the 
“equivalential logic”184 of affect—as trust grows between growers and their neighbors, they 
come to collectively identify as small-farming communities. As is shown in the analysis chapter, 
both producers and consumers play a role in organizing and practicing food sovereignty. Burke’s 
comments on ‘alienation’185 bring the affective modes of identification and social capital into 
stark relief, as I believe that, at its base, food sovereignty is an alienated discourse.  
 Alienation, for Burke, designates conditions in which one loses a sense of ownership or 
control over their world because “it seems basically unreasonable.”186 Authority, and those who 
possess it, have ‘lost touch’ with those they authorize. Power becomes less contingent and more 
distant; uniformity becomes an end that justifies invasive force. In Maine, this takes the form of 
regulatory pressure to comply with expensive facilities requirements that simply do not make 
sense for many small-scale growers. In response, the discourse of food sovereignty addresses the 
immediate, sensual, and affective relations that compose everyday living.187  
 Advocates of food sovereignty in Maine demand that the regulatory system change to, for 
example, accommodate the “rights of appropriators to devise [their] own institutions.”188 Small-
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scale growers who cannot meet the expense of licensing fees intended for much larger farming 
operations do not have recourse to a more appropriately scaled system of monitoring, or one that 
keeps pace with the smallest-scale of farming.189 Such a system accounts for local networks of 
customers that value trust as much as the approval of USDA safety protocols. Such a system 
develops what Ostrom terms “contingent strategies”190 that do not require absolute compliance 
from all producers – for that eliminates those who cannot meet the standards of production. Such 
a system remains “incomplete” in the sense that it cannot account for the diversity of 
producers.191 Food sovereignty in Maine directly addresses such a system and advocates for one 
that resembles a “nested enterprise” regulatory structure, where different rules address the 
conditions present at different levels of food production.192 Small-scale farmers in Maine already 
self-regulate through a system of social obligation as it relates to raw milk, meat processed on-
farm, and informal bartering of goods and services. They want the state of Maine to recognize 
such a system of self-governance and to legitimize their efforts in doing so. As noted earlier, the 
Maine Supreme Court has basically recognized the validity of the ordinance. 
 Trust is central to the social obligations that food sovereignty argues form the basis of 
any healthy local food system. It is trust that builds in the self-regulation that ensures the safety 
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of local food products and accounts for “the moment of decision that characterizes the field of 
politics.”193 Through advocating for the embedded form of politics that the local food ordinance 
symbolizes, food sovereignty contributes to a “democracy of the emotions.”194 In this, different 
value systems at play in the world—for example, those of industrialized food regimes and 
agrarianism—are not synthesized into a homogeneous political mixture, but rather in their 
tension with one another create the “space in which…confrontation is kept open, power relations 
are always being put into question and no victory can be final.”195  
 The concept of boundary object provides a heuristic for the municipal ordinance in its 
applicability to “cooperative work in the absence of consensus.”196 It is helpful to consider how 
consensus allies itself with the homogeneity of the regulatory impulse, with the exercise of 
power and its extension through time and space. One of the most potent possibilities of food 
sovereignty in Maine lies in the concept’s navigability between political perspectives and 
physical communities. The hegemonic nature of consensus implies violence, or a struggle 
without any resistance, “an agonism without antagonism.”197   
 Through its emphasis on and cultivation of affective dimensions in local politics, the 
local food ordinance in Maine offers promise as a tool for navigating both the contentious 
political landscape of today as well as the paths opening up in the future. These paths will surely 
have antagonisms regarding the inflexibilities of globalized food regimes and their enforcement 
via federal and state governments. But such antagonisms actually constitute the ‘democratic 
paradox’ and its “irreducible tension between equality and liberty,” between democratic identity 
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and the rule of law.198 In Maine, displacement through regulatory enforcement gives way to 
replacement through municipal ordinance, but the agrarian and industrialist values at play will 
continue to contest the farm as a ‘non-place,’ a site of engagement, and as a site where decisions 
take place. 
Conclusion: Collaborations 
 In following the tensions within food sovereignty, the relationship between power and 
knowledge in small-farming communities in Maine is at its most ambiguous on homesteads and 
farms. Here, enforcement and subversion of regulations occurs through a struggle between 
different sets of practices, each of which functions as a set of “meticulous procedures that impose 
rights and obligations.”199 Both of these sets have discourses with material consequences. The 
dominant discourse of regulation has the effect of homogenizing farming practices to meet 
standards set by an agricultural industry that has seen massive consolidations in 2016. The 
subversive discourse of food sovereignty emerges through small-scale farming practices that 
emerge from the “traditional foodways” of rural Maine yet face de-legitimation because of 
regulatory norms.200 Despite this, the discourse seeks legitimacy through municipal ordinances 
that institutionalize agrarian values on a town-by-town basis. The viral nature of this discourse 
throughout the state resonates with Mouffe’s suggestion that liberal discourses of rights and the 
exclusive implications of a democratic ‘us’ need to continuously and mutually ‘contaminate’ one 
another.201 Neither the law nor the demos should ever become ‘pure.’  
 This chapter has discussed how the frames of agrarianism, food regimes, and sovereignty 
all contribute to this struggle between power and knowledge at macro and micro scales. Each 
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frame contains paradoxes that demand decision-making. Solutions are not an option, but rather 
choices as to how to respond and how to articulate the collective, whether that collective is a 
town, a network of towns, a state, or larger. The articulation occurs regardless of one’s 
conviction; what is needed is to understand where it comes from, what habits (not essences) 
condition its emergence, and what is excluded from any articulation.202 In this sense, the 
conglomerate mergers described at the outset of this chapter do not speak for all of us. Rather, 
the forms assumed through the globalization of capital accumulation and regulatory governance 
necessarily exclude the small-scale, inherently regional agrarian practices that condition the daily 
lives of countless communities across the world. Food sovereignty attends to these communities. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 The focus of this study is to analyze the discourse of ‘food sovereignty’ in Maine. 
Specifically, I am interested in the ways that advocates of food sovereignty in Maine have 
constructed a discourse by rhetorically disrupting the dominant agricultural discourse of 
industrial food production. In this chapter, I share my methodology for this research, which 
draws from rhetorical ethnographic approaches and uses interpretive and critical methods to 
analyze interview transcripts, legislative hearing testimonies, and legal documents, informed by 
the work of Aaron Hess,203 Michael Middleton, Danielle Endres, Samantha Senda-Cook,204 and 
D. Soyini Madison.205 It also draws from the qualitative research methods of Thomas Lindlof 
and Bryan Taylor206 and the ethnographic methodology of Clifford Geertz.207 Michel Foucault’s 
theories on the genealogy of discourse208 have proven instrumental in shaping how I approach 
this work. Together, these theories about critical-rhetorical ethnography guide the specific 
conduct of my research. In this chapter, I elaborate on these theoretical and then describe the 
specific methods used to gather information and produce insights about the discourse of food 
sovereignty. First, I define the framework that guides my research. Second, I reflect on my 
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position as a practitioner of both qualitative communication research and farming. My personal 
identity as a farmer provides the motive for this study and has fundamentally shaped the ways I 
engage with the research. Third, I discuss how rhetoric guides the types of questions that I ask as 
a researcher. Fourth, I describe the ethnographic attention paid to context and thick description as 
integral to my methodology. Fifth, I discuss the critic’s role in discourse analysis.  
Critical-Rhetorical Ethnographic Praxis 
 Broadly, I conduct rhetorical field research that combines theory with practice to examine 
the discourse of food sovereignty in Maine. In line with core commitments within rhetorical field 
methods, I examine the local rhetoric of food sovereignty as an act of resistance against 
macroscale socio-economic and ecological realities. Advocating for food sovereignty as a form 
of resistance aligns with a methodology that combines theory with practice. This combination 
expects critical engagement with how theorists conceive of power relations.209  As praxis, these 
rhetorical field methods occur in situ, where I position myself as a participant in the events that 
generate food sovereignty rhetoric.210  
Rhetorical Field Methods 
 The fluid and embodied qualities of rhetoric attune me to emergent aspects of how food 
sovereignty advocates create meaning. An ethnographic approach directs my attention towards 
the contextual influences shaping the advocacy and guides my analysis through the method of 
thick description. Critical theory enables thick description in its provision of “a vocabulary in 
which what symbolic action has to say about itself…can be expressed.”211 As a critical scholar, I 
acknowledge my positionality and advocacy as vital components to the study. Without this 
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awareness and intent, I could not answer the question of “what do I do know?”212 My open 
support for food sovereignty with my participants provides an ethical motive to this study. It has 
repeatedly led me to ask the questions: how can I both honestly represent food sovereignty and 
honor the community and what they do? How can I embrace yet describe their differences?  
 Honoring these differences means I attend to ways in which state power limits and 
prevents their ability to live agrarian lifestyles characteristic of rural Maine. For guidance, I have 
repeatedly referred to the work of Phaedra Pezzullo that studies communities adversely affected 
by industry in Louisiana.213 Pezzullo, when discussing the toxic tour of Louisiana she 
participated in, includes scholarship on community, notably that of James Baldwin. After 
quoting his insight that community sustains historically marginalized groups, Pezzullo ascribes 
this way of surviving “to a sense of interconnectedness among those who feel endangered or 
threatened by dominant culture.”214 In this passage she posits that the strength of ‘intoxicated’ 
communities lies in the recognition and cultivation of their difference from the hegemonic 
culture that has turned their home into a carcinogenic environment. This recognition of strength 
in difference reflects Pezzullo’s understanding of the cultural context in which these 
communities live. She sorts out the “structures of signification” that Geertz claims as integral to 
the analytical ethnographer.215 Structures of signification stand in as structures of differentiation 
between the vulnerable community and those who live outside of it. In highlighting this 
difference, Pezzulo attempts to understand their culture “without reducing their particularity.”216  
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 Lindlof and Taylor’s chapters on producing data and its subsequent analysis and 
interpretation further underscores the centrality of difference to the ethnographic process. They 
also, as Geertz does, emphasize the need to recognize the “particular cultural setting” of any 
ethnographic research.217 Awareness of difference not only helps identify the significant patterns 
of behavior within a studied group, but also clarifies one’s role as a participant observer. As a 
method of interpretation, ‘crystallization’ embraces difference and fluidity in its attention to 
context.218 People’s behavior and a community’s being continuously shifts depending on the 
people, places, and things that comprise any given moment.  
 As the primary form of data collection, I conduct interviews. For my study, I interview 
key participants, including local farmers who lead the advocates of food sovereignty; state 
legislators who have proposed bills to incorporate rights-based language on food sovereignty into 
the Maine constitution; as well as citizens who advocate for the goals of food sovereignty. In 
total, I conducted thirteen interviews of twelve different advocates of food sovereignty. I 
received IRB approval to conduct the interviews, and followed a semi-structured format when 
performing the interviews.219 In doing so, I followed Seidman’s advice in using open-ended 
questions, from which I aim to “build upon and explore [the] participants’ responses to those 
questions.”220 Post-interview, I transcribed the audio and analyzed the content for thematic 
overlap. Once I identified the major themes in each interview, I made connections across 
interviews between related themes.  
 I also thematically analyzed the testimony for seven different bills that had public 
hearings in front of the Agriculture, Conservation, and Forestry committee on issues relating to 
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food sovereignty. Similarly to the interview analysis, I identified related themes and arguments 
across testimonies. Together, the analyses of the interviews and testimony yield seven distinct 
themes that I consider a representative condensation of the ideas and arguments at play in food 
sovereignty’s discourse. Within each theme, I have selected representative quotes from the 
interviews that I feel act as a further condensation of the aspect in question.  
 Additionally, I read extensively through academic, journalistic, and legal writings 
relating to food sovereignty and incorporate their perspectives and findings into my analysis 
when appropriate. In the literature review, I contrast many of these perspectives as constitutive of 
three distinct frames, or conceptual objects that circulate within and give shape to the discourse 
of food sovereignty: agrarianism, macropolitics or ‘food regimes,’ and sovereignty. Frame 
analysis of relevant literature follows Erving Goffman’s conception of frames as objects that 
organize perception and modes of involvement within discursive communities.221 I use this 
method to clarify what I see as disparate, yet interwoven, concerns present in food sovereignty as 
a “transnational agrarian resistance” so that, through my analysis, I show how they manifest in 
Maine. Within the analysis chapter, I refer to these writings when appropriate, often for 
clarification or to expand on an interviewee statement in the footnotes. 
 I cannot omit how my identity as a small-scale farmer affects my analysis. My 
experiences managing farms of various scales, production methods, and specialties 
fundamentally shape how I approach this project as an advocate. While commercially growing 
produce in 2012 for a small community in New Hampshire, I was one of many farmers who had 
to understand the proposals for new regulations in the Food Safety and Modernization Act 
(FSMA) and how they might affect my livelihood. Throughout the season, we stocked a small 
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farmstand with freshly picked fruits and vegetables. We also retailed food products from 
neighboring farms, such as honey, maple syrup, and frozen, USDA-inspected meat. These food 
products, under FSMA, would have transformed the farm’s designation from ‘farm’ to an official 
‘food distributor,’ and placed it within a different regulatory category that would have 
necessitated upgrading the facility. Such a change would have altered the character of the farm. 
This experience is emblematic of the motives drawing me to study the discourse of food 
sovereignty. The regulatory categories are not the primary concern, but rather the cultural 
transformations that occur as a result of industrial pressure. To comply, for many, is to 
compromise their way of life. The ‘grassroots diplomacy’ of food sovereignty in Maine enables 
cultural and agricultural difference to continue, to the benefit of all.  
Rhetoric 
 This study focuses on how the ‘constitutive’ rhetoric of advocates of food sovereignty in 
Maine guides the formation of their discourse. Focusing on rhetoric means that I am concerned 
with “how symbolic practices articulate disparate identities, ideas, values, beliefs, images, 
meanings, bodies, and communities”222 that, in turn, shape the very communities from which 
these practices emerge. This reflexivity of rhetoric makes for a “messy multimodality”223 that is 
difficult to define in a total sense, but does compel the researcher to work within a community to 
understand and follow the nuances of rhetorical composition. Attending to one’s own 
positionality and rhetorical influence contributes to the participatory nature of this research and I 
will discuss it in more detail below.  
 A central assumption to my study is that the texts I analyze are socially embedded. The 
interview transcripts and various legal documents all gain meaning from the “embodied 
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participation in emplaced rhetoric”224 by myself and advocates of food sovereignty. 
Embeddedness of rhetoric means that it is both a part of any community and present in all its 
happenings. Rhetoric is partial yet ubiquitous and also highly partisan, that is, always culturally 
mediated. As a means of producing ideology and identity, rhetoric acts in “ordinary and taken for 
granted”225 ways, often subliminally experienced by members of any community while obvious 
to outsiders. Conceiving of texts as interwoven with the social practices and contexts that create 
them opens their interpretive possibilities, making them both fluid and embodied.  
 Given the complexity and interconnections that shape food sovereignty discourse, my 
methodology requires commitments to fluidity and embodiment in order to sense patterns and 
follow the tangled threads of how patterns connect. Two rhetorical concepts in particular help me 
develop these commitments, namely: kairos and phronesis.226 Kairos speaks to the timing or 
sense of seizing rhetorical opportunities when they arise. It pushes the creative boundaries of 
research, encouraging the scholar to adjust to emergent situations both in the field and in the 
analytical process. Kairos leads one to attend to rhetorical flux, necessarily drawing the 
researcher closer to the subjects of their study.  
 Phronesis demands sound judgment or understanding on the part of the researcher. As it 
relates to my study and critical-rhetorical study in general, phronetic research engages with “the 
micropractices and micropolitics of power."227 For example, the ‘constitutive’ rhetoric of food 
sovereignty directly addresses questions of authority and power because of how advocates 
perceive their livelihoods as threatened by power imbalances perpetuated through existing 
governance structures. Such a concern implicates the capacity of rhetoric to form identity and 
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ideology, as advocates’ sense of self is at risk. Phronesis, in this example, directs my attention to 
how the effects of governmental power “pass not just between distinct subjects but through the 
individual person,”228 deeply impressing the discourse of food sovereignty with a rhetoric of 
resistance. Kairos aids me in the interviewing process to understand when and how I should ask 
questions or allow the interviewee to expand on a thought in order to gain “access to the context 
of people’s behavior,”229 or the nuanced power relationships at work in food sovereignty’s 
discourse. 
 The inventiveness of food sovereignty’s rhetoric has become clearer the closer or more 
embedded I have become in the discourse—as I have developed a more ‘contingent’ 
understanding of it. This relationship grows as the interpretive process unfolds in relation to the 
words, thoughts, and actions of the participants; both parties co-create the research process and 
bring to it myriad contingencies that must be accounted for when trying to make sense of the 
data. 
  Understanding these contingencies begins by acknowledging and respecting the 
expression of experience offered by the participants, recognizing that “each word a participant 
speaks reflects his or her consciousness… [their] thoughts become embodied in their words.”230 
Embodiment of experience and expression contributes to the researcher’s interpretation of a topic 
and undoubtedly affects the research conclusions. Lindlof and Taylor make a similar claim when 
they address the approach of ‘crystallization’ to qualitative research. In lieu of any sort of 
‘objectivity’ capturing reality, they recognize that “qualitative methods are all shaped by a 
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researcher’s partial, contingent, embodied, and historically situated experience with a group or 
culture.”231 Context shapes interpretation and prevents a tone-deaf interpretation of phenomena 
that emerge in response to socially-constructed environments.  
 Emergent phenomena present challenges to researchers as well in that, by acknowledging 
such phenomena, “the researcher must… [have] an open attitude” and seek emergent data as they 
interpret.232 Sensitivity to context leads the authors of both readings to make claims as to the type 
of thinking needed to reduce the data into a final product. Seidman advocates for inductive, 
rather than deductive, thinking. Lindlof and Taylor, though, introduce a third mode of thought in 
abduction, of which they state that “the work of interpretation is mainly characterized”.233 
Abduction, in their terms, corresponds to a sensitivity towards emergence in that the abductive 
process “creates a new principle from established facts” rather than inferring from instances, as 
with induction.234  
 Regardless of terminology, the emphasis remains clear: an awareness of context allows 
for recognition of emergent phenomena as they occur. This approach to interpretation sustains 
creativity and promotes, as Lindlof and Taylor suggest, “the purposeful blending of artistic and 
scientific sensibilities for studying the complexities of human experience.”235  
Ethnographic Methodologies 
 As a researcher, awareness of the context within which rhetoric occurs is a way to 
conceive of my research as “in situ rhetorical analysis.”236 Emplaced research allows for 
engagement with marginalized communities and voices that might not otherwise be heard within 
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the “disciplinary”237 discourse of industrial food production. This emphasis on place draws 
heavily for its methodology from ethnography, especially the need for researchers to be ‘present’ 
with their participants. 
 Taking presence into account, Conquergood warns against the “temporal reification of 
other cultures” that can occur in the course of ethnographic research.238 Rather than perpetuating 
the intercultural “closure…constituted by the gaze” of the detached researcher, he advocates for 
listening, an “interiorizing experience” that privileges conversation over observation.239 
Conquergood uses a critical stance to “[unveil] the political stakes that anchor cultural 
practices.”240 In this case, he focuses on the cultural practices of ethnographic researchers.  
 Similarly, Madison calls for ethnographers to move away from just being ‘present’ to 
having ‘presence’ with “the Other” through dialogue.241 Her discussion of the “ethnographic 
present” draws attention to the (mis)representation of ‘timeless’ cultures, thus extending the 
myths of a ‘developed’ vs. ‘undeveloped’ world and further entrenching binary logic. Like 
Conquergood’s claims about conversation, she claims that through “dialogue and meeting with 
the Other,” one can be more fully themselves, that researchers can understand and know their 
place in the complicated relationships with research participants.242 
 Presence and a dialogical mode of inquiry allows the researcher to describe the “flows of 
behavior”243 that form the current of cultural articulation. By engaging with the context of 
discourse, the analytical process is one of ‘thick description’ that addresses the value of 
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particular modes of public expression. Any general claim “grows out of the delicacy of its 
distinctions, not the sweep of its abstractions.”244 Throughout my analysis, I use thick description 
of the context and language of food sovereignty advocates to gain a deeper understanding of “the 
role of culture,”245 or to understand what their symbolic action has to say about itself.  
 The agrarian values and affective connections that constitute food sovereignty’s discourse 
serve as the things they seek to sustain, that they hold in common with each other as a means of 
identification and a source of power. These forms are their “culture’s substance,”246 the basis 
from which they develop public life and political presence at the state level. To trace this 
substance throughout my analysis, I have had to cultivate an awareness of their context through 
presence, dialogue, and a kairotic attention to how state power affects their daily lives.  
Situating the Critic in the Field 
 As a critical researcher, I see myself as “an inventor of discourses” – similarly to the 
participants in my study – and thus “engaged in a constant critique of power.”247 Questioning the 
exercise of power, as demonstrated through my analysis, leads me to “advocate on behalf of the 
vernacular”248 of food sovereignty, or to use the language that is used within the community.  
This ability stems from my own participation in small-scale farming outside of my capacity as a 
researcher, yet still shapes how my participation through this study develops in self-reflexive 
ways. This “rhetorical reflexivity”249 attends to my participant observation of the food 
sovereignty discourse, a role that is constantly “negotiated and performed” along lines of 
“informed reciprocity.”250 
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 These lines act as boundaries between myself and the participants and my roles as 
observer and participant. Throughout this study, I am more of a “participant-as-observer”251 than 
an observer-as-participant, meaning that I inform the participants of my advocacy for food 
sovereignty. As a result, I have more flexibility to negotiate my positionality during and after 
interviews and have contributed to the efforts of the community in a public way. Regardless, 
such a position still entails sensitivity to boundaries between academia and the broader public, 
specifically the embodied construction of boundaries that then shape the ability to interact with 
each other. 
  For example, Ingold focuses on the literal movement of humanity through the world 
with our feet and how this bipedalism inevitably situates us “within a relational field…not of 
interconnected points but of interwoven lines.”252 Rather than a separated, independent existence, 
humans “grow or ‘issue forth’ along the lines of their relationships.”253 Barad also conceptualizes 
a relational being-in-the-world that emphasizes our capacity to act as the defining characteristic 
of our relationships.254 Whereas Ingold seeks to illustrate our connections to the world beyond 
ourselves, Barad details how our relationality consists of “the enactment of boundaries—that 
always entails constitutive exclusions.”255 With exclusion as a consequence of experience, with 
“the fact that marks are left on bodies,” accountability emerges as a complement to exclusion.256 
We actively construct boundaries; therefore, we must acknowledge the presence of these 
boundaries before we can cross them.  
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 The omnipresence of boundaries, both known and unknown, has implications for the 
analysis of everyday life. Barad directs attention towards everyday interaction in her situating 
‘position’ as “a property of the phenomenon—the inseparability of ‘observed object’ and 
‘agencies of observation.’”257 Events and phenomena, rather than isolated objects, assume 
primacy and blur the boundaries of individualized being.  
 Paying attention to boundaries is to pay attention to my positionality as a researcher in 
the ‘field.’ With positionality comes political ramifications and what Madison terms an “ethics of 
accountability.”258 Ethical accountability as a researcher materializes in making oneself 
“accessible, transparent, and vulnerable to judgment and evaluation.”259 Throughout my study, I 
attempt to be as transparent as possible with participants, letting them know what personal 
experiences I bring to our conversations and how I interpret their rhetoric. Indeed, I have had to 
explain at times what I am interested in when I say ‘rhetoric,’ as the term carries a pejorative 
connotation for many.  
 Awareness of my positionality closely connects to my advocacy for food sovereignty. A 
goal of mine is to “actively assist in the struggles” of participants and, when possible, identify 
“the tactics, symbols, and everyday forms of resistance” which they enact through their 
discourse.260 For example, in my analysis I describe the invention of the municipal ordinance as 
a move of tactical deftness, at once appropriating language from legislation elsewhere in the 
country and state and yet tailoring the document to articulate their right to produce, process, 
consume, and sell foods of their choosing. As I have not yet had the opportunity to pass one of 
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these ordinances, the extent of my advocacy for now is constrained to analysis and attempting to 
conceive of new possibilities for food sovereignty in Maine.  
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CHAPTER 3 
ANALYSIS 
 In this chapter, I proceed through the analysis in three distinct sections, organized 
according to common arguments and emergent themes. First, I draw from the rhetorical theory of 
Kenneth Burke to explore distinctions between the symbolism and substance of food sovereignty 
in Maine and what implications these bring to the fore. I conceive of these distinctions as being 
affective and bound with ideas of how sovereignty and politics interact. The primary goal in this 
section is to understand what terms food sovereignty advocates use that, as Burke suggests, 
“reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise.”261  
 Second, I demonstrate that these ambiguities, far from presenting a weakness in food 
sovereignty’s discourse, serve as a source of attraction to a wide group of people and begin to 
constitute a describable community. I draw from Foucault’s notion that discourse should be 
“treated as and when it occurs” by attending to its “irruptions.”262 In other words, I analyze the 
terms used by advocates to argue that the discourse of food sovereignty forms through the acts, 
agents, and purposes that combine in events that disrupt the dominant discourse of an 
‘international food regime.’263 This dominant discourse acts as a form of ‘juridical’ or 
administrative power enforcing a code of agricultural normalization—it is a discourse of 
“discipline.”264 Agrarian lifestyles – and the communities they help to form – act as “subjugated 
knowledges”265 within this discourse and the small-scale farm becomes a contested site of power. 
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 This systematic subjugation of small-scale farming communities creates relationships 
between the state and localities perceived as oppressive by food sovereignty advocates. I 
articulate how the alternative discourse of food sovereignty in Maine deploys tactical rhetoric to 
interrupt, organize, and gain access to the decision-making process. 
 Third, I bring Elinor Ostrom’s theories of collective resource management to link the 
critical discourse theory of Burke and Foucault to the everyday practices that compose food 
sovereignty and from which the discourse emerges. Of specific value are Ostrom’s observations 
on the effectiveness of “locally designed rule systems”266 based on systems of social obligations 
to create ‘laboratories’267 of democratic governance.  
 To conclude this chapter, I pose questions that align with the ‘constitutive’ rhetoric 
concerning equality, liberty, and democracy. I intend that these questions may be used to 
strengthen the capacity of food sovereignty advocates to both critique the neoliberal paradigm of 
food production and create a viable, vibrant alternative. I want to know if it is possible to 
incorporate a nonhuman dimension into the food sovereignty discourse. What might this look 
like and what effects could we expect if the demand for rights extends to the physical world 
around us? I offer one potential path, namely that food sovereignty advocates conceive of their 
work as a form of ‘grassroots diplomacy’ that grounds itself not in identifying one way or 
another, but in belonging.268 
The ‘Constitutive’ Rhetoric of Food Sovereignty 
 I begin the analysis with an incongruous pairing, where the formal setting of public 
testimony merges with a fable to demonstrate the creative capacity of this discourse to constitute 
                                                          
266 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 69. 
267 For this quote, see Justice Louis Brandeis’ dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann in 1932. 
268 See Isabelle Stengers. “Introductory Notes on an Ecology of Practices.” Cultural Studies Review 11, 1 (2005): 
183-196. 
58 
 
 
an alterity of belonging. In the following example, this alterity gains its discursive force by 
disrupting the “epistemic space”269 of a legislative committee hearing. The epistemic space of 
legislative committees, courtrooms, and laboratories shape how we collectively create 
knowledge. Food sovereignty attempts to shift these spaces outside of legal and scientific spaces 
to the farm fields, milking parlors, and ‘kitchen tables’270 of Maine. By using a fable in a space 
that demands evidence-based testimony, an advocate implicitly challenges the norms of 
governmentality that produce agricultural regulations. In doing so, this example grounds the 
‘constitutive’ rhetoric of food sovereignty as the means by which advocates construct an 
alternative discourse to the hegemonic one of industrial food production. It exposes the 
‘episteme’ of an industrialized regulatory framework, or the “set of relations which define and 
situate”271 subjects according to norms of standardized, mechanized, and commodified 
agricultural practices. 
 During a 2013 hearing of the Agriculture, Conservation, and Forestry committee for LD 
475: An Act to Increase Food Sovereignty in Local Communities, a citizen supporter of the bill 
testified to its merit. After grounding her argument in “the belief that everyone has the right to 
healthy, sustainably produced food,” she warns that “the daunting structure of federal laws and 
rules…[have] substantially affected” her ability to farm and for customers to access her 
products.272 This sense of being arbitrarily constrained by power beyond one’s control emerges 
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over the course of this analysis, but I begin with this testimonial because of what this farmer does 
next: she shares a fable with the committee. She tells the fable of The Crow and the Pitcher, from 
Aesop:  
A Crow, ready to die with thirst, flew with joy to a Pitcher which he beheld at 
some distance. When he came, he found water in it, indeed, but so near the 
bottom, that with all his stooping and straining, he was not able to reach it. He 
then endeavoured to overturn the Pitcher, that at least he might be able to get a 
little of it; but his strength was not sufficient for the accomplishment of this 
purpose. At last seeing some pebbles lie near the place, he cast them one by one 
into the Pitcher, and thus, by degrees, raised the water up to the very brim, and 
satisfied his thirst.273 
By retelling this fable she constructs what Kenneth Burke calls a ‘perspective by incongruity;’274 
by placing fables in the committee chamber, she merges a text and context that normally stay 
separate. This combination produces new possibilities for interpretation and attempts to change 
the social behavior of an otherwise solemn occasion. Using this fable as a rhetorical device, she 
implies that the work of food sovereignty in the state can overcome a daunting regulatory 
structure. She uses the metaphor of pebbles to represent the towns in Maine that have passed 
ordinances and urges the committee to pass the bill on to the legislature. To do so would be to 
“support the towns…who are picking up the pebbles, one by one, to raise the level of resilience 
                                                          
273 Aesopus, The Fables of Aesop, (New York, NY: Two Continents Publishing Group, 1975): 63.  
274 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change (Los Altos, CA: Hermes, 1954): 69; 87. ‘Perspective by incongruity’ is 
Burke’s phrase to refer to a state of transition between different orientations, where one offers new ways of 
characterizing events as “an attempt to convert people…[and] to alter the nature of our responses.” Here, this 
transition moves from the industrial-state regulatory scheme to that of food sovereignty.  
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in the state of Maine by protecting our local food supply and our traditional ways of exchanging 
food.”275 
 This testimony helps illustrate the central themes I identify in my analysis of the 
discourse of food sovereignty in Maine, which include identification, discursive construction, 
and political conditioning. The fable conveys its meaning through symbolism; how we use 
language resides in its capacity as symbolic action. As an allegorical story, this symbolism 
functions arbitrarily and with the purpose to impart lessons or morals to the audience. In the case 
above, the speaker delivers these lessons in a two-fold way, both as a metaphor for the work food 
sovereignty advocates in the state do and as a means to humanize the situation. Many relate to 
the fable as a genre of storytelling because of a childhood experience of reading one with an 
adult. By bringing her experience of using fables to teach children at home into the public 
hearing, this advocate aligns the intent of food sovereignty with the intent of any community—
that of raising young ones well. Notably, however, the messages we intend for children still 
resonate as we age and bear fruit if we return to them once in a while.  
 A fable’s resonance comes from its capacity to ‘set’ an example, to influence the 
behavior of a listener by creating a model to imitate for their benefit. In its exemplary power, the 
fable shares the company of other rhetorical devices that seek to influence: the myth, proverb, or 
parable. To set the theoretical stage for this analysis, I therefore make the connection with Brian 
Massumi’s emphasis on parables as a writing style that affects us through its use of 
exemplification.276 Parables and fables illustrate through their activation of detail, where a 
digression can unfold into a moment of creativity and invention. Fables enable us to make new 
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interpretations, they fabricate. Fabulists are creators, inventors of interpretation and makers of 
morals.  
 For this discursive analysis, beginning with a fable used to testify to the intent of food 
sovereignty yields insight into the shared values articulated in Maine because the fable helps 
show how rhetorical tactics, such as the use of allegory to create ruptures and resist formal 
power, shape the discourse of food sovereignty. Etymologically, ‘fable’ refers to the action of 
speaking, fābula meaning ‘discourse,’ in Latin.277 It shares its roots with that of ‘fate,’ or that 
which has been spoken. There is, then, an element of prophecy in fables or parables, of pre-
diction or pre-scription, of recommendation and advice. As rhetorical devices, they provide an 
opportunity to look forward into the future and towards what we may become. They offer 
glimpses of possibility. Through their symbolic creativity, fables recondition how we know the 
world and turn it into something new. This is why they make great bedtime stories, because they 
plant seeds of hope that can grow in the sweet soil of dreams.  
 Such invention carries with it a lot of potential and can weave many stories with many 
morals. Thus we look for guidance to those fabulists who exercise discernment and whose 
decisions about the things we hold in common impact all of us. In short, we look to judges. In 
numerous instances, food sovereignty activists invoke Supreme Court cases that serve as a sort 
of adult fable, an example of how those in positions of power should reason.  
 In particular, during the public hearing for LD 783: RESOLUTION, Proposing an 
Amendment to the Constitution of Maine To Establish a Right to Food, testimonials referred to 
two specific Supreme Court opinions that offer prescient morals for both food sovereignty and 
the three branches of government in Maine that it affects. The first was the dissenting opinion of 
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Justice Stephen Johnson Field in the 1888 case of Powell v. The Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania,278 who writes that the court ruling, in effect, sanctioned “the arbitrary deprivation 
of life and liberty.”279 He uses food production as the basis of his exegesis and the prime 
example of what is due all United States citizens:  
By ‘liberty’…is meant something more than freedom from physical restraint or 
imprisonment. It means freedom, not merely to go wherever one may choose, but 
to do such acts as he may judge best for his interest not inconsistent with the equal 
rights of others; that is, to follow such pursuits as may be best adapted to his 
faculties, and which will give to him the highest enjoyment….The right to pursue 
one’s happiness is placed by the declaration of independence among the 
inalienable rights of man…to secure them, not to grant them, governments are 
instituted among men. The right to procure healthy and nutritious food, by which 
life may be preserved and enjoyed, and to manufacture it, is among these 
inalienable rights, which…no state can give, and no state can take away.280 
Herein lies a principle tension that runs not only through the history of the United States, but 
through the discourse of food sovereignty in Maine as well—namely, that of equality and liberty. 
We are all equal in our right to liberty, but we constitute governments to protect – or “secure” – 
our equal access to those liberties, including “the right to produce, process, sell, purchase, and 
consume local foods.”281 By placing that burden of responsibility onto governments, we also 
cede certain abilities to those in government, principally the ability to execute, legislate, and 
                                                          
278127 U.S. 678 (1888). Justice Field defends an oleo-margarine manufacturer who was indicted for selling a product 
deemed threatening to public health. In his dissent, he claims the ruling of the court violates the due process clause 
of the 14th amendment of US Constitution.  
279 Ibid.  
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judge laws by which we all consent to abide. Engagement with the law – as food sovereignty in 
Maine does at multiple levels and with all three branches – is to enter into a dialectical 
relationship that uses and is used by rhetoric to make meaning.  
 James Boyd White describes this dialectic as underlying “constitutive rhetoric,” referring 
to the type of language that “enables people to say ‘we’ about what they do and to claim 
consistent meanings for it.”282 The ‘we’ in food sovereignty includes a wide range of people, 
both producers and consumers of food, who coalesce into a community that shares values and a 
sense of equality and liberty and traces its logic through a set of legal and historical precedents in 
the United States. Food sovereignty’s constitutive rhetoric has sufficient “motive”283 in the 
small-scale agricultural practices of production and consumption to generate texts in the form of 
municipal ordinances. Using White’s notion of “constitutive rhetoric,” I conceive of these 
ordinances, which follow a basic template, as the ‘constitution’ of food sovereignty in Maine.  
 To textually constitute the motives of food sovereignty, however, is to use necessarily 
vague language and, therefore, to open the door to “the ambiguities of substance.”284 Constitutive 
rhetoric remains vague because it suggests the terms by which ‘we’ judge our public acts. It 
focuses our attention towards certain patterns of experience and away from others because of 
‘our’ shared values and collective sense of what ‘we’ need. These patterns shift over time; the 
vagueness of terms enables our interpretations of the constitution to shift along with those 
patterns so that we may bring the new conditions of life to bear on the ‘principles’ that constitute 
us. It is to these principles that we must bear witness. 
                                                          
282 James Boyd White. Heracles’ Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (Madison, WI: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 37. 
283 I refer explicitly here to Kenneth Burke’s notion of “motive,” whereby our attempts to define and describe the 
world through language fundamentally depends upon our “patterns of experience.” See Burke, Grammar, 44. 
284 Burke, Grammar, 373. 
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 I return to this discussion of principles in the following section that discusses how food 
sovereignty in Maine articulates its identity, or how its process of identification unfolds through 
the language of its advocates. To complement the emphasis on securing our rights from Justice 
Field’s dissent, advocates also reference Justice Louis Brandeis’ dissenting opinion from New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann in 1932.285 Famous for its claim that any state can serve as a 
“laboratory” of democracy, this opinion focuses its judgment on the imperative “to meet 
changing social and economic needs.”286 As an example of how constitutions serve as guides or 
heuristic models yet still bind us as statements of our collective will, Brandeis concludes his 
dissent as follows: 
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the 
nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This 
Court has the power to prevent an experiment…[b]ut, in the exercise of this high 
power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal 
principles.287 
A source of inspiration to food sovereignty in Maine, Brandeis’ opinion speaks to the notion that 
‘we’ must always engage in the democratic process in order to keep our government accountable 
and to make those in power aware of the conditions on the ground. In the words of one advocate, 
government is a set of relations “that we do together with”,288 rather than ‘they’ do separately 
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without ‘us.’ Access to the process is one principle that food sovereignty puts forth because the 
very lack of access to the regulatory and rule enforcement process serves as its motive. 
 The emphasis in food sovereignty, as in Brandeis, lies on the democratic process as one 
of experimentation, creativity, and invention. In this light, I return to the fable of the crow and 
the pitcher. Having identified its motive – thirst – the crow satisfies its thirst through creative 
expression, experimentation, and using the available means. Similarly, White reminds us that 
rhetoric, like law, “invents not out of nothing but out of something.”289 We use the means 
available to us to constitute communities around principles. We share questions of meaning, not 
some sort of transcendental truth. Our constitutions mold the questions we ask in order to direct 
us towards certain answers while still leaving them open to interpretation.  
 By outlining this notion of ‘constitutive’ rhetoric as playing a key role for advocates of 
food sovereignty in Maine, I frame the subsequent analysis of its discourse as one that creates 
boundaries that define the people and the principles involved in its expression. Through the use 
of ‘constitutive’ rhetoric, food sovereignty in Maine articulates a sense of belonging that appeals 
to some but not all. I claim that this is necessary if food sovereignty is to ‘succeed’ in Maine. 
The sense of belonging I witness within the food sovereignty community forms a crucial part of 
developing the ‘grassroots diplomacy’ that the discourse creates and sustains.  
Identification in Food Sovereignty: Symbolic and Substantial 
 In developing his conception of ‘substance,’ Burke draws on the word’s etymology in the 
idea of ‘place’ or ‘placement.’290 Although in common usage it refers to an intrinsic quality, it 
derives from a sense of the extrinsic or the external qualities that affect things. In other words, 
‘substance’ derives its meaning from any thing’s context or environment in the sense that these 
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support or underlie a thing’s interiority. Burke calls this tension between the inner and outer 
worlds of things the “paradox of substance”; by speaking of something’s ‘substance,’ one refers 
to what it is by using a term that designates what it is not.291  
 Such a paradox, for Burke, lies at the heart of human language. We cannot speak of 
things in their essence, so we “necessarily talk about things in terms of what they are not.”292 
Language is symbolic ‘action’ that serves as “labels, signs for helping us find our way about,” 
and can be misused as easily as used well.293 To speak of the substance of food sovereignty, I 
define it in terms of its context in Maine as advocates describe it to me, but remain aware of the 
symbolic limits of their descriptions. Their words serve as a symbolic guide for this analysis.   
 In this analysis, three emergent themes define the context of food sovereignty in Maine, 
including ‘sovereignty as…,’ ‘political corruption or the appearance of corruption,’ and ‘affect.’ 
In describing these components of how advocates identify with food sovereignty, I explore 
individual voices as representative of the themes. Although I condense the themes out of the 
interviews and documents analyzed, I want the individual voices to emerge as the means by 
which I put theory in conversation with their practice and vice versa.  
 For the first theme, sovereignty not only refers to liberty and unimpeded authority, it also 
speaks to the social obligations that form community and collective capacity for resilience when 
facing uncertainty. This variation points towards the heterogeneous substance composing the 
patterns of experience that motivate their advocacy.  
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 For example, ‘sovereignty’ acts as a sort of unifying community value. Helen is a small-
scale farmer who produces raw milk and poultry for sale in her community. The context of food 
sovereignty clearly lies with how communities build and sustain connections, even though these 
connections suffer from what she calls a “labyrinth” of structural bias pitting localities against 
state and federal governments. To elaborate this conception, she distinguishes between the 
“inside” and “outside” of farming communities. For example, in describing the history of 
Hancock County’s dairy farms, she points to the progressive encroachment of regulations 
eroding the ability of dairy farmers in the area to maintain micro-dairies (of 8-10 cows). In doing 
so, she characterizes the regulatory pressure as “tinkering [from] outside the farming 
communities.” 
 Designating state actions as ‘tinkering’ implies that one intent of the regulatory structure 
– to sanitize the process of dairy farming – has unintended consequences. Namely, that of ending 
a “traditional foodway” in the mid-coast region of Maine. Attempts to repair or systematize 
small farming communities have been little better than tinkering, or clumsy efforts to ‘improve’ 
dairy farming in the aggregate while ignoring the idiosyncrasies of communities in different 
places. 
 She furthers this argument when discussing the “overlapping jurisdictions” present in 
food regulation. For example, the regulatory structure of food and agriculture is fragmented 
enough that different agencies regulate the same product depending on its use and source.294 
Helen uses a spatial metaphor to articulate how communities use municipal ordinances to 
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navigate this overlapping legal field. If food regulations consist of a single field, then “there is 
more than one player on that field” making decisions about how to classify food. With the 
ordinance, local communities create the capacity to play in that field. In this, they also designate 
their boundaries in relation to the numerous state and federal agencies that occupy the field. By 
metaphorically applying “counter pressure” on the state of Maine, municipalities can tell the 
state that “you’re not needed here…this is our food and here’s where we’re drawing the line.” 
 Concern for where to draw community boundaries is a political issue and one that draws 
from how we designate matters of concern. What concerns us depends on the questions we ask 
and the motives for questioning the ways we arrange the world. For Burke, “the assigning of 
motives is a matter of appeal.”295 Difference in motives from one group of people to another 
change according to the patterns of experience that form their community, but also change, as 
Burke notes, through rhetorical emphases that alter “the scope of the orientation within which the 
tactics of appeal are framed.”296 In this sense I move into another conception of sovereignty that 
complements the idea that sovereignty means applying pressure on the state from the municipal 
level by connecting community building to the process of food production.  
 Jeff practices permaculture, or the system of environmental design that aims to develop 
stable socio-ecological systems based on agricultural production that cultivates perennial (instead 
of annual) crops. In effect, permacultural food systems pattern themselves after ecosystems 
rather than agricultural methods that depend on tillage to grow crops. From this perspective, Jeff 
connects the idea of sovereignty with that of resilience or regeneration. As a permaculturalist, he 
perceives a need for underlying design principles to guide the transformation of the food system 
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from its concentrated industrial form to one of “small-scale, distributed production.” Jeff makes 
the connection explicit in the following quote:  
…in order for a people to be sovereign unto themselves, they need a stable food 
production system and contemporary industrial agriculture, organic or not, I don’t 
see as being as stable as a perennial style of food production that’s modeled on 
natural ecosystems. 
Sovereignty, as a practice in this conceptualization, diffuses production for stability. 
Concentrated production—that which the industrial regulatory system encourages—creates rigid 
organizational structures that struggle to withstand stress as well as more distributed systems. 
The polycultural practices of permaculture, for Jeff, complement an associated world-view that 
attempts to compose an “arrangement of elements on the surface of the planet [that] is more 
resilient to those external shocks…in the face of floods or droughts, which are what is coming, 
what lies ahead.”  
 As an example of the shift in perspective when thinking through how to re-compose our 
socio-economic systems, Jeff points to the irony found in many places within the industrial food 
system. When policy makers enforce regulations intended to create food safety, they address the 
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) that produce massive amounts of manure in a 
single location. As an example of what the perspectival shift would entail, he suggests that “in 
that kind of large-scale production mode, waste is pollution….whereas if you change the 
production model and change the management regimes, those waste streams from those 
animals…can be harnessed in a regenerative capacity.” 
 Sovereignty connotes resilience for another community member, although the context for 
using the term ‘sovereignty,’ for Nicholas, merits special attention. He needed to understand the 
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motives behind food sovereignty in Maine before he could lend support as an organizer affiliated 
with a non-profit that works to foster sustainable development. For Nicholas, at first blush the 
ordinance seemed more ideologically driven than having practical goals to attain for the 
community. He found the language of ‘sovereignty’ and local control questionable, not least 
because, historically, it has been used, among other things, “to justify slavery in the South… 
[and] more recently, deny gay marriage in certain areas of the country.” In other words, without 
clarifying the context in which communities demand to exert it, sovereignty is not an inherently 
good or bad thing.  
 As such, he addresses the context of the ordinance for communities in Maine by 
highlighting resilience as a key motivation driving the ordinance in his community (Rockland). 
Resilience connects closely with how communities produce food at the local level. From this 
perspective, the industrial food system creates an unsustainable and widespread dependence on 
multinational corporations that produce and transport food. To achieve collective resilience, food 
sovereignty addresses this reliance: 
The assertion of food sovereignty…is an assertion of local control over our food 
production and, in fact, it’s a way of privileging local, small-scale farms...over 
large, industrial farms in other states or other countries…it’s about…trying to 
reduce our…reliance or dependence on large corporations. 
Using a systems-thinking approach, Nicholas emphasizes the different motivations at work in 
local food systems, or systems characterized by a “tight feedback loop the local corporations or 
local individuals have with their customers.” Conglomerates cannot have such tight feedback 
loops. In other words, money and other resources—as well as affective resources like 
accountability—cannot stay within communities when the company profiting is headquartered 
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elsewhere. Asserting local control, for Nicholas, increases a community’s ability to provide for 
itself economically. In a word, the community has more resilience.  
 Taking a more ecological perspective, Nicholas echoes Jeff by connecting this notion of 
resilience as local control or sovereignty with the notion of resilience as the ability to respond to 
environmental crises. He conceives of the ordinance’s focus on food production systems as a 
means to plan for an uncertain future. Community resilience, in this regard, again ties into 
keeping food production and consumption as local as possible. Nicholas contrasts this with the 
sense of a precarious food system that depends on “remote” food production and the limitations 
this places on an individual community to respond. 
We just don’t know what the world is going to look like in regards to climate or 
anything else in fifty years. And the less we have to rely on remote, industrial 
models…the safer we’re going to be in terms of our own resilience and our own 
response, whether it be something catastrophic or something relatively mundane, 
like the slow creep of climate change. 
 The emphasis on sovereignty as local control in the interviews with Nicholas and Jeff 
repeats in the testimony of state representatives in support of LD 218: An Act to Promote Small-
Scale Poultry Farming that passed through the legislature in 2013. Advocating for a regulatory 
exemption for farmers slaughtering fewer than 1,000 poultry a year, these two legislators argue 
that the licensing and facilities requirements for small-scale poultry producers arbitrarily 
transgresses the community boundaries that Helen speaks of above. By so doing, the industry 
argument that food safety is paramount appears less concerned with safety per se, and more 
concerned with how technologically developed farms become. This first quote demonstrates how 
sovereignty concerns itself with the rightful attribution of responsibility and accountability when 
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it comes to food production: “Safety in all aspects of food production, processing, and 
preparation is the responsibility of all who produce, process, purchase, prepare, and consume 
food. Methods of enhancing food safety will be most effective if they concentrate on education 
and training rather than concentrating on facilities and equipment construction details.”297 
 In the discourse of food sovereignty, members identify with the idea of sovereignty as 
more than simply a question of authority. Rather, authority connects with concerns for how 
communities draw their boundaries and what practices those boundaries allow. When it comes to 
the need for food safety, the ‘constitutive’ rhetoric of food sovereignty leads one to ask questions 
that concern the authorship of food production itself. Who grew this tomato? Or, how was this 
squash grown? Rather than the bacterial count or the levels of inspection any given food product 
has, these types of questions generate a discourse that focuses on how, “apparently, the best food 
safety measure is knowing the grower and having their name on the product.”298 
 In sum, advocates express diverse meanings about what sovereignty connotes, including 
community, resiliency, local control, and an alternative sense of food safety. I now transition to a 
second theme of identification, that of political behavior and the appearance of corruption in 
politics. This theme symbolizes the disconnection between motives of food sovereignty 
advocates and those that underlie the industrial regulatory structure. 
 Concerns voiced about the nature of politics throughout the interview process as well as 
in testimony offer substance in the sense that the political ‘climate’ surrounding agricultural 
regulation in Maine deeply affects the context of food sovereignty’s emergent discourse. 
Advocates find motives in what they see as corruption, unfettered lobbying, and systematic 
disenfranchisement of their political voice, both in ‘Augusta’ and at home in their communities.  
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 In identifying political behavior as a cause of bias against them, they perform a consistent 
identification amongst themselves. This theme bridges the first and third themes of identification. 
The conceptions of sovereignty present in the way we arrange ourselves in the world only go so 
far if elected (and unelected) officials act as barriers to an accessible democratic process; through 
political patterns of experience in the legislature and elsewhere, advocates come to develop, in 
the third theme, political savvy that turns on affection.  
 Bea offers a compelling perspective into the political theater of ‘Augusta’299 as a 
community organizer, non-profit leader, and part-time lobbyist in the state legislature advocating 
for small-scale farming communities in Maine. She refers to political behavior at state and 
federal levels as significant barriers to reasonable policy making. A principal focus concerns the 
idea of a “revolving door” between business and government agencies, where legislators or 
administrators have either worked in or join the private sector that they now regulate and vice 
versa. For example, Bea discusses the Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA), who 
regularly represents the opposition to food sovereignty in the state legislature, and in particular 
an influential lobbyist for the organization: “The woman who is now the lobbyist for the GMA 
came right out of the department of agriculture…she is going and writing the 2500 dollar checks 
[to political action committees].”  
 In this example, Bea draws attention to the perception that “money is speech.” Lobbyists 
sway the political process in their favor through material means. Using Kenneth Burke’s theory 
of language as symbolic action, the notion that “money is speech” points to the irreducible 
connection of language to the physical realm, or “nonsymbolic motion.”300 Legislation or 
                                                          
299 Advocates repeatedly refer to any legislative activity as occurring in ‘Augusta,’ the capital city of Maine.  
300 Kenneth Burke, “(Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action,” in On Human Nature, Ed. William H. Rueckert 
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policies drafted that systematically favor corporate agribusiness and an industrial model of food 
distribution relate to the financial gain implicit within such a regulatory structure. The symbolic 
mode of finance takes form through the implementation of overly-burdensome regulation for 
small-scale farmers.  
Until we get money out of politics, these lobbyists are going to have enormous, 
enormous impact. [They have] been playing the game for a long time, because 
[they] went from working in Augusta to lobbying in Augusta, [they] knew all the 
players and they know [the lobbyists] and…when they go into the back room of 
the committee meeting to caucus, [the lobbyists go] with them. I mean, [they are] 
‘invited.’ 
Experiences such as these, when perpetuated at a state-by-state and federal level, contribute to 
the ‘liberalization’ of agriculture that McMichael and others point to.301 The discursive 
construction of systemic bias occurs through the symbolic actions in state legislatures. Closed-
door meetings between legislators and lobbyists have outsized effects on the daily processes of 
small farms whose actions fall under the jurisdiction of these committees.  
 With the representative process (or synecdochic relationship)302 seemingly broken, the 
tactical rhetoric of food sovereignty in Maine uses metonymy to focus attention on and amplify 
the sense of collusion between government and industry. Merging concerns about the vitality of 
small-scale farms and ecological degradation, Bea summarizes this political behavior as 
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‘greenwashing’ and suggests that, to remedy agro-industrial bias, the locus of decision-making 
must shift back to localities: 
organic agriculture can feed the world. True organic agriculture, not this 
greenwashed, commercial organic agriculture. The mono-cropping, the feeding 
cows in feedlots with organic grain and calling it organic meat. That’s not going 
to help the climate at all. But [what will is] small, organic farmers, taking good 
care of their soil and selling their food locally so you don’t have the carbon 
footprint of transportation…the way you support small local farmers is you let 
them scale to the appropriate scale for them. You don’t make them get big or get 
out.303 
By allowing local control of food production, regulatory measures bubble up rather than trickle 
down. Numerous citizens express astonishment at how closely the perspectives of leading food 
companies and federal regulators align when it comes to a ‘right to food.’304 Describing the 
statements as having sent a “shockwave through my body” and “astounding,” one testifier claims 
they amount to “tak[ing] away our right to choose from whom we obtain our food.”305 
                                                          
303 The phrase ‘get big or get out’ is attributed to Ezra Taft Benson, the Secretary of Agriculture under Presidents 
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favor of the US Dept. of Health and Human Services stating that “there is no absolute right to consume or feed 
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ds_mtd.pdf.  
305 Smithers, testimony. 
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 Similarly, a legislator testified that “the corruption, and the appearance of corruption, has 
got to stop. It is tearing at the fabric of my community.”306 The appearance of corruption comes 
from the “arbitrary and capricious application of food safety laws”307 preventing farmers from 
producing food for their community, limiting consumer access to local and fresh food, and 
straining community relations by subjecting them to regulation. As an example of how the 
dominant regulatory discourse helps to create food sovereignty’s alternative one, testifiers ask 
questions that lead to different conclusions than if they were concerned with a regulation-defined 
‘safe’ food product: “are we not capable to look at a local food producer face to face and make a 
decision about whether or not we want to consume their product?”308 This type of rhetorical 
question subverts the appeals of government regulators for food safety – according to their 
standards – by privileging direct access to food producers.   
 Some take this sentiment further when describing the “faceless corporations” responsible 
for the majority of food-borne illnesses in the United States.309 Within the food sovereignty 
discourse, rules that claim to strengthen food safety meet with a skepticism suggesting such rules 
“sound an awful lot like the fox guarding the hen house.”310  
 An extended example of this comes from Sarah and David, a couple who own a goat 
dairy small enough that they do not sell product, but would like to sell surplus milk and cheese 
                                                          
306 Ralph Chapman, testimony in support of LD 1287: An Act to Deregulate Face-to-Face Transactions between the 
People and Small Farms and Small Food Producers, May 7, 2013. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Smithers, testimony. 
309 Betsy Garrold, testimony in favor of LD 475, 2013. Between 1998 and 2015 in the US, over 19,000 outbreaks 
had been documented by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), resulting in almost 400,000 
illnesses and almost 350 deaths. See CDC https://wwwn.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/. Globally, foodborne illness 
affects an estimated 600 million people per year; the World Health Organization attributes the widespread 
occurrences, in part, “to the speed and range of product distribution…amplified by globalized trade”. See WHO 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs399/en/. 
310 Ibid. 
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when they have any. They have felt numerous times either confused or deceived by how the state 
enforces its own laws and shares this information. As owners of a micro-dairy, they looked into 
the rules regarding licensure in the event that they might want to sell any excess product in the 
community. Having taken the initiative to contact the state department of agriculture, Sarah 
claims that she was “manipulated into an appointment with an inspector,” in spite of the fact that 
she realized, through self-education, that it would not make sense for them to be licensed.  
 This initial contact with the state has led to repeated interactions with inspectors that 
leave them suspecting that state employees do not understand the rules governing food 
production in the state. This apparent dissonance fuels their suggestion that the political process 
itself is fundamentally flawed and disconnected from the consequences it has on small-scale 
farmers.  
 For example, in her meeting with the state inspector, Sarah recounts how, after reading 
the statute regarding the definition of ‘milk distributor,’ the inspector seemed unaware that the 
law states that any dairy farmer is technically a ‘distributor.’311 This episode exemplifies for her 
the confusing nature of agricultural law:  
The problem with this whole thing is, even if you want to learn, the problem is 
that there is not just a statute, but behind the statute are milk rules. And, of course, 
the milk rules have their own definitions…I think this is on purpose, creating this 
confusion that you get lost and don’t know and have to listen to the inspectors. 
David suggests that part of the problem lies in the separation between the legislative and rule-
making processes. The former is public and the latter private (without public input). In line with 
what other interviewees suggest, their pattern of experience with state level politics points to a 
                                                          
311 Title 7, Section 2900 of the Maine Food Code states as follows: “’Milk distributor’ means any person who offers 
for sale or sells to another person any milk or milk products in their final form.”  
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sense that a structural bias creates this confusion. The rule-making process remains convoluted, 
even if the statutes appear straightforward, making licensing an onerous, if not impossible 
(because of exorbitant costs), task for small-scale farmers.  
When they send you the milk rules that are made for big milk plants and you have 
really only one or three goats—you will not go through 180 pages to figure out 
what it is about or what applies to you. It’s really confusing. 
 Not only does this bias seem directed against small-scale farmers, it also seems to favor 
larger producers. The biggest issue for Sarah and David is not financial burden of compliance, 
but rather that “they make it [seem] that it is so easy. And it is—and this is the scary part—it is 
easy, or it can be easy.” If regulations do not present a big enough financial burden for the farm, 
then the farm can pass muster with relative ease.  
 I conclude the theme of political behavior and the appearance of corruption by leading 
this discussion to ‘affect’ in talking about how the power of political discourse often lies in its 
use (or manipulation) of emotion. The affective dimension of food sovereignty comes in the next 
thematic section, but I foreshadow this transition to argue that money can have a greater 
influence over legislation in the statehouse – within the current industrialist discourse – than can 
emotion. Alan, a state legislator and supporter of food sovereignty, attempts to explain this 
dynamic by sharing “how politics really works.” This euphemism emphasizes the emotional 
character of political discourse, or how, rather than making decisions on a rational basis, most 
people make “an emotional decision and then rationalize that, picking whatever information fits 
that emotional decision.”  
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 Politics as an emotional pursuit resonates with Ernesto Laclau’s analysis of the 
metonymic quality to popular political discourses.312 Narratives that typify and shape the 
political realm rely on what Laclau calls ‘equivalential logic,’ or a mode of reasoning that relies 
on the affective connections that people make with one another through the process of 
identification.313 Such logic enables mass mobilizations of people towards a single political goal. 
This equivalency through identification, however, always also depends on a ‘differential logic,’ 
or a mode of reasoning that identifies ‘the other’ as a result of identifying with an ‘us’ or ‘we.’ 
These discursive constructions form along affective fault lines and dictate socio-political control.  
 Coming to the notion of control in this sense follows Alan’s logic as he discusses the 
emotional arguments made by food sovereignty and how they ultimately get at a question of 
control: 
things about do we have a right to food, do we have a right to choose what we eat, 
or do we have to eat what some corporation tells us we must eat, or what the 
government tells us we must eat or not eat, in other words. These are emotional 
issues…there’s not a lot of rationality to it. Do I want somebody else dictating to 
me…the choices that I make? [...] The major argument there is who has control. 
Political culture revolves around the perpetual negotiation of control. Food sovereignty, for Alan, 
comes to this negotiation through emotional argumentation, or what he calls “the fundamental 
feeling that people have that they should have a right to food of their own choice.” While the 
tactical rhetoric of food sovereignty advances an emotional argument, however, that of industry 
combines emotion with the potency of money.  
                                                          
312 Ernesto Laclau. On Populist Reason. New York: Verso, 2005.  
313 Ibid., 231. 
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 Political opponents to food sovereignty in the Maine legislature consistently characterize 
raw milk as ‘dangerous,’ a description that Alan considers effective to the extent that it is an 
‘emotional’ argument.314 A further connection he makes, however, is that this argument is not 
effective enough on its own (i.e. the emotional arguments of food sovereignty are stronger than 
those of ‘food safety’), so it need the financial clout of the industry lobby to influence legislators.   
I don’t know that the industry holds sway by lobbyists because they’re making 
emotional arguments. I think the industry holds sway with their lobbyists 
primarily by their monetary donations to the political action committees that fund 
the elections of the people that they’re swaying…As a general matter, that’s the 
way our political system works—that is, lobbyists being influenced by monetary 
donations, which are often laundered through political action committees. 
Alan points out that he cannot be certain about the exact influence of corporate lobbyists. His 
larger point consists in that food sovereignty, whose central argument concerns control over the 
local means of production and governance, meets resistance in the legislative process from 
competing forces exercising control through different means (i.e. money). Thus, the negotiation 
for control seems poisoned or that industry has an unfair advantage over small farming 
communities through their outsized financial influence.  
 Political corruption or the appearance of corruption act as catalysts for identification with 
the food sovereignty effort. Patterns of experience align for advocates – whether in the 
legislature, on the farm, or observing from a distance – in their frustration at the simultaneous 
increase of regulatory pressure and decrease of local community influence on the rule-making 
                                                          
314 Alan recounted how, in response to opposition of raw milk legislation, he circulated a letter to his colleagues 
“pointing out that [consuming raw milk] was a risk two hundred times less than the risk of being killed by a 
lightning strike. In other words, this is an inconsequential number of deaths from unpasteurized dairy.” 
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process at the state level. This seeming impasse leads advocates to look towards their 
communities for political solutions. The third and final theme of how identification develops in 
food sovereignty concerns the affective relations that constitute the foundation of both local food 
commerce and the constitutive rhetoric found in the municipal ordinances. I close with this 
theme because it serves as an effective transition into the second section of this analysis, which 
describes how advocates construct their discourse out of a concern for their communities rather 
than personal gain. 
 In this analysis, affect plays the key role in defining how advocates constitute their 
rhetoric and construct their discourse. For the purposes of identification, it also forms the basic 
motive for the symbolic action of food sovereignty. To frame this theme, I put Kenneth Burke 
and Ernesto Laclau in conversation. Specifically, Burke’s emphasis on the “paradox of 
substance” as the primary gesture of language—or the definition of things in terms of what they 
are not—resonates with Laclau’s claim that catachresis forms “the common denominator of 
‘rhetoricity.’”315 Catachresis speaks to a distortion of meaning or of the improper use of terms 
because of our inability to literally translate a thing’s essence. Affect fills in the gaps in meaning 
that language leaves behind.  
  For Laclau, the archetype of catachresis is the term ‘the people,’ which depends on the 
power of affect to complement the inadequacy of the term itself and support its power to rally a 
heterogeneous group to its cause. In this formulation we see Burke’s paradox at work: the 
symbolic (‘we the people’) always refers to the nonsymbolic (affect) for its motive force.316 
Through this complementary relationship forms the “equivalential logics” mentioned earlier that 
link disparate groups of people together. In the case of food sovereignty, affect performs a 
                                                          
315 Laclau, Reason, 71-72. 
316 Burke. Language as Symbolic Action. 
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similar role connecting producers and consumers together in a way that does not reflect the 
dominant mode of relationship Americans have to food. However, this alterity acts as both an 
affordance and a constraint to its growth. To gain a more ‘popular’ or widespread following, 
food sovereignty in Maine must conceive of how to link with other social demands being made 
in order to form the “chains” of equivalency that compose a populist (and revolutionary) political 
imaginary.317  
 Affective relations act as a “radical investment” in communities that lays a foundation for 
a diffuse regulatory structure and pluralistic access to the democratic process. In the following 
discussion, I show how affect enables the alternative discourse of food sovereignty to gain 
popular support. 318 From an analytical perspective, this articulation concludes this section on 
identification and situates the advocates as prepared to construct a “minoritarian” discourse.319  
 Conceiving of alternatives to a biased system of regulations and developing collective 
decision-making depends on articulating an alternative community ethos. For Harold, a 
community member who does not farm but supports small-scale farming to the extent that he 
can, such an articulation happens through acknowledging that the agro-industrial food system 
creates eaters whose “trained incapacities” develop on account of the distance between ourselves 
and our food.320  
                                                          
317 Laclau, Reason, 74. Laclau identifies two “preconditions” for populism, the first of which I believe food 
sovereignty has forcefully articulated already. First, there needs to be “an internal antagonistic frontier separating 
‘the people’ from power.” Second, there needs to be an “equivalential articulation of demands.” 2017 may mark a 
turning point for food sovereignty regarding the second precondition. A bill has been put forward in the state 
legislature that seeks to give municipalities authority over food production and water extraction within their town 
limits. Water rights have been up to now considered a separate demand, but advocates are moving forward with the 
understanding that food and water are inseparable. See LD 725: An Act To Recognize Local Control Regarding 
Food and Water. 128th Maine Legislature, 2017. 
318 Ibid., 111: “…discursive or hegemonic formations…which articulate differential and equivalential logics would 
be unintelligible” without affect.  
319 Gilles Deleuze and Fèlix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 291. 
320 Burke, Permanence and Change, 7. 
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 This distance distracts from our ability to critically perceive the extent to which 
corporations control the industrial food system.  For many eaters within this system, such 
physical and conceptual distance obscures the “fundamental link to the humble embeddedness” 
of human existence in the world. “We think we can do anything—and we can do many things—
but we do a lot of those things at our peril.” Food sovereignty  
has spawned discussions about basic issues of trust between members of a 
community who know one another…that is different from the kind of trust that 
you have to have when you go into any supermarket and pick up food that has 
been flown from Peru or trucked in from California or gone through a dozen 
different processing operations 
Closing the gap between ourselves and our food depends on making trust “immediate, palpable.” 
Metaphorically, this conception of a sovereign local food system begins with sense-making. The 
idea that, when one goes to purchase food at a neighboring farm, they also feel “something 
resonating from the fields.” Claiming that the current industrial food system encourages us to 
“give up your senses,” Harold makes the connection between ourselves and our food an intimate 
one.  
You still have to rely upon the senses God gave you, which means you have to 
know what those things are…what to pay attention to when your crap detector 
says ‘something’s wrong here,’ either in consistency or appearance…our lives 
depend on it. 
 Cultivating our senses to food builds collective knowledge as to what food production 
entails. Harold claims that strengthening this collective knowledge helps in strengthening “the 
sense of security that people have when they buy food, when they cook it.” In the tactical 
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rhetoric of food sovereignty, advocates link this sense of security with proximity to food 
production. In this discursive construction, systemic bias and inability to access the decision-
making process have material consequences in the form of losing touch with our sensual food 
landscapes. 
the gaps between what we know and think and can do on the larger scale of things 
where everything is in the FDA’s hands, or the department of agriculture, and 
what I can do and feel comfortable asking in my own local environment are huge, 
huge! 
Gaps between what we know we can do and what we should do, as Harold describes here, 
resembles what Hannah Arendt calls the “assumed time lag” between the technical ability of 
humanity and humanistic developments such as rights and laws that direct that ability for the 
common good.321  
 This relates to agricultural regulation and ‘food safety’ in particular in a dialectic that 
squeezes peasant and small-scale farming communities the world over: as the technological 
capacity of humans to produce enormous quantities of food develops, the regulatory structure 
also develops not to constrain the use of agricultural technology, but to accommodate and even 
facilitate its adoption. In Maine, this reality comes to bear through the enforcement of regulations 
that require new and small-scale farmers to purchase expensive equipment and facilities in order 
to meet safety codes. If they cannot afford these, little recourse exists for them to pursue but to 
take on debt in the form of loans or to remain unlicensed and unable to sell raw dairy or 
unlicensed meat products.   
                                                          
321 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958): 49. 
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 In the abstract, this ethical ‘time lag’ asks questions of propriety and forces consideration 
of what is appropriate in any given time and place.322 The assertion of rights central to the food 
sovereignty platform calls attention to the perceived inappropriateness of regulation that effaces \ 
small-scale farmers as valued members of local food systems. Such impropriety comes to the 
fore especially in times of environmental stress, when the means of food production come into 
public view as a matter of necessary concern.  
 Renee, a city councilor who supports food sovereignty, addresses this reality by returning 
to the idea of achieving resilience through food sovereignty, but taking into account the affective 
dimension of resilient communities. A primary motive for her support is concern for how to 
increase her community’s capacity to adapt to social and environmental changes that she sees on 
the horizon. In discussing this question of adaptation, she uses a recent example of how the 
industrial food system creates such an ethical ‘time lag’ as mentioned above:  
We just had that flooding down in Florida and North Carolina and what 
happened? Those huge lagoons of pig waste got flooded and now they have 
significant pollution. The whole thing just seems like an idea run amuck. And 
then as we grow more and more safety-conscious, it’s all of a sudden you can’t 
bring a casserole to a community event. You have to become a certified 
[commercial] kitchen to make something. I trust this idea that, if we know our 
neighbors, it’s okay for me to buy eggs from my neighbor who now has four 
chickens, you know? 
                                                          
322 The concept of Kairos is key for these types of consideration. See Aaron Hess. “Critical-Rhetorical Ethnography: 
Rethinking the Place and Process of Rhetoric.” Communication Studies 62, 2 (2011): 127-152. I discuss the 
importance of Kairos for my research in more detail in chapter 2.  
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 This quote compares the affective dimensions of community to the technical and often 
flawed dynamics of the agro-industrial system. In the first sentence, Renee alludes to the impact 
of Hurricane Matthew in September and October 2016 on CAFO operations (mainly hog and 
chicken farms) in North Carolina. In the aftermath of this storm, 36 factory farms along the 
Neuse, Black, and Cape Fear rivers flooded, leading to widespread water contamination in North 
Carolina’s coastal floodplain with bacteria such as e-coli and salmonella.323 This example points 
to the precarious way in which the industrial food system concentrates both food production and 
waste products to an extent that violent storms such as Matthew can lead to rapid and devastating 
consequences for surrounding communities. Instances like this erode public trust in an industrial 
food system that fails to adapt to realities facing us, namely less predictable but more powerful 
weather patterns.  
 Renee juxtaposes this lack of trust in the industrial food system with the trust that 
undergirds communities in Maine that advocate for food sovereignty. The rhetorical tactic here is 
to compare the relative risks between a food system that, as seen through North Carolina, 
endangers large portions of the population in a relatively short amount of time and one that seeks 
to mitigate such risk through a reliance on neighborly relations. The comparison does not say 
that a community with a food sovereignty ordinance would somehow weather a hurricane better 
than the communities in North Carolina’s coastal floodplain, but rather that they would recover 
without the wide-ranging and immeasurable effects of fecal contamination in the watershed. This 
perspective seeks, above all, to radically re-distribute the means by which we produce and 
                                                          
323 See Soren Rundquist, “Exposing Fields of Filth: After Hurricane, First Detailed Look at Flooding of Feces-Laden 
N.C. Factory Farms,” Environmental Working Group, http://www.ewg.org/research/exposing-fields-filth-hurricane-
matthew. For a study that measures the sanitary quality of waters near CAFOs, see Heaney et al., “Source Tracking 
Swine Fecal Waste in Surface Water Proximal to Swine Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations,” Science of the 
Total Environment 511 (2015): 676-683. 
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consume food—such redistribution would, as the logic goes, protect farmers and consumers alike 
from the worst effects of a concentrated and, thus, vulnerable food system. 
 Vulnerability, in this sense, speaks to the large-scaled means of agricultural production 
prevalent throughout the United States. Such systemic vulnerability also manifests at the 
personal level in ways that food sovereignty advocates see as highly inappropriate. The 
impropriety relates, as with Renee, to the loss of trust between community members and their 
government and how it seems to promote dangerous food production practices predicated on, as 
seen in the following example, the ways in which regulators use language.  
 This sense of distrust and impropriety occurs in a strange rhetorical situation regarding 
dairy labelling. An official designation distinguishes ‘pasteurized’ products from ‘heat-treated’ 
products. The former undergoes pasteurization in “aseptic conditions” whereas the latter does so 
in “septic conditions.”324 The different classification amounts to heat-treated dairy products 
reaching the same temperature for the same length of time as pasteurized products, but doing so 
in uncovered containers. Bacteria are still eliminated, but, technically, pasteurization occurs in 
specific machinery that is often prohibitively expensive for small-scale producers like Sarah and 
David. Thus, the classification is as much a financial as a processing one. 
 Such interactions with the state—both at home and in the state house—fuel the argument 
that food sovereignty in Maine builds upon affective relationships of trust. This reasoning calls 
for a built-in safety measure where communities filter the risks of food-borne illness for one 
                                                          
324 This distinction between aseptic and septic conditions for milk processing can be found in Chapter 329: RULE 
GOVERNING MAINE MILK AND MILK PRODUCTS from the Department of Agriculture, Food, and Rural 
Resources, specifically pages 6 and 15, 
http://www.maine.gov/dacf/qar/inspection_programs/dairy_inspection.shtml. See also Title 7, §2902-B of the Maine 
Revised Statutes for the laws regarding the sale of unpasteurized milk and milk products, where it states: “A person 
may not sell unpasteurized milk or a product made from unpasteurized milk, including heat-treated cheese, unless 
the label on that product contains the words ‘not pasteurized.’” 
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another because of their shared bonds. As Sarah and David see it, regulations will never fix the 
problem of food safety because sharing food with one another is such a basic form of human 
interaction, despite its ‘risk.’ “You will always have such problems. Regardless if everyone is 
licensed because they sell.” The point should not be to regulate our modes of sharing food at the 
interpersonal level, but rather scale the regulation in common sensical ways—namely, the ways 
that make the most sense for the community affected by them. To further push this point, David 
makes the comparison to the commercial prepared-food industry: “it can happen to anybody at 
any given time, anywhere. You go to Chipotle and they have all the fresh stuff and what 
happened...there’s been more recalls on food from the commercial side of everything than there 
ever has been from the raw milk people.”  
 In tension with this emphasis on trust lies the risk that ‘food safety’ advocates (most 
notably the FDA) point to in the form of food borne illness. Significant risk exists for the small-
scale producers who work within the towns that have passed ordinances. Referencing the case 
against Dan Brown,325 Sarah and David suggest that, even if a town votes in an ordinance, it only 
serves as a symbolic gesture: “it is still illegal, in spite of our ordinance, it still illegal to sell raw 
milk [and] raw cheese.”  
 As a way to explain why they support the passage of a symbolic gesture, David suggests 
that the ordinance has a twofold purpose: to give one standing in court should the state prosecute 
them, and as an act of “civil disobedience…the concept is that someday somebody is going to 
say something and the law is going to change.” An implicit goal remains that, someday, the state 
will find itself ‘on the wrong side’ of a majority of Maine citizens.  
                                                          
325 State of Maine v. Dan Brown, ME 79 (2014). For an analysis of the Superior Court ruling that preceded the state 
Supreme Court case, see also Mario Moretto, “Blue Hill raw milk ruling deals blow to local food sovereignty 
movement,” Bangor Daily News, May 04, 2013. 
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 One can never eliminate the risk of food borne illness completely, but affective relations 
of trust can serve as filters to mitigate this risk at the interpersonal level. “It’s a thing about 
trust—you know the person, you know how they make it, and then you decide you want to buy 
it.”326 Affective reasoning also connects to the sense that “it is the right thing to do.” Sarah 
makes the link to civil disobedience explicit when she says: “this disobedience, it happens 
always when the law is not right.”  
 For advocates, civil disobedience grows from the trust that we have with one another to 
do right. Reconsidering this position through Arendt’s concern for propriety suggests that what is 
improper is the way that the industrial food system discursively constructs trust. Industrial trust 
is too blind for advocates of food sovereignty; they feel compelled to know their sources of food 
in a tangible way. 
 Language in the ordinance signifies the ‘plasticity of the proper’ through its emphasis on 
‘access.’ Although section 5.2 of the ordinance discusses the “Right to Access and Produce 
Food,” the demand in question concerns the ability to benefit from closer proximity to food 
production.327 Moving from a perspective that only considers rights (propriety and property) to 
one that focuses on ability attends to the webs of “social relationships that can constrain or 
                                                          
326 Sarah and David, personal interview, September 20, 2016. 
327 Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance of 2014. Alliance for the Common Good. Justice Rising 
6, 3 (2015): 18-19. The full text of Section 5.2 reads: “Right to Access and Produce Food. (Name of town) citizens 
possess the right to save and exchange seed; produce, process, sell, purchase, and consume local foods of their 
choosing.” Access also receives mention in the purpose statement of the ordinance, Section 3:  
(i) Provide citizens with unimpeded access to local food;  
(ii) Enhance the local economy by promoting the production and purchase of local agricultural 
products; 
(iii) Protect access to farmers’ markets, roadside stands, farm based sales and direct producer to 
patron sales;  
(iv) Support the economic viability of local food producers and processors; 
(v) Preserve community social events where local foods are served or sold; 
(vi) Preserve local knowledge and traditional foodways. 
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enable people to benefit from resources” instead of just focusing on property ownership.328 
Indeed, the ordinance in Maine acts as a means by which landowners have access to, or the 
ability to benefit from, their property. This perspective emphasizes how “access patterns change 
over time; [hence] they must be understood as processes.”329 The ordinance brings this process 
orientation to the fore; small-scale farming succeeds because of its ability to adapt to the needs of 
the locality.  
 One advocate underscores this perspective in testimony for a public hearing by tracing 
the emphasis on affect back to the Declaration of Independence: 
‘But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same 
Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, 
it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for 
their future security.’330 Our new guards will be old ones that have existed since 
long before our country has: our trust in one another, our ability to make our own 
decisions, and our ways of nourishing each other that pre-date corporate 
agriculture.331 
 Other advocates use similar language to emphasize the connections between community 
members as the integral aspect of sovereign food production. To “cherish the connection,”332 
communities value opportunities to know and understand the food production process. These 
opportunities have so much value that communities need legislation to protect it, for “there is 
                                                          
328 Jesse C. Ribot and Nancy Lee Peluso, “A Theory of Access,” Rural Sociology 68, 2 (2003): 154. 
329 Ibid., 160. 
330 Declaration of Independence, para 2, U.S., 1776. 
331 Bonnie Preston, Testimony in support of LD 475: An Act To Increase Food Sovereignty in Local Communities, 
2013. 
332 David J. Berg, Testimony in support of LD 783: RESOLUTION, Proposing and Amendment to the Constitution 
of Maine To Establish a Right to Food, 2015. 
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nothing more intimate than eating.”333 Two legislators testifying in support of food sovereignty 
articulate how their support finds its motive in childhood experiences—as one put it: from “the 
lessons I learned about governing from growing up on a farm…Plan for the future…You reap 
what you sow…[and] we are all in this together.”334 
 I finish this theme on affect and this section on identification by returning to comments 
made by Helen that synthesize concerns expressed by advocates relating to resiliency in response 
to economic and ecological vulnerability335 and food sovereignty as a form of community re-
connection. She also leads this discussion into the next section, which focuses on how advocates 
in Maine construct a discourse around the pluralistic goals of increased access to the democratic 
decision-making process. 
 Taking an active role in decision-making processes builds the capacity of small-farming 
communities, but Helen suggests that this capacity addresses a need that emerges from 
communities vulnerable to regulatory pressure. To relieve this pressure through ‘counter 
pressure’ lessens community vulnerability. 
 This vulnerability is multifaceted, but stems from a lack of community engagement. She 
references the current opioid addiction problems that many rural communities struggle with in 
Maine and elsewhere in the country. She suggests that there is “a desperate need…[to] feel like 
there are positive ways to engage in your own community” in order to know “that you’re not 
                                                          
333 Rep. Craig V. Hickman, Testimony in support of LD 783.  
334 Rep. Charlotte May Warren, Testimony in support of LD 783 (underline emphasis in original). See also Rep. 
Craig V. Hickman, Testimony in support of LD 783, who gives a moving account of how his mother and father 
taught him “the miracle of feeding people.” 
335 An alternative conception of vulnerability is as a capacity that affords, rather than a liability that constrains. 
Bridie McGreavy has articulate such an alternative, suggesting that “the dialectic of resilience-vulnerability sets up 
affectability as negative risk, which reinforces the perceived need for control.” See Bridie McGreavy. “Resilience as 
Discourse.” Environmental Communication, 10, 1 (2016): 104-121. Such a perspective of vulnerability is applicable 
to the discourse of food sovereignty in that, as I argue here, affect is a source of community strength and resistance. 
Rather than coping, advocates for food sovereignty are actively seeking out alternatives to the paradigm of industrial 
food production. 
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disconnected and you’re not seeking those things out.” As it relates to small-farmers as 
community members, she recalls how, when she and her husband began farming, they practiced 
“ostrich farming,” where they farmed with minimal political engagement. With the farm taking 
precedence over everything else, the effect is that “your head’s in the sand and your tail’s in the 
air and you’re actually really vulnerable” to the regulatory system.  
 Such vulnerability affects the non-farming community as well. The lack of public 
engagement between farmers and non-farmers breaks down lines of communication, so that 
people who supported…small farms had absolutely no idea…[that] most small 
farms are there by a thread…then when [farmers] stop farming, the people that ate 
from those farms never knew why. Why did they just disappear?...Where did they 
go? 
For Helen, the fear that this lack of engagement and loss of shared knowledge creates provides 
the exigence for enacting municipal ordinances. The absence of strong local communities 
presents an existential threat to small farms and traditions which the ordinances seek to preserve. 
Lack of knowledge and engagement, however, is not the inevitable collateral damage of social 
‘progress.’ Rather, it results from progressive regulatory reform that accelerates the 
consolidation of smaller farms and modes of production into larger farms and more extensive, 
extractive modes of production.  
 Consolidation, accelerated by the industrial regulatory structure, catalyzes advocates of 
food sovereignty in Maine. In forming a coherent community, they identify around three 
principal themes, including a necessarily broad conception of sovereignty, a rejection of the 
appearance of political corruption, and the potency of affective relations, specifically that of 
93 
 
 
trust. The next section builds off how advocates use their identification with food sovereignty to 
construct an alternative discourse to that of industrial food production.  
Discursive Construction of Food Sovereignty: Subjugation and Access 
 The ways advocates identify with the principles of food sovereignty develop a 
‘constitutive’ rhetoric and materialize in the testimonies and texts of the community. These 
events interrupt the industrial food system’s discourse, specifically as it relates to food safety, 
and emphasize how such a system subjugates their patterns of experience and collective 
knowledge about food production.336  
 In discussing this subjugation, I begin to refer to these patterns of experience as 
‘agrarian.’337 Agrarian knowledge has fundamentally transformed under ‘international food 
regimes’338 from a central cultural component for many people around the world to a 
marginalized and, in the case of Maine, an increasingly rare emblem of a ‘regressive’ past. In 
advocating for “traditional foodways,”339 food sovereignty troubles the assumption that technical 
innovation leads inexorably to social progress. Advocates do not oppose agricultural 
regulation,340 but suspect that ‘progress’ is a euphemism for corporate control of the food system.  
                                                          
336 Foucault, Society, 7-10. 
337 Agrarianism has a rich and varied philosophical history in the United States. For the purposes of this study, 
‘agrarian’ will refer to the “neo-agrarianism” put forward by William H. Major. In his book, Grounded Vision, he 
suggests that a new agrarianism has the potential to act “as a material friction to an ecologically destructive 
machine,” i.e. the industrial food system and its attendant regulatory power. The emphasis he includes on ecological 
principles makes it particularly suitable to this discussion of food sovereignty, where concepts of social and 
environmental resilience have helped shape my interpretations. Furthermore, Major considers right use and care as 
the core values of agrarianism. Variations on these two values occur repeatedly within food sovereignty’s discourse 
and emphasize the limits to industrial policy in a return to affect and local community leverage in state politics. See 
William H. Major. Grounded Vision: New Agrarianism and the Academy. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama 
Press, 2011. 
338 See Henry Bernstein. “Food Sovereignty via the ‘peasant way’: a skeptical view.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 
41, 6 (2014): 1031-1063; Friedmann and McMichael, “Agriculture and the state system.” 
339 Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance, 2014. 
340 Several interviewees and testimonies explicitly affirm their support for regulation of industrial agriculture. The 
primary concern for Mainers is how to appropriately scale down this regulation to accommodate the many small-
scale farmers that still practice in the state. As Bea puts it:  
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 This perception speaks volumes to the rhetorical sensibilities of advocates. For small-
scale farmers, the discourse of industrial food production performs metonymic reductions341 of 
what it means to farm.342 In other words, industrial agriculture’s discourse “conveys some 
incorporeal or intangible state in terms of the corporeal or tangible.”343 Regional dynamics 
become obstacles to industry goals of standardization, homogenization, and commodification. In 
response to this, food sovereignty’s discourse articulates the intangible344 values associated with 
small-scale agriculture that no amount of facilities requirements or licensing can reproduce. This 
discursive move points to the subjugation of such values and how communities need them to 
secure their health, safety, and welfare.  
 In the following analysis, I explore how food sovereignty’s discourse functions in a 
tactical way as opposed to a strategic way. I rely on Michel de Certeau’s distinction between 
tactics and strategies,345 specifically looking at how tactics do not identify with “the law of the 
place,”346 but rather cut across the public and private spheres through use, manipulation, and 
diversion of these places. In contrast to the metonymic reduction of the industrial discourse, food 
sovereignty’s discourse and agrarian values “metaphorize the dominant order” and make it 
“function in another register.”347 By focusing on sovereignty, however, this discourse analyzes 
                                                          
“…we’re not against regulation; we’re for right-sized regulation…somebody needs to be watching 
[large-scale farms], but if I want to sell a bushel of tomatoes to my next door neighbor who wants 
to can them herself, we don’t need the FDA inspecting those tomatoes. That’s the bottom line.”  
341 For one perspective of how certain linguistic devices align with each of the four ‘master tropes,’ see Frank J. 
D’Angelo, “A Theory of ‘Dispositio’,” Journal of Advanced Composition 10, 1 (1990): 101-109. 
342 Here I refer to Burke’s discussion of the “four master tropes,” where he discusses metonymy as a reductive use of 
language. See Burke, Grammar, 506.  
343 Ibid., 506. 
344 I use ‘intangible’ as an adjective to describe the agrarian value system. I also use it to foreground the notion of 
propriety and how Hannah Arendt suggests that intangibility is a fundamental characteristic of ‘the social,’ as 
opposed to the clearly defined oikos and polis of antiquity, as discussed later in this section.  
345 Michel de Certeau. The Practice of Everyday Life. Trans. by Steven Randall. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1984. 
346 Ibid., 29. 
347 Ibid., 32. 
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the inequalities of power in Maine’s agricultural sector not through a metaphorical frame of war, 
but through one of contract. 
 Foucault describes such an analysis as “juridical,”348 or how sovereignty remains 
enmeshed in a matrix of political power that defines it in terms of legitimacy and illegitimacy 
rather than submission or repression. In food sovereignty’s discourse, the state, through its 
corporately-influenced regulatory enforcement, breaks the social contract as laid out in the U.S. 
and Maine state constitutions. Thus, food sovereignty uses constitutive rhetoric to pick up the 
pieces and recompose rural society in line with agrarian values.349 
 Food sovereignty’s discourse also draws attention to farms and their place in local food 
systems as one where state power is exercised to the detriment of the community. To 
conceptualize this, I draw on Foucault’s idea of ‘subjugated knowledges’ as being particular yet 
central to the formation of local critiques of the exercise of state power as consisting of 
“disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges…naïve [and] hierarchically inferior” to the erudite 
and scientific discourse that the state requires.350  
 The systematization of difference characteristic of a bureaucratic regulatory scheme 
masks the endemic differences of small-scale farming communities and renders illegitimate their 
appeals for recognition by the state apparatus. Food sovereignty attempts to transorm this official 
illegitimacy by honing a critical set of tactics that “struggle against the coercion of a unitary, 
formal, and scientific theoretical discourse.”351 Following the discursive eruptions of this 
struggle takes me over the contested terrain of contemporary agricultural discourse and 
                                                          
348 Foucault, Society, 16-17. 
349 Composition, in this sense, resonates strongly with Latour’s manifesto on the topic, in which he states that, to 
have a sense of continuity through time and space, actors must “compose it from discontinuous pieces.” See Bruno 
Latour, “An Attempt at a Compositionist’s Manifesto,” New Literary History 41 (2010): 484. 
350 Foucault, Society, 2.  
351 Ibid., 10. 
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highlights the boundaries of two primary “terministic screens”:352 that of scientific, industrial 
food production and its homogeneous regulatory goals and that of poetic self-governance, where 
food sovereignty turns towards intangible values rather than towards tangible, measurable, and 
easily-controlled values of economic legitimacy.  
 The farm becomes a site of struggle that demands a ‘radical investment’ of affect to 
succeed. Discursive construction of such struggle, however, brings to the fore tensions between 
conventions of public and private spaces. Farms become sources of public good yet remain 
private property and, often, private businesses. To negotiate these distinctions into a cohesive 
discourse, food sovereignty focuses on access to the decision-making process as what the 
industrial food system controls.  
 Theoretically, pitting the metonymy of industrial food discourse against the metaphorical 
discourse of food sovereignty creates a convenient dichotomy.353 Practically, however, the 
discourses interact in dialectical ways that do not always align with the rhetorical categories I 
place them in here. Metaphor slips into metonymy and vice versa, depending on the situation.  
 The crafting of municipal ordinances that constitute food sovereignty present an example 
of such slippery rhetorical boundaries. As noted in the section one of this chapter, ‘constitutive’ 
rhetoric has purposeful vagueness that enables future interpreters the flexibility to relate the text 
to current conditions. Constitutive rhetoric emphasizes the principles and values that 
communities use as a guide to address problems as they arise. The municipal ordinances, as 
                                                          
352 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, 44-45.  
353 Comparing metonymy and metaphor as oppositional tropes is not entirely justified, but, as I allude to later in the 
analysis, the reductive (metonymic) discourse of industrial food production serves as a paradigmatic logic, which 
necessarily limits the possible range of ‘legitimate’ farming practices. I suggest that, in constructing their discourse 
metaphorically, food sovereignty advocates demonstrate a syntagmatic logic that composes a worldview from what 
surrounds them. In other words, food sovereignty is a place-based logic that demonstrates, through rhetorical tactics, 
an ability to re-articulate their values from what they have, not from what they wish they had. In the words of De 
Certeau, they ‘make do.’  
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examples of this, work to “establish a principle of inviting citizens to interpret and debate… [to] 
a freedom to shape themselves through creatively grounded interpretive and rhetorical 
processes.”354 Creativity defines food sovereignty’s discourse, both within and without the 
ordinances, and by focusing on access to regulatory decision-making uses this creativity to open 
up public interpretation of what it means to farm legitimately in Maine.  
 The first theme is that of perceived systemic or structural bias, perpetuated through the 
regulatory structure. This perception of bias that subjugates the agrarian practices that contribute 
to the discourse of food sovereignty. Small-scale farms become “site[s] of engagement”355 
between the state and communities, exposing the imbalance of power and the lack of popular 
access to the regulatory process.  
 Conceptually, the corporate-state’s power over the small farmer “occurs in the 
interstice…the pure distance which indicates that the adversaries do not belong to a common 
space.”356 ‘Common space,’ for the state, does not refer to the home, but to the landscape of 
industrialized food production and the regulatory system that sets standards to comply with 
industry, not the other way around. The interstice of industrialized food landscapes occurs on the 
small farm that cannot afford or wishes not to comply with regulatory fees and, therefore, finds 
its farming practice—its ways of knowing and inherited knowledges—under threat and out of 
place. Placement here is arbitrary and a function of the state’s “distribution of the sensible,” 
whereby the designation of ‘commonness’ also denotes uncommonness, or exclusion.357 
                                                          
354 Leigh H. Holmes. ”Claiming Grounds of Substance: Reading James Boyd White on the U.S. Constitution’s 
Discursive Communities,” RSQ: Rhetoric Society Quarterly 21, 3 (1991): 59-67. 
355 Priscilla Claeys. Human Rights and the Food Sovereignty Movement: Reclaiming Control. London and New 
York: Routledge, 2015. 
356 Michel Foucault. “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” In Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays 
and Interviews, edited by Donald F. Bouchard, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977): 150.   
357 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, trans. Gabriel Rockhill, (London and New York: Continuum, 2006): 
12 
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 Excluding small-scale farming from common places results in losing the intangible 
values associated with small-scale farming that the interviewees, testimony, and texts of food 
sovereignty articulate. Food sovereignty’s discourse seeks to protect these values by 
recomposing the legal landscape of agriculture. First, however, it defines the discourse of 
industrial food production as aggressively hegemonic, enforcing the loss of defining community 
values. Such losses alter the relationship between state regulatory agencies and farmers into one 
of oppression: one-size-fits-all agricultural regulations create “non-places” for small-scale 
farmers while, conversely, placing corporations everywhere.358  
 Systemic bias has its most detrimental effects in terms of political access for communities 
and accountability on the part of legislators and state agents. In terms of social resiliency, this 
industry-government infrastructure remains “brittle” and prone to repeated and dangerous 
breakdowns.359 This instability acts as a motive for advocates to reconceive community food 
systems as a means to a more pluralist and responsible society. For example, Harold references 
subsidies for corporate business as a growing risk with the prospect of unpredictable 
environmental change. Continuing to pursue fossil fuels relies on such financial support; to 
question it questions the economic foundation of our culture. And yet, such questioning remains 
a conceptual motive for food sovereignty:  
There are larger principles that need to be addressed and common interests across 
groups, nationwide and, ultimately, the world as well…They [policy makers] can 
                                                          
358 Foucault, “Nietzsche,” 139-164. The sense of a “non-place” resonates strongly with Nietzsche’s tragic art and the 
goals of a radically democratic society. Rationality and transparency function as central themes in the myth of 
progress. Unveiling and pushing this myth so that it “recede[s] progressively to the horizon of the social” will make 
it a ‘non-place,’ or “the symbol of its own impossibility.” See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, (London and New York: Verso, 1985): 191. 
359 Jeff, personal interview, November 3, 2016. 
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either make it a disincentive for people to [pursue alternatives], or they can make 
it an incentive, and nobody is asking those big questions. 
 One consequence of structural bias results in the loss of accountability policy makers 
have to the general public. This loss acts as a displacement of identity at the community level. 
Representation in government, while ostensibly borne out of a synecdochic360 process whereby 
the interests of regional constituencies condense into a single voice of the political 
representative, now also competes with interests of businesses and lobbying associations that 
represent wealthy constituencies whose influence crosses state boundaries.  
 Harold presents an example of this moneyed interest influencing the regulatory process in 
describing how legislation containing food sovereignty language has been prevented from 
passage into law because of seemingly manufactured concerns that align with industry 
interests.361 During review in the appropriations committee, the department of agriculture argued 
that they would “have to hire one or two new inspectors to implement” the bill. The problem 
with such a response, for Harold, is that in food sovereignty, the accountability and inspection 
(i.e. the costs the committee associated with new hiring) remains embedded within the 
community.  
 This interpretive gap between the state and advocates as to what accountability means 
and how to implement it speaks to the transformative aspirations of the discourse. In a food 
system predicated on anonymity and mass production, rules for accountability depend on a “very 
elaborate structure of transportation and handling” as a sort of insurance against risk “rather than 
the trust and knowledge” that constitutes community connections.  
                                                          
360 Burke, Grammar, 507. 
361 This is a reference to LD 783, from 2015. 
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 Thus, how to work within a regulatory system that develops in biased ways represents a 
principal struggle for food sovereignty in Maine. A sense of urgency exists in response to the 
perceived redefinition of what it is that farming means for society: 
what appears to be happening writ large, in terms of corporations having way 
more of a role than politicians or the people and that the corporations are defining 
new centers of power and hegemony that are different from nation-states. How do 
you access them? 
Jeff offers a possible answer to this question and suggests that codifying small-scale, “micro 
enterprise development” suggests way to work within a corporate regulatory structure. This 
claim has, as its basis, the perspective of sovereignty as closely linked to regenerative or resilient 
modes of social organization. Jeff emphasizes this goal of stability by contrasting industrial and 
small-scale food production practices:  
large-scale, concentrated food production in the hands of a few who have these 
large-scale, capital-intensive production operations [is]…very brittle from a 
macro-cosmic perspective because it is capital-intensive, it is energy-
intensive…We have this capital-intensive, energy-intensive infrastructure…[and] 
forms of production that we assume should be the way everyone should operate. 
And that is a flaw in our imagination, I think. 
  Here, Jeff suggests that a brittle infrastructure produces brittle assumptions about 
how people should live, about propriety and collective expectations. Change, in order to 
adapt and gain resilience in the face of heightened environmental risks, must be systemic. 
Drafting small-scale (municipal) and distributed legislation finds its parallel in the 
distributed means of production that it seeks to “enshrine.”  
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 This move towards local legislation responds to the perceived threat from federal 
and state governments. The process of political representation seems disrupted, with 
representatives responding more readily to wealthy interests than to the majority of their 
constituents. Rather than waiting for the process to include local constituencies, these 
constituencies have begun a new and different process in the form of writing grassroots 
legislation. Building a more stable collective infrastructure focuses on redefining the 
pursuits of regulation. Food sovereignty ordinances serve as “an affirmation of a right,” 
namely the “right to grow and sell food,”362 instead of assuming humans to have a 
destructive relations with the world.  
 Barbara, a community member, avid supporter and consumer of local food, and a lead 
organizer for food sovereignty in Maine, articulates how the ordinance begins this redefinition. 
In her articulation of a “triangle of doom”—consisting of federal agencies, state departments, 
and corporate industry—she approaches the interactions between the state and small farmers in 
terms of the tactical advantages gained by one side or the other. This perspective contextualizes 
the following two themes in this section as forming a political landscape in Maine that 
disadvantages small farming communities and the traditions that food sovereignty hopes to 
maintain.  
 As an example of this, she summarizes a highly-publicized legal case that came before 
the Maine Supreme Court in the fall of 2011 and pitted the state of Maine against a farmer that 
sold raw milk from a single cow.363 This case is the only one to date that has addressed the 
                                                          
362 Interestingly, Jeff suggests that this affirmation of growing food for our neighbors—the “de facto status 
quo”—is the first step in a longer-term process “for enshrining right in other entities. If a corporation can 
have legal personhood, then I think mountains should as well as forests, watersheds, bodies of water, etc.”  
363 State of Maine v. Dan Brown, ME 79 (2014). See also Mario Moretto, “Blue Hill’s Farmer Brown loses three-
year fight against state dairy regulation,” Bangor Daily News, June 17, 2014.  
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municipal ordinances directly in terms of their legal logic. While the ruling led to the defendant 
having to end his sales of raw milk, the Supreme Court avoided ruling against Maine’s ‘home 
rule’ law,364 which forms the basis of the ordinance’s goals “to carve out zones of protection” for 
small farmers. By avoiding a ruling against the home rule clause, the court, according to Barbara, 
“made a tactical error.” The focus on a single farmer who worked at such a small scale seemed 
like a form of bullying that rubbed many people the wrong way. This public perception led to 
increased scrutiny of the state’s case against the farmer—scrutiny that undermined the state’s 
credibility. Claims about the high bacteria count seemed hyperbolic, given the fact that people 
drink raw milk in order to ingest higher amounts of bacteria seemed lost on the state.  
 Ostensibly, the state’s concern regarded food safety. While a consistent argument against 
food sovereignty, Barbara suggests that the state unevenly applies this concern across different 
jurisdictions in the regulatory structure. For example, she questions the sincerity of food safety 
concerns when elsewhere in the food industry there seems a disturbing disregard for food safety. 
“Prophylactic use of antibiotics” in meat production are necessary only to maintain the 
dangerously unsanitary conditions that many animals are raised in. If this practice was banned, 
Barbara suggests, it “would eliminate the whole CAFO system because you can’t raise animals 
that close together without feeding them full of antibiotics.”  
 In terms of rhetorical effects, such policies erode trust in the regulatory system to actually 
keep consumers safe. The notion of “food safety” sounds more like a ruse to advantage large-
scale, corporate farming operations that can afford regulatory costs that price out smaller-scale 
farms. For the skeptical consumer, rather than government regulating the agricultural industry, it 
                                                          
364 Home rule is a Maine constitutional statute that presumes authority to lie in the will of municipalities and grants 
them the capacity to adopt, amend, or repeal ordinances. See §3001. “Ordinance power.” Maine State Constitution, 
Title 30-A, Subpart 4, 1989. See also Julia Bayly, “Maine towns declare food sovereignty, claim ‘home rule’ trumps 
state, federal regulations,” Bangor Daily News, March 07, 2016. 
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appears more like “governmental catering to the corporations” at the expense of small farming 
communities. 
 Tactically, these same communities in Maine try to exploit these perceptions of “the 
triangle of doom,” consisting of federal agencies, state departments, and corporate industry. One 
example of this focuses on constructing the sense of a systemic assault on small-scale farming 
communities that emanates from the federal government. Food sovereignty in Maine emerged 
out from under the pressure to conform to new governmental regulation that sought to expand 
the federal field of jurisdiction. “The FDA came down on Maine because they weren’t in 
conformance with their regulations”365 as they related to direct sales between farmers and their 
customers.  
 Historically, “there’s [been] no relationship between the state and farmers doing direct 
sales to their customers,”366 but the increased pressure led to regulatory changes that have 
redefined the modes of production for small farms. For example, the state “redefined dairy 
farmers as milk distributors,”367 regardless of how they produced milk or how much they 
actually sold or how they actually distributed the milk. Small farmers that sold on-farm to 
neighbors were designated as ‘milk distributors’ and thus subject to regulations such as 
refurbishing barns with concrete floors and purchasing expensive processing equipment. Rather 
than increasing food safety, the effect of this pressure has been to make it harder for small 
farmers to serve their communities.  
 Food sovereignty advocates incorporate this community-mindedness into their rhetoric. 
The municipal ordinances have appropriated language from legislation elsewhere in the state or 
                                                          
365 Barbara, personal interview, July 22, 2016. 
366 Ibid. 
367 Ibid. 
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the country to further the goals of communities in Maine.368 For example, Barbara explains how 
the ordinance uses “right to farm’ language, which is generally something used by…corporate 
farms.” Combining this appropriated language with knowledge of legal theory enables advocates 
to present arguments that the state and industry have been unable to overturn in court.369 Barbara 
even suggests that state and federal laws frustrate the purposes of each other, and that the 
language of food sovereignty remains faithful to the intent of the state’s department of 
conservation, agriculture, and forestry.370  
 The only way for the state to prevent the municipal ordinances from taking effect is to 
show that the ordinance ‘frustrates the purpose of state law.’371 However, she points out that in 
the law establishing the state department of conservation, agriculture, and forestry, language is 
included that “specifically says that the purpose of the establishment of the department is to 
protect small family farms and rural communities.” The tactical rhetoric of the food sovereignty 
discourse in Maine has deftly appropriated language to recompose the legal landscape of 
agriculture in response to the redefinition of agricultural modes of production by state and 
federal governments.  
                                                          
368 Sources of the ordinance language include the Florida SB 1900: Florida Food Freedom Act of 2010; the 
Wyoming HB 0054: Wyoming Food Freedom Act of 2010. Within the state, sources of language for the ordinance 
language include two ‘water rights’ ordinances from western Maine towns seeking to control both the quality and 
quantity of their groundwater. See “Large-Scale Groundwater Extraction Ordinance of the Town of Shapleigh, 
Maine” and “Town of Newfield Water Ordinance.” Both ordinances were passed in 2009.   
369 Unfortunately, the perspective of advocates that the state purposely avoided preempting the ordinance is not 
shared by one of the most prominent, if not the most prominent, voice of public opinion in Maine—the Bangor 
Daily News. The daily paper implied, at one point, that state law preempts the ordinance, which it does not. See 
Mario Moretto, “Raw milk, poultry and produce: Bills easing small-farm oversight clear big legislative hurdle,” 
Bangor Daily News, May 08, 2013. 
370 See “L.D. 837: An Act To Clarify the Laws Establishing the Department of Agriculture, Conservation and 
Forestry,” Laws of the State of Maine: As Passed by the 126th Legislature, 997-1010. See especially Title 7, MRSA 
§101, sub-§2-A and Title 7, MRSA §201-A; in these revised statutes is language defining “foodways” and stating 
that “[i]t is the policy of this State to encourage food self-sufficiency for its citizens” and goes on to enumerate local 
control, small-scale farming and food production, and self-reliance and personal responsibility – among other things 
– as policy goals for the department.  
371 See Paul Diller, “Intrastate Preemption,” Boston University Law Review, 87, 1113-1176.  
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 This tactical use of language, ensuring that the language used by advocates agrees with 
the stated purposes of state law, exposes the bias of the regulatory structure in favor of 
corporations. The common rebuttal to food sovereignty in the state legislature and at town 
meetings is that food safety is paramount. But I highlight how the patterns of experience for 
advocates do not align with this purported concern for safety.  
 As a city councilor advocating for passage of an ordinance, Renee tries to understand 
“what people are afraid of.” Ironically, the concern, above all, seems to be food safety, even 
though the same system that produces the type of contamination seen in North Carolina is 
perceived as being safer than the small-scale production model that food sovereignty seeks.  
 This irony derives from the discursive construction of food-borne illness as a ‘disorder’ 
within the industrial food system. The ‘disorderliness’ resides within the product itself (food) as 
opposed to within the production process. Hence, all the regulatory measures conceived of to 
control the mode of production have as a goal an ‘orderly’ or ‘clean’ product.  
 Health is referred to in terms of cleanliness, or the negation of ‘impurities.’ The 
legislative testimony of various advocates of food sovereignty echoes such a sentiment. For 
example, citizens argue that the right to food is a “fundamental right,” the prevention of which is 
analogous to other violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses in the fourteenth 
amendment.372 To use this frame in food sovereignty’s discourse suggests that industrial food 
discourse considers unlicensed food products as violating “the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
                                                          
372 Brian Jones, Testimony in favor of LD 783, 2015. In making this argument, Jones invokes the US Supreme Court 
Case Loving v. Virginia, which ruled against Virginia’s state law preventing interracial marriages. Such laws 
prevented the ability of individuals to “enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” (emphasis mine). See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
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free men.”373 For advocates who farm or consume small farm products, it is as though their 
products “are treated as if they fall into some bio-hazard category.”374 
 One aspect of this discursive ‘disorder’ has an effect of intimidation on small-scale 
producers by redefining them as criminally non-compliant. Several citizens testify to this by 
saying that increasingly stringent regulations will “turn us into outlaws.”375 One advocate even 
calls their homemade candies “Criminal Caramels” because they make them “in an unlicensed, 
uninspected kitchen…[and] use…lard from our own healthy pigs.”376 Instead of a regulatory 
framework that discursively transforms artisanal and small-scale food production into criminal 
acts, advocates claim that Maine “would be better served if our Attorney General was pressuring 
the DOJ to prosecute Dean Foods, DFA, and National Milk Holdings” in order to “protect Maine 
farmer from corruption, unfair market forces, and an unfounded public health campaign against 
unpasteurized milk.” Such redefinition would “keep us from becoming criminals for doing what 
we do, growing what we grow, selling what we sell and honoring the agrarian tradition of 
Maine.”377 The regulatory structure only addresses the symptoms of its own defined practices. 
 If regulators wish to ensure safe food, then the entire frame of food safety needs to 
change. The discourse of food sovereignty produces new frames with which to perceive food 
safety not as something that can “‘legislate’ a disorder out of existence,”378 but rather as 
something endemic to food production, not particular actors. The industrial discursive frame of 
‘food safety’ operates as a legislative remedy to the ‘disorder’ of food-borne illness.  
                                                          
373 Ibid. 
374 Mark Willis, Testimony in favor of LD 1287, 2013. 
375 Betsy Garrold, Testimony in favor of LD 1287, 2013. 
376 Deborah Evans, Testimony in favor of LD 1287, 2013.  
377 Garrold, LD 1287.  
378 Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History (Los Altos, California: Hermes, 1959), 28. 
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 Food sovereignty seeks an injunction here to redefine and re-frame mass food-borne 
illness as a symptom of the industrial system, not rooted in food production that occurs in 
unlicensed facilities. In this sense, the discourse of food sovereignty warns against the use of 
legislation in the name of ‘food safety’ as something “hardly more than a kind of public 
prayer.”379 Regulators and the industry focus on the product rather than the process as that which 
needs to be controlled and, in so doing, offer no opportunity to actually address the causes of 
unsafe food.  
 Renee refers to this product-oriented regulation as “the guise of safety,” a guise that can 
filter public health disasters such as the flooding in North Carolina as unfortunate but ephemeral 
‘accidents’ as opposed to an ever present risk latent in the industrial food system. The discourse 
of food sovereignty tries to invert this narrative, claiming as Renee does that: 
the danger from food is actually coming from the industrial food business. You 
can’t buy chickens at the local supermarket that are not covered in e-coli…you 
don’t see that on small farms. You see that when you have ten chickens crammed 
into a cage…because the only way you can grow food under those conditions is to 
supplement with huge amounts of antibiotics. Now we are developing bacteria 
that are resistant to that…we are in danger now from corporate farming. 
The point should never be to try and eradicate the risk, but rather to actively work with it and 
even include it within our arbitrary definitions of ‘healthy’ communities. In other words, our 
symbolic action should include the bacteriological substance that necessarily composes part of 
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our world, for it would be disingenuous to do otherwise. We cannot escape this; let us not delude 
ourselves in the pursuit for purity.380  
 An example of the consequences of this pursuit appear in the case of Lisa, a micro-dairy 
farmer who, at one point, repeatedly attempted to get licensed in order to sell a fermented bean 
product. Despite having “followed their rules exactly… [and being] legal to the letter of the 
law,” the state department of agriculture repeatedly denied her a license to sell fermented bean 
dip at a local grocery store. 
 Even though Lisa certified her home kitchen according to the state specifications, she 
learned that “the kitchen regulations that are posted by the state do not agree at all with the hoops 
they make you go through.” The structural bias of the regulatory apparatus manifests in this 
discrepancy between the rules and her experience, but perhaps is most telling in how the state 
responded to her requests for clarity as to the ineligibility of her product. The state denied her 
application twice, each time returning the form with only a sticky note attached with little to no 
explanation as to why they refused her license: “It [went] round and round and round…nobody 
signed it, nobody dated it, nothing official. No refusal letter, no explanation why.”  
 The bias became a little clearer after a phone call with a department representative who 
told Lisa that “you can’t mess with beans because they’re a protein food. Regardless if your end 
product passes all the tests with flying colors. [Therefore, suggesting] that’s irrelevant.” Her 
experience suggests an implicit bias against foods containing protein, or as she puts it, against 
nutritious food.  
                                                          
380 Burke comments on the folly of such a pursuit in his grammatical form, the “paradox of purity,” where a 
collective motive (i.e. absolute food safety) is defined against an individual motive (i.e. the unlicensed, ‘unsanitary’ 
farmer). In this situation, the discourse of industrial food production construes small-scale farming practices as a 
source of ‘impurity’ or contamination. 
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I got the impression they were telling me over and over ‘you can make cakes and 
cookies as long as you don’t put butter in them. You have to put Crisco [in], 
which is heart-attack city…as long as you make a totally safe food full of sugar, 
we’ll okay it. My impression was nothing nutritious because nutrition will support 
bacterial growth as it will support all growth—including humans. You can’t do 
that in a certified home kitchen. 
 Such a reality severely limits what small-scale producers can produce to foodstuffs that 
have little nutritious value. In turn, this discursive construction of the food system forces people 
to seek out ‘nutritious’ foods in the supermarket, or the purveyor of industrially-processed foods.  
 A principle grievance of food sovereignty in Maine, as Lisa’s experience makes clear, is 
the bind between producing and consuming healthy foods and gaining legitimacy under the 
current regulatory structure. This structure does not encourage the consumption of healthy 
foods—it does quite the opposite in order to normalize and systematize the production of edible 
foods on a mass scale. The quality of the food product seems less ‘relevant’ than its 
reproducibility at the expense of nutrition. This points to a process of homogenization occurring 
at all levels of food production and consumption: monocultural growing conditions, processing 
conditions, and homogeneous choice at the check-out. Small growers like Lisa who transgress 
these pressures to normalize are classified as deviant and suffer the consequences. 
 The systemic bias of agricultural regulation discursively construes small-scale farming as 
‘disorderly’ or unsanitary. This definition leads to, in the discourse of food sovereignty, 
unreasonable situations where the lifestyles that advocates follow appear as a threat to the 
dominant mode of industrial farming. Emerging out of a tension between different value 
systems, food sovereignty’s discourse goes on to point out the next theme in this section, that of 
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‘disappearing’ rural traditions. ‘Disappearance’ calls attention to the implicit notions of propriety 
produced through discourse and how these arbitrary definitions come to shape social norms. I 
discuss how, as an attempt to gain visibility, food sovereignty in Maine redefines what things its 
members share in common as having value.  
 In Maine, the homogeneous values of industrial food discourse create tension with the 
heterogeneous values at the center of food sovereignty’s discourse. Several advocates describe 
the results of this tension as a sort of “disappearance” of small-scale farms from the rural 
landscape. By doing so, they guide this conceptual movement from the metaphor of ‘guise’ to 
the metaphor of ‘disappearance.’ Notions of visibility emerge with advocates arguing that 
legitimacy, at the state level, comes through recognition by the state. Becoming visible, however, 
is nearly impossible when the regulatory scheme defines your livelihood as illegitimate.  
this is what happens as—if you want to call it [this]—a movement goes forward 
that the principles go forward, but the experiences that generated it in the first 
place don’t always translate. 
 This quote from Helen discusses the frustration she feels when people in positions of 
authority suggest that her advocacy constitutes an ‘unnecessary’ set of demands or “somehow 
make it seem like it is not real, like what we are experiencing is not real.” In this she makes 
connections between the sense of ‘being real’ and being ‘seen’ by the state, or those with 
authority. The illegitimacy of many small-scale farms, while a legal sort of designation, gains its 
‘reality’ from a small farm’s inability to appear in a public way. Helen distinctly connects this 
illegitimacy with the senses that accompany the small farmer in public. Not only does she 
suggest that some legislators simply “didn’t hear us,” but also that:  
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what is not being recognized…is the invisible nature of all the farms that those 
rules have disappeared. Or those that just aren’t going to begin. Or those of us that 
are doing it in every way, I think, legitimately, but aren’t recognized by the state 
as being ‘legitimate’ farmers if we don’t have a license. 
 Arendt writes about the public sphere as the ‘space of appearance,’381 and food 
sovereignty in Maine experiences a version of this. While the small-scale farmer achieves some 
form of legitimation by selling at farmers markets or at a local grocery store, legitimacy in the 
eyes of the state entails more for Helen. It includes a sense of knowing that your way of life is 
safe. There comes a sense of protection, that small, unlicensed farming has a level of social 
acceptance that the government acknowledges its place in the public sphere. It is not enough that 
some officials and most residents of the state of Maine “know that it is happening all the time;” 
places need protection for the assurance that these ‘traditional foodways’ can continue. Another 
way to conceive of such protection is as an “investment” of authority in the municipalities 
passing the ordinances.  
 Municipal authority offers a level of governance that all Maine residents can share in 
common to exert the power of redefinition alluded to above when discussing discursive frames. 
Redefinition occurs at the farm level as well as the level of on-farm activity or process. 
Advocates seek to replace authority for these definitions in the smallest scale of government, the 
municipality, where rules can be made by those who know the local conditions that affect how 
the rules come to bear on the community. The legal definition of ‘small farm’ is a central feature 
of what Barbara calls “regulatory capture,” or the discursive redefining of what legitimate 
farming means.  
                                                          
381 Arendt, Human Condition, 50-51. 
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 At the federal level, ‘small farm’ means something at a completely different and much 
larger scale than for all but the largest of Maine farms. As Barbara explains, in the FSMA,382 
“their definition of small farms was that…you’re selling within a 500-mile radius. That would 
have our farmers selling in Newark, NJ…that is their definition of a small farm. Well, that is 
completely irrelevant…to what we’re doing.” Thus, a primary concern for food sovereignty in 
Maine concerns the appropriate scaling of regulation, according to the local definition of ‘small 
farm’ and the different pace of small-scale farming.383 
 With laws like FSMA, it feels like these lines extend too far. Such regulatory discourses 
of discipline limit the possible selection of means for farmers to practice their trade. Scholars 
note such limits have paradoxical effects of enabling ‘alternative’ choices such as organic foods 
while encouraging the consolidation of agriculture into norms informed by the interests of 
‘agribusiness.’384 The appearance of choice obscures the reality of agricultural codification that 
aligns with industrial practices, thereby further naturalizing the processes of legitimation that 
form the legal landscape for farmers at any scale.385 Regulation, here, assumes a literal role of 
                                                          
382 Food Safety and Modernization Act, 2011. Barbara refers here to the scale at which the sales categories of the 
USDA and the FSMA classifies “small” and “local” farms. The USDA classifies farm “size” in terms of gross sales 
of products. For example, “small family farms” is a category for farms with gross sales less than $250,000. This 
category then has two tiers of “low” and “high” sales, with a $100,000 sales threshold that “large” farms need to 
surpass. See “USDA Small Farm Definitions.” Aug. 19 2013. http://articles.extension.org/pages/13823/usda-small-
farm-definitions. In a 2015 congressional report from the USDA Economic Research Service (ERS), the authors 
speak to some of Barbara’s concerns when they state:  
“The FSMA calls for sweeping changes to the U.S. food safety system. Regulatory focus shifts 
from response (to contamination) to prevention in order to ensure that the U.S. food supply is safe. 
This will be the first time that the …FDA will have jurisdiction over on farm activities, and FSMA 
will impose relative uniformity of standards across suppliers of fresh produce.”  
383 ‘Pace’ refers to the rate at which, for example, small-scale farms can upgrade their facilities to comply with 
regulations. Early in their farming careers, not many farmers can afford concrete floors, stainless steel washing 
stations, and other similar requirements. Many farmers want to comply with these requirements, but need time to 
develop financial resources and customer base to support such investment.  
384 Julie Guthman. “Regulating Meaning, Appropriating Nature,” Antipode 30, 2 (1998): 135-154. 
385 Indeed, the normalization of agricultural production comes in seductively familiar forms, especially through a 
discourse of “natural” foods. Guthman highlights how, as organic farming regulations in California were evolving to 
meet growing demand, they actively courted agribusiness interests by “enabl[ing] the discourse of nature, coded 
here as ‘organic,’ to be evoked in selling new commodities.” See Guthman, “Regulating Meaning,” 149. 
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making the farm a regular phenomenon, a predictable set of practices that precludes ‘othered’ 
practices that cannot comply with the instated norms. 
 Identifying what small farming communities in Maine hold in common emerges as a 
rhetorical tactic used by advocates to address this process of redefinition. Barbara demonstrates 
this when speaking of the “common” things that happen in rural Maine towns. Church suppers, 
bake sales, and other types of fundraisers that include the selling of home-made food represent a 
mode of community organizing food sovereignty both wants to protect and to point out come 
under threat from invasive regulations. The rhetorical move occurs through making these types 
of events equivalent (in terms of a regulatory category) with direct sales of food between farmers 
and consumers. In making this move, food sovereignty in Maine performs a metonymic 
comparison between the largely public gatherings that communities have maintained and the 
private transactions of local businesses (farms). 
 Eliding the public and the private in this way influences how to analyze the rhetoric of 
food sovereignty in Maine. Barbara and others repeatedly refer to the “disappearing” effect that 
the current regulatory structure has on small farms. In light of the equivalential logic that 
connects church suppers with the face-to-face transactions that occur on farms and at farmers 
markets, the implicit understanding is that these community events, too, potentially face 
regulatory scrutiny if ‘we’ do not respond.  
 That which occurs ‘in public’ enters, in Arendt’s terms, the ‘space of appearance.’ The 
public realm and the audience it implies enables communities to perform acts in common and to 
which, over time, they can refer as though these common things have more permanence than life 
itself. Arendt speaks explicitly of government as this ‘common thing,’ but the analogy applies 
well to this example of communities coming together to share food. Indeed, the food sovereignty 
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community in Maine exercises their right to self-governance by instituting social principles at the 
municipal level in the form of an ordinance. These principles act as ‘things,’ assembling us 
together, bringing us closer to create collective, shared meaning by defining rights and 
obligations grounded in agrarian patterns of experience.386  
 To then include the direct sales of private business within this category of public event 
makes a claim about the act of small-farming in these communities. In such a perspective, small-
scale farming performs a public role. It appears as a formative practice to community identity 
and, as such, becomes a matter of public concern. Such metonymy, however, slips into irony 
when one considers that, as Barbara claims, the private interests of corporations drive the 
formation of public sector regulation. Thus, food sovereignty’s discourse makes a sophisticated 
argument—that public spaces (i.e. farms in rural communities) are incompatible with the private 
interests supported by the federal and state regulatory structure. The ostensible concern of the 
agency is public food safety; the effect, however, is to endanger the public good.  
 In addition to bringing farms into the space of public appearance, the discourse of food 
sovereignty also attends to the disappearance of traditions as a common thing under threat from 
industrial food production. Consumers play a key role in maintaining agrarian traditions in 
Maine, a reality that advocates want to grow to apply counter-pressure on the state legislature 
and regulatory apparatus to relieve the structural bias the industrial discourse creates.  
 As a way to address this structural inequality for growers, Lisa addresses the 
responsibility of consumers to apply counter-pressure on the regulatory environment by 
supporting local, and possibly unlicensed, growers. She points to the ordinance itself as a 
                                                          
386 This is a good example of the development of ‘juridical things’ that transform things that matter into things as 
matter. See Kenneth R. Olwig, “Heidegger, Latour, and the reification of things: The inversion and spatial enclosure 
of the substantive landscape of things—the Lake District Case.” Geografiska Annaler Series B: Human Geography, 
95, 3 (2013): 251-273. 
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commonly misinterpreted form of protection for farmers alone. Rather, “the whole ordinance…is 
designed to protect the consumer’s right to have access to the foods that these people grow.”  
 The ordinance, for Lisa, needs to be understood as an argument for “consumers’ rights.” 
Again, this links to the notion of community events that play a pivotal role in the life of any rural 
community—church suppers, for example. In assuming more responsibility for their influence 
over the food system, consumers must shed the sense of privilege that comes with the relative 
ease of finding food within it.  
 She suggests that it is a matter of paying more attention to the “things where people are.” 
Attending to our common things builds collective capacity for affection—for trust and shared 
knowledge in how we produce food and especially how we consume it. Culturally, this 
acknowledges that we cannot “just take it for granted that we’ll always be able to feed each other 
what we want.” Maintaining our local food systems, while possibly sacrificing some 
convenience, allows communities to hold both each other and the industrial food system 
accountable. A dialectical relationship around food can form, where the mutual dependence 
between producers and consumers focuses our attention on how we all contribute to our common 
‘foodways’ and how these contributions have consequences.  
 Advocates express similar sentiment in testimony by saying, for example, that “[t]he best 
regulators of local butchering facilities are the customers, not the government.” 387 In the 
discourse of food sovereignty, consumers have a lot of leverage to effect change. Industrial food 
discourse, as exercised through regulatory agencies, does not extend such power to the 
consumer. As mentioned earlier, regulatory concern focuses almost exclusively on the product 
                                                          
387 John O’Donnell, Testimony in favor of LD 271: An Act To Facilitate the Processing of Livestock That Is Not for 
Resale, February 26, 2013. 
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and individual producer as that which needs control. As a result, the overdetermination of food 
safety constrains the capacity for creative food regulation that accounts for local dynamics.  
 As a response to the claims that consumers should act as the arbiters of food safety, 
Maine’s director of Quality Assurance and Regulations (QAR) deploys standard industry 
discourse, framing the discussion in terms of the state enabling progress and exercising 
‘tolerance’ of deviant agrarian practices:  
To be of maximum benefit to these small Maine agricultural businesses, state 
regulators need to be viewed as a technical advisor partner and not an impediment 
to progress…Custom slaughterhouses who are seeking less oversight must be 
willing to assume zero tolerance for insanitary conditions, food contamination and 
any other food safety infractions in order to protect the health of their 
customers.388 
 The discrepancy between the industrial and food sovereignty discourses manifests in this 
quote in that advocates already assume a “zero tolerance” policy from their customers. Returning 
to the idea of ‘constitutions’ as heuristics that lead us to ask certain questions, food sovereignty 
does not ask the question, ‘how many corners can I cut to keep my business afloat,’ but rather, in 
the words of an advocate, “What’s the relative risk between buying something from my neighbor 
versus buying something from a large, national agricultural company that is sourcing food from a 
variety of places?”389 Additional questions posed from food sovereignty to the above statement 
might read: “what constitutes ‘insanitary conditions’ and ‘safety infractions,’ and ‘to what 
agricultural practices are they addressed?’ Again, the industrial discourse relies on metonymic 
                                                          
388 Ronald Dyer, Testimony Nether For Nor Against LD 271, February 26, 2013. For other counter-arguments to 
food sovereignty in Maine, see Mario Moretto, “Maine farmers speak out against local food sovereignty 
movement,” Bangor Daily News, April 21, 2013. 
389 Alan, personal interview, October 20, 2016. 
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reductions—in this case, the use of euphemistic designations for a vague concept of food 
safety—for it means to farm as a way to exercise power.  
 Consumers and the affective connections they form with food producers form a major 
component of food sovereignty’s discourse. To conclude this section on the discursive 
construction of food sovereignty, I include a brief anecdote of when the first ordinance passed in 
the town of Sedgwick to demonstrate how a primary motive for advocates is to maintain the 
ability of community traditions to be seen. Barbara emphasizes the threat felt by communities to 
their traditional ways of living because of the dominant industrial food discourse. I conceive of 
this as another mode of effective tactical rhetoric, one that constructs again a sense of 
vulnerability in the community in order to build capacity for self-protection in the form of the 
municipal ordinance.  
 In discussing the town meeting in which the first ordinance passed, Barbara describes 
how community members framed the vote as whether or not the town of Sedgwick wanted to 
preserve their way of life. For example, one supporter of the ordinance  
stood up and…turned around and pointed to the table in the back of the room 
where the seventh graders were selling baked goods to raise money for their 
eighth grade class trip and…said if we don’t pass this, that could go away. And 
then somebody said, well what about church suppers? And he said ‘yeah those 
could go away, too.’ And you could literally hear the gasp around the room. 
The vote passed unanimously soon after this exchange. Tactically, such rhetoric appeals to the 
affective connections that sustain any local community. Such mundane events as church suppers 
or cookie sales constitute the traditions of small-scale farming communities as much as the direct 
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sales of milk and meat between neighbors. Barbara draws attention to the demonstrable effect of 
this example, stating deictically that “this is rural Maine—to be able to do these things.”  
 Rhetorically, the tactics of food sovereignty’s discourse in Maine appeal to the traditions 
and agricultural memory of rural communities still existing in the state, and how these affective 
connections to place resonate in the political sphere.390 Advocates construct this discourse 
through a tactical rhetoric that brings small-scale farming into the ‘space of appearance.’ To do 
so, they articulate how their alternative (though traditional) methods of farming suffer from a 
systemic bias that advantages industrial modes of food production. In the next section, I analyze 
how this discourse manages to influence the political landscape in the state and begin the process 
of composing an alterity of belonging. 
Political Conditioning 
 The tactics of food sovereignty’s discourse in Maine enable the affective community 
connections to dictate how the discourse develops and what events it selects as disruptive of the 
dominant industrial food discourse. They also create metaphorical openings for re-composing 
what it means to farm going forward in time. Namely, the spatial metaphors391 that dominate in 
the discursive construction of industrial food are tactically disrupted, enabling a consideration of 
time as well. De Certeau suggests that “tactics are procedures that gain validity in relation to the 
pertinence they lend to time,” through the advantages gained by intervening at the right moment 
                                                          
390 An example of this is when Barbara recalls how the State Representative to the federal House for the second 
district in Maine, Mike Michaud, drank raw milk on a local farm in her community, stating that “I grew up on raw 
milk—we got it from our neighbor!” The agrarian heritage of Maine still exists, if not in actuality, then in the 
memory of its communities. “They remember these days when that’s what you did: you got your raw milk from 
your neighbor. They owned a cow and sold what they didn’t use to their neighbors…that’s the way it always was 
and people really remember that.”  
391 This is a good example of when metaphor can shift into metonymy, as the ‘inefficiencies’ of time and space act 
as the barriers that industrialization seeks to reduce. Food sovereignty calls to work with and embrace these nuances. 
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and thus re-organizing the spaces governed by a dominant strategy.392 Similarly, food 
sovereignty builds its discourse through rhetorical events such as legislative testimony, bills, and 
texts such as the Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance.  
 In this final section of analysis, I stress how the “evental”393 quality to food sovereignty’s 
rhetoric creates democratic dynamics by opening food system discourse to incorporate temporal 
metaphors. By opening the discourse in this way, advocates for food sovereignty further subvert 
the chronological discourse of administrative and bureaucratic power that privileges and 
promotes a teleology of ‘progress.’ A ‘kairotic’ discourse builds off the sense of imposed 
impropriety at the hands of the regulatory structure and informs legislation that is at once 
appropriate and informal.394  
 Appropriate and informal legislation such as the municipal ordinances re-conditions the 
political landscape of food systems and food safety by attending to the dynamic episteme of local 
food production unfolding around kitchen tables rather than in laboratories. Furthermore, this 
legislation has the potential to strengthen community resilience through better collective 
management of public goods. By ‘public goods,’ I refer not only to locally sourced food, but also 
the traditions and political power that accompany resource systems with, in the words of one 
food sovereignty advocate, “tight feedback loops.”395  
                                                          
392 De Certeau, Everyday Life, 38. 
393 Barbara A. Biesecker. “Prospects of Rhetoric for the Twenty-First Century: Speculation on Evental Rhetoric 
Ending with a Note on Barack Obama and a Benediction by Jacques Lacan.” In Reengaging the Prospects of 
Rhetoric: Current Conversations and Contemporary Challenges. Ed. Mark J. Porrovecchio. New York: Routledge, 
2010: 16-36. 
394 See Timothy Peeples, Paula Rosinski, and Michael Strickland. “Chronos and Kairos, Strategies and Tactics: The 
Case of Constructing Elon University’s Professional Writing and Rhetoric Concentration.” Composition Studies 35, 
1, 2007: 57-76. For a discussion of Kairos, see James L. Kinneavy. “Kairos in Classical and Modern Rhetorical 
Theory,” in Rhetoric and kairos: essays in history, theory, and praxis, ed. Philip Sipiora and James S. Baumlin 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002): 58-76. 
395 Nicholas, personal interview, October 24, 2016. 
120 
 
 
 ‘Public goods’ also refer to situations where, as Elinor Ostrom demonstrates, 
“appropriation problems do not exist, because resource units are not subtractable.”396 For food 
sovereignty in Maine, small farms act as the indispensable resource units that communities rely 
on for identifying with their agrarian heritage. Therefore, this section will focus on key demands 
of the discourse that constitute it as a system of public goods management.  
 Sovereignty remains central to how advocates recondition the political dynamics of 
Maine, specifically when attending to the ways in which it focuses on the collective decision-
making process. ‘Collective,’ here, is key when considering how sovereignty addresses the 
relationships of power that form between multiple subjects.  
 In relationships of power, subjects emerge from the way power directs their behavior; 
“power is exercised through networks…[it] passes through individuals. It is not applied to 
them.”397 The ‘juridical’ or administrative form of state power in terms of agricultural regulation 
enforcement forms one such network of power. My concern with articulating sovereignty’s 
theoretical significance here lies in how this power “displaces”398 the small-scale farmer through 
a process of appropriating public ‘goods’ such as agrarian value systems that have long guided 
rural livelihoods in Maine. Such networked power can be considered a “discourse of discipline,” 
or a hegemonic arrangement of collective practices that “define[s] a code of normalization."399 
Sovereignty assumes that power moves between people in reciprocal ways and food sovereignty 
seeks to disrupt and redirect this movement by generating a resistant discourse.  
 In reconditioning the political landscape in Maine, food sovereignty redirects the flow of 
sovereignty in the effort to acknowledge that “problems, motivation, fairness, and preferences 
                                                          
396 Elinor Ostrom. Governing the Commons, 49. 
397 Foucault, Society, 29. Emphasis mine. 
398 Ibid., 36.  
399 Ibid., 38. 
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play an important role” when addressing “collective-action problems” like sustaining small rural 
economies.400 The affective connections stressed earlier again emerge as key contributions to the 
trust that “can act as a heuristic guiding the choice among alternative norms”401 and enable more 
reciprocity as a result.  
Access to the Decision-Making Process 
 The principal demand is that of increasing community access to the decision-making 
process for agricultural regulations. Such a demand forms the basis to an appeal for a pluralistic 
democracy that can adapt its form to social spaces.402 Democratic adaptation to space requires 
aptitude for understanding when to demand access. Food sovereignty demands access at this 
point in time because of the increasing pressure from the federal level to regulate agricultural 
production in a homogeneous way.403  
 ‘Access,’ here, refers more to the process of or “ability to benefit from things” rather than 
focusing exclusively on rights, which can often direct attention towards a discourse of property 
ownership rather than the social relationships that I claim food sovereignty centers around.404 In 
this conception, food sovereignty’s access to decision-making is relational and always subject to 
change, depending on the positions and powers of the group.405 In this sense, the call for access 
and a right to food of one’s own choosing is never made in isolation, but only in relation to how 
food sovereignty’s “subject position”406—whether as a group or as individual advocates—is 
defined by the social relationships that constitute it. The democratic rights that this discourse 
                                                          
400 Amy R. Poteete, Marco A. Janssen, Elinor Ostrom, Working Together (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2010): 174. 
401 Ibid., 226. 
402 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 185. 
403 For instance, with the passage in 2011 of the FSMA. See note 89.  
404 Ribot and Peluso, “A Theory of Access.” 
405 Ibid., 158. 
406 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 184. 
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calls for must be realized collectively.  As discussed earlier, the elements for such a collective 
effort are in place with the dual emphasis placed by advocates on producers and consumers alike.  
  Helen strongly advocates for participation in the process not only as a citizen but also as 
a producer, emphasizing this process as the source of power to claim space within one’s own 
town. With the food sovereignty ordinance, this happens to focus on food production as the 
process in which municipalities want to participate in, but Helen claims that this focus forms a 
part of a much larger concern:  
if we can decide how our food needs are met, we should be able to decide the 
rules. If we can’t decide the rules, we’re not going to have those food exchanges. 
So, we have to have access to the decision-making…it’s really not about 
regulations—it’s about who is making those decisions. You cannot get out [of the 
system] what you’re not allowed to put in. 
 This concern for the process of decision making draws attention to the legislative 
mechanisms at work behind regulation. Helen showed awareness of this when she referred to the 
regulatory framework as a “labyrinth.” After going to the state house in Augusta to testify for the 
first time regarding regulatory exemptions of small-scale poultry production, she reflects on how 
the focus of her advocacy shifted from “scale-appropriate regulation” to the democratic process 
itself. Agencies and regulators jeopardize this process by “telling the legislators what they can 
and can’t do” and, as a result, “the people are left out of it entirely.”  
 As “a form of resistance” to unfair regulation, Helen describes food sovereignty as a way 
of reclaiming authority within their hometown. It serves as a way “to opt-out” of the current rule-
making process in preference for “engaging and participating in democracy at a level that we can 
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actually access the democracy.” The ability to access the decision-making process is a base-line 
expectation of food sovereignty not being met at this point in time. 
 The decision-making process represents the primary field of struggle for community 
members, as the administrative structure of government has ceded control to “extra-
governmental decision panels that decide inside closed doors and with highly specialized 
attorneys.”407 Harold laments this loss of common access as a diminishing of the civic or public 
sphere, a loss of the ability to collectively deliberate as to how to live in the world. Analogizing 
public decision-making around food to that of energy policy, he emphasizes that “energy policy 
is for the whole community, and the whole community is you and me and the technical people in 
energy.” In other words, systemic issues such as energy generation and use or food production 
and distribution require input from everyone because the results have too much influence to be 
left to the experts who may gloss over community nuance and differences.  
 Focusing on this structural deficiency of access to the regulatory decision-making process 
contributes to a larger argument by Harold that advocates for community self-governance. As a 
“democratic argument,” this form of governance aims for “what is best for different reasons and 
different purposes in different parts of the community.” It fragments the decision-making process 
in order to account for local nuance and to build trust amongst members. In other words, it seeks 
to build social norms in such a way that reflects the values of communities that feel threatened 
by corporate consolidation of agricultural practices. Over time, these norms serve as effective 
mechanisms of regulation in themselves, but rather than regulate the idiosyncratic practices of 
                                                          
407 Harold, personal interview, October 27, 2016. 
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small-scale farms, they would regulate and define as ‘abnormal’ the industrial, disconnected 
modes of food production.408 
 In calling for the rule-making process to occur at the smallest unit of government possible 
in the state—the municipality—the legal maneuver can presumably account for the built-in 
affective connections of town politics and the relationships that exist there.409 Towns enacting 
resistant legislation serve to localize the legitimation process that otherwise functions as a form 
of “contract oppression,” where legitimacy emerges only through adherence to the strict schema 
of a legal system that privileges high production and standardized practices.410  
 By legally recognizing the localized practices of farming, food sovereignty affirms and 
privileges a discursive landscape formed by contingency and difference, rather than any uniform 
discipline. Furthermore, affirming the differences between farmers strengthens the locality’s 
ability to articulate when they experience relations of domination; the municipal ordinances 
fragment regulatory impact and afford more flexibility at the town level while exposing the 
homogenous rigidity of the state’s regulatory apparatus. 
 Such fragmentation of the decision-making process, however, does not discount the 
individual’s ability to decide, but rather amplifies the resonance of decisions each person makes 
because of a more tightly-woven community ethos. From a public goods management 
perspective, such amplification through shared norms “reduce[s] the cost of monitoring and 
                                                          
408 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 35-36. Ostrom emphasizes how social censure regulates abnormal behavior, 
which includes the opportunism that is a characteristic of the ‘international food regime.’ Globalized 
commodification of food production has been termed a “third food regime” in reference to the concept of 
“International Food Regimes,” or IFRs, that have accompanied agricultural ‘revolutions.’ See Philip McMichael. 
The Global Restructuring of Agro-Food Systems. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994; Richard Le Heron. 
Globalized Agriculture: Political Choice. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993; Harriet Friedmann, “The Political 
Economy of Food: A Global Crisis.” New Left Review 197 (1993): 29-57. 
409 Each of the eighteen towns that have thus far passed a Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance 
has followed the template provided in the issue of Justice Rising devoted to food sovereignty in Maine.   
410 Foucault, Society, 15. 
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sanctioning activities” and generates a form of “social capital.”411 For example, in response to 
the concern that food sovereignty ordinances would imperil consumers with an increased risk 
food-borne illness, Harold responds: 
[If] you’re marketing your product where the buyer does not know, or even 
perhaps care, where it came from, then you have to create a structure which 
guarantees to the public that everything reasonable has been done…to guarantee 
public safety. But if you have direct interaction between producers and 
consumers, or processors and consumers, within a support structure [composed] 
of the connections between community members, I think other principles of food 
safety can be brought to bear. It’s up to me. It’s important to keep those kinds of 
things alive because otherwise what we’d get is a totally regulated top-to-bottom 
[food system] 
The ‘social capital’ that Harold describes in this passage operates as a sort of “lex insita,” or the 
law or principle undergirding “the immanent regularities of the social world.”412 Public goods 
management generates social capital, or the affective relations that materialize in the 
‘constitutive’ rhetorical texts of food sovereignty’s discourse.  
 Social capital has inertia. It accumulates through the value communities invest in 
common things like traditions and law. Food sovereignty seeks to re-articulate agrarian values at 
the municipal level to the extent that they gain enough momentum (through the passage of 
municipal ordinances, for example) to have these values and practices recognized at the state 
level. The impact of such inertia appears in the testimony offered by actors who are not directly 
                                                          
411 Ibid., 36. 
412 Pierre Bourdieu, “Forms of Capital,” in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, ed. by 
John G. Richardson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986): 241. 
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connected to the communities who have passed municipal ordinances, such as non-profit 
organizations and engaged academics.  
 Food sovereignty’s discourse resonates beyond the sphere of food production into the 
wider spheres of social organization that conceive of “consumer education [as] a public good”413 
to the extent that informed decisions about what food one feeds their family leads to general 
public welfare and the prevention of food-borne illness. Likewise, the discourse of food 
sovereignty in Maine draws the attention of scholars studying how social relationships that 
cultivate and maintain subjugated knowledges are inevitably connected to the regulatory and 
infrastructural constraints of industrial food production.414  
 Alan, the state legislator, uses the metaphor of “moving” in a positive direction regarding 
food sovereignty legislation at the state level. He suggests that, as momentum accelerates 
through more towns passing the ordinance, more representatives will have to recognize “the will 
of the people through their local ordinance decision-making.” By emphasizing this, Alan nods 
not only to the grassroots-level organizing that fuels the advocacy, but also to the process of 
gaining legitimacy in the eyes of political representatives. Through the publicizing and 
multiplying of local decision-making in the form of ordinances, ‘the will of the people’ “gains 
respectability.”  
 Such gains shift the discursive field of state politics in ways that expose ‘status quo’ 
political rhetoric as out-of-touch or even deliberately misleading. As an example, Alan points to 
the “bizarre” and “irrational court decisions” that occurred in Maine v. Brown. Even though the 
                                                          
413 MOFGA Testimony in support of LD 783, April 30, 2015. 
414 Hilda Kurtz Testimony in favor of LD 783. See also Hilda E. Kurtz. “Scaling Food Sovereignty: Biopolitics and 
the Struggle for Local Control of Farm Food in Rural Maine.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 
105, 4 (2015): 859-873. 
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farmer was selling raw milk from his farm and at a farmers market in a town that had passed an 
ordinance,  
the judge said that the people of the town of Blue Hill did not intend to include 
meat and dairy when they passed the ordinance…it’s very bizarre for a court to 
presume what the people meant when they pass an ordinance. That’s outside of 
the normal practice of jurisprudence. 
This decision, along with “an equally bizarre ruling” by the Maine Supreme Court, was made 
because the ordinances use specific language from the state constitution in defending their rights 
to produce, process, sell, and consume foods of their choice. The court decisions stretch the 
limits of interpretation because they do not want to wade into the “constitutional nightmare” of 
challenging home rule, or the investment of authority into municipal governments.  
 Home rule constitutes a point of pride for Maine culture, or the independent spirit that 
other interviewees comment upon. I include a lengthy passage from Alan to illustrate both how 
the court rulings stretch interpretive limits and how comparisons are frequently made between 
the face-to-face transactions of food products and community social events where food is also 
often sold:  
the Supreme Court…made an equally bizarre ruling that the ordinance, when it 
said that goods could be purchased without regulation, they said that that means 
local regulation, that that means regulations from the town of Blue Hill and it 
does not mean state regulations. Well, there are no regulations at the town level, 
so nobody ever thought to put the word ‘state’ before the word ‘regulations’ in the 
ordinance to clarify that they meant state regulations. Of course they meant state 
regulations! ...The reason for these bizarre court decisions, in my opinion, is 
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because it gets at a very fundamental constitutional issue in the state of Maine, 
which is called the home rule provision in the constitution. And no court really 
wants to dig into that constitutional nightmare…Home rule is regarded as a high 
priority in the way laws are interpreted in the state… 
 If the court rules against home rule, it would negate a strong tradition of local influence; 
if the state rules in favor, then it might “open up the floodgates.” ‘Floodgates’ metaphorically 
refers to the regulatory structure that governs commerce at the municipal level in the state and 
that a slippery slope situation may arise at any level of regulatory leniency. In opposition to this 
position, Alan suggests that a ruling one way or another on home rule would necessarily 
compromise the “state of limbo over the home rule question” that has become the de facto legal 
status in Maine.  
 Food sovereignty applies counter-pressure against the regulatory structure by pushing the 
state on the question of home rule. Such counter-pressure functions in a tactical way, where 
actions have their greatest effect in undefined spaces and at times most advantageous to the 
community under pressure.415 With this court ruling, a new avenue of tactical possibilities 
presents itself for advocates. By appropriating the home rule clause from the Maine constitution 
into the ordinance, food sovereignty advocates make “a calculated action determined by the 
absence of a proper locus,”416 or a definitive regulatory stance towards home rule and how it 
affects food. 
 In Maine, this ‘state of limbo’ enables the growth and maintenance of a “historical 
culture…of community members coming together and holding church suppers” among other 
community social events. These events are unquestionably culturally appropriate. As Alan puts 
                                                          
415 Peeples et al., Chronos and Kairos, 60. 
416 De Certeau, Everyday Life, 37. 
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it, “nobody’s going to try to prosecute the church ladies for putting on a church supper…that’s 
politically and culturally just unacceptable.” Food sovereignty seeks to make comparisons 
between these types of events and the food distribution system as a rhetorical tactic to strengthen 
their argument and heighten its emotional appeal.  Attempts to do so appeal to those common 
things that “we agree on by the way we live our lives” and which nobody would rightfully 
question because of our unspoken rules of propriety.  
 We spin our cultural web through tacit agreements that serve as public nodes of affective 
connection. By making explicit the comparison between church suppers (or similar events) and 
the face-to-face exchange of food, food sovereignty actively searches for those sites of affection. 
At the legislative level, these sites serve as touchstones for cooperating without consensus. Alan 
acknowledges as much by speaking to the bipartisan appeal of food sovereignty legislation. 
While “republicans may focus more on eliminating governmental control and promoting 
individual rights,” “democrats are probably thinking of it more along the lines of community-
building [and] strengthening local economies.” Although these ways of thinking may not 
coincide, both sets of political persuasions seek to create the conditions for affect—namely, 
maintaining the tension between the individual and community.  
Appeal of Food Sovereignty or Combinatory/Syntagmatic Logic 
  The tactical rhetoric of food sovereignty in Maine, as noted earlier, uses metaphor in 
response to the metonymic reduction of its values by the disciplinary discourse of industrial food 
production, but can slip into metonymy as well when using ‘constitutive’ rhetoric.417 It defines 
                                                          
417 The agrarian heritage of Maine still exists, if not in actuality, then in the memory of its communities. As Barbara 
notes, many people “remember those days when that’s what you did: you got your raw milk from your neighbor. 
They owned a cow and sold what they didn’t use to their neighbors…that’s the way it always was and people really 
remember that.” As mentioned earlier in my discussion of the role affect plays in identification for advocates, this 
phrase operates as ‘catachresis,’ or an empty signifier.  
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itself and its values as subjugated to the discursive “relations of oppression”418 that corporate 
farming create, yet needs these relations to articulate its own capacity for hegemony. By paying 
attention to rhetorical devices at play in the discourse, I try to foresee how food sovereignty can 
actualize it potential for hegemony, or how it may ‘become hegemonic.’419  
 This necessarily looks at the current moment in time to judge the effectiveness of food 
sovereignty’s discourse. In terms of applying pressure, the political moment of popular anger 
towards ‘elites’ in general and bureaucracy more specifically lends a sense of urgency to efforts 
that look to subvert established relations of power or at least to divert the power so that it is more 
widely shared.  
 Such a rhetorical mapping follows the ways food sovereignty appeals to a wide array of 
people, as the widespread symbolic influence implicit in any reference to hegemony finds its 
substance in ‘equivalential logic,’420 or in the capacity to identify with a common cause. Many 
find common cause in ‘food’ as a political frame, which has a lot of purchase in the current 
political landscape. Again, the tactical deftness of food sovereignty comes to the fore, as the 
increasing cultural influence of local food systems creates an opportunity for advocates to take 
advantage of. Bea identifies the ‘frame’ of food as “sexy” in terms of how it attracts political 
attention at this point in time.  
 Specifically, she refers to how the politicization of the food system unites political 
factions that may traditionally oppose one another. In articulating how food makes an effective 
                                                          
418By using this phrase, I suggest that the agrarian values and livelihoods of food sovereignty activists in Maine have 
been “transformed…into sites of antagonisms” because of how the regulatory structure defines them. See Laclau 
and Mouffe, Hegemony, 154.  
419 Laclau, Reason, 109. 
420 Ibid., 111. And, with such equivalency, another of Burke’s four ‘master tropes’ comes into question, with 
synecdoche being the analogous rhetorical device for hegemony. 
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form of political framing, Bea ties in food sovereignty with populist sentiment and the current 
political culture that many have characterized as ‘populist.’  
When I go to talk about [food sovereignty]…half the room is libertarian…it is a 
big circle. You eventually come around to realizing that…when the hippies and 
rednecks realize that they’re both getting screwed by the same people, then the 
revolution will happen. And on this particular issue, the hippies and the rednecks 
have found common ground. 
The widespread political appeal of food taps into popular notions of independence, liberty, and 
sovereignty. Additionally, this appeal finds its grounding in the physical realities of daily life in 
small farming communities. For example, Bea explains that: 
the food sovereignty movement fits very comfortably into [populist discourse] 
because it is the little guys defending themselves against being told what they can 
grow and what they can eat and how they can sell it to people. That is why the 
GMA is our enemy—because they don’t want people to know that they can grow 
their own food. They don’t want people to know that they can go down the road 
and buy eggs from their neighbor. 
 This quote points out the physical entanglements that the regulatory structure interferes 
with as the basis for popular resentment. Such a perspective echoes the fundamentally 
“embodied” quality of both democracy and populism. As a ‘political logic’ that is always latent 
in any institutionalized form of society,421 populism forms along the affective connections we 
                                                          
421 Laclau, Reason, 117. I want to stress that ‘populism,’ as I talk about it here, is not a pejorative in the least. It is 
conceived as a potent form of political logic that does not fall under the aegis of the ‘left’ or the ‘right.’ My goal in 
articulating the populist character of food sovereignty is to suggest that, as a political discourse, it has potential to 
undermine and erode the hegemonic status that industrial food production has at the state level. Namely, advocating 
for farming rights and rights to food contribute to “rethink[ing] the ecological conditions and scale at which human 
communities can live, and survive.” In this way, the ‘populism’ of food sovereignty in Maine underlies “an active, 
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have with one another. Food sovereignty is, above all, an embodied set of demands. Embodiment 
not only focuses more attention on the affective dimension of discourse than the rational 
dimension, it also erodes the belief in a transcendental and hierarchical law governing all forms 
of social organization. As embodied demands, food sovereignty emphasizes the temporally 
“plastic continuity” of democracy, or the ways meaning fluctuates through time between and “is 
embodied in various representations, images, and metaphors.”422 
 In the attempt to preserve ‘traditional foodways,’ the ordinance speaks directly to the 
practices that define these traditions—local production and distribution of raw milk, home 
slaughter of meat, and bartering of goods with one’s neighbors. The industrial regulatory 
schema—as referenced by food sovereignty—directly impacts the embodied meaning of small-
scale food production. It is bio-political and exerts bio-power. 
 Bea compellingly draws this definition to include the wider community in describing 
food as a political ‘frame’: 
food freedom is like mom’s family says; growing your own food is like printing 
your own money and, fortunately, growing your own food is still legal. It is a way 
for the people, for a popular movement, to take back their power. 
Within this wider community falls the ‘consumer,’ who has leverage in resisting the structural 
bias against small-scale farmers. In Maine, Bea attributes to the consumer a role of protection. 
Farmers grow the food, but without the local markets in which to sell their products, the impetus 
behind food sovereingty would dissipate:  
                                                          
anti-systemic struggle.” See Philip McMichael, “Historicizing food sovereignty,” The Journal of Peasant Studies, 
41, 6 (2014): 937. 
422 Foucault, Archaeology, 150. 
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the protection comes from the consumer side, more than from the farmer side 
because you have consumers who are educated and aware and paying 
attention…they are making much more conscious decisions about where their 
food dollars are going. That is the protection, because those folks are pretty hard 
to bamboozle and they are pretty hard—greenwashing does not work with them. 
They see right through it. 
 Using food as a discursive frame allows for a wider identification with food sovereignty 
and grounds the demands in the physical realm. Although vague, this very vagueness of food 
accounts for its resonance, such that ‘food’ for farmers can refer to the processes and means of 
production whereas for consumers ‘food’ can refer to the culinary and intimate acts of enjoyment 
and satisfaction within the home. Regardless of the perspective, the frame attaches the audience 
to a place. Thus, it has ‘substance’ in a Burkean sense, yet remains symbolic in its attraction. 
 ‘Food,’ in this sense, becomes a “commonplace.”423 Considering it as such takes into 
consideration the practices that constitute food itself. Jeff does this in discussing the “paradigm 
shift” needed in terms of agricultural methods of production towards a more distributed model. 
Using a metaphor of “inoculation,” Jeff articulates the tactical ethos of food sovereignty by 
saying that “you work within the regulatory framework.” This perspective of growth from within 
seeks to undermine and eventually transform the system to produce different sets of assumptions. 
At the moment, the corporate regulatory system “presupposes destruction…it assumes that any 
                                                          
423 The “commonplace” of food, here, refers to its capacity as a site of material and symbolic worth “that mobilizes 
those who identify with it to make substantive changes on its behalf.” See Caroline Gottschalk Druschke, 
“Watershed as Common-Place: Communicating for Conservation at the Watershed Scale,” Environmental 
Communication 7, 1 (2013): 80-96. Such a ‘commonplace’ is but one of many within the larger discourse of food 
sovereignty. The ways food can operate within this discourse—as ‘sexy’ political bait, the product of a community’s 
collective labor, and the object of state regulatory power—make it more than a commodity; food as commonplace 
manifests in the “enactments of the dynamics that generate discourse.” See Nathan Stormer. “Looking in Wonder: 
Prenatal Sublimity and the Commonplace Life,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 33, 3 (2008): 648. 
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human activity on the planet is inherently destructive, and so we must regulate our destruction 
and regulate our animal urges.” 
 Distinguishing between the regulatory system and the ‘animal’ instincts it seeks to 
control echoes the dualism found in rhetorical traditions dating back to Plato and Aristotle. In 
antiquity, philosophers found the sociability of humans to present a limitation on our capacity to 
develop wisdom. Thus, philosophers (lovers of wisdom) sought separation from the realm of 
necessity (the home) – where labor and needs were satisfied through force – in the public realm, 
the realm of politics. Jeff advocates for a very different conception of the political here, one that 
accounts for the “emergence of society” as Hannah Arendt terms it.424 Assumptions about human 
capacity need to change along ecological fault lines and recognize “humans as a keystone species 
on this planet.” It is not that we inherently destroy the world around us, but that we change it in 
fundamental ways:  
Our actions on ecosystems affect the well-being of all other organisms in that 
ecosystem. We are a keystone species, whether or not we choose to accept that 
responsibility. Right now, as Americans, we have this exceptionalism. Like, we 
are not going to take responsibility! … Humans can be beneficial, a force of good 
on this planet.425 
 Focusing on the means of production in food sovereignty as a practice have appeal across 
a wide range of political viewpoints. There is a liberal impulse to adhere to law, but a 
deregulatory impulse as well to protect small-scale growers from over-burdensome regulation. 
Indeed, Jeff frames this appeal in that the ordinance has “always been about enshrining the de 
facto status quo into local, municipal ordinance law.” Transforming the de facto into the de jure 
                                                          
424 Arendt, Human Condition, 68. 
425 Jeff, personal interview. 
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because of a perceived threat relies on the commitment to a distributed model of food 
production. 
 In practice, this means that communities recognize how “the working rules used by 
appropriators” (i.e. small-scale farmers) do not have a singular or common source, but rather 
they should depend upon the dynamics that condition farming at the municipal level.426 The self-
governance advocated by food sovereignty affirms that agrarian practices emerge in situ as 
opposed to being vertically imposed within a hierarchy. This endemic horizontality of 
agrarianism guides the political logic that leads to its codification at the municipal level in vague 
language. Jeff takes this in an ecological direction with resilience in mind, but other advocates 
take it to mean a sort of resilient community ethos in terms of traditions and values. Of course, 
ecology and value systems are intimately connected, but the shifts in emphasis speak to the 
widespread appeal or ‘combinatory’ logic of food sovereignty.  
 This logic is at work in Nicholas’ commentary regarding the political attraction of the 
ordinance. Besides increasing a community’s capacity for resilience in the face of dramatic 
change by altering modes of food production, the assertion of local control also allows for 
changing public perception of how we make sense of the world we live in. Playing on the 
common trope of ‘independence,’ Nicholas suggests that food sovereignty should make the case 
that the ordinance “would be a victory for individual liberty as well as sustainability.” He 
acknowledges that the ordinance has widespread appeal because of its ability to speak into 
different political discourses. 
 These discourses may seem at odds, but the ordinance has thus far straddled the 
discourses by focusing on the common-ness of our food system. Regardless of whether or not 
                                                          
426 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 55. 
136 
 
 
one has “philosophical reservations” about the intent of the ordinance to exert local control, it is 
“something that should be publicly discussed.” Perhaps this simple insight can help to explain 
the appeal of the discourse.  
 In a time of toxic political discourse, food sovereignty offers opportunities to address 
commonly-held values and to look critically at the system of food production that we all partake 
in. Similar to Bourdieu’s concept of lex insita, Nicholas’ comments point to the potency of a 
form of self-governance known as “vernacular law.”427  
 Vernacular law emerges from the “unofficial zones of society and is a source of moral 
legitimacy and power in its own right.”428 In practice, it looks much like the municipal 
ordinances passed by communities in Maine, with its primary characteristic that of distributed 
governance derived from social practice and tradition. Distributed governance enables 
communities to respond to particular needs arising in their localities, but does not seek to upend 
the rule of law. Indeed, vernacular law makes a compelling case to widen the range of the 
‘Public Trust Doctrine,’ or the means of state power to declare certain things—like a lakeshore, 
forest, or a ‘foodshed’—as commonly owned.429 
 By enabling this common focus, the ordinance opens up opportunities for affective 
exchange, or interactions that allow members of the community to think through how our modes 
of food production and consumption influence how we interact more broadly in terms of trust 
and ‘togetherness.’ Such reflection leads Nicholas to provide a fruitful juxtaposition between the 
industrial regulatory environment and its local counterpart—a comparison that attends to the 
                                                          
427 Burns H. Weston and David Bollier, Green Governance: Ecological Survival, Human Rights, and the Law of the 
Commons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 104. 
428 Ibid. 
429 See the landmark US Supreme Court case that is marked as defining the Public Trust Doctrine, Illinois Central 
Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
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discursive absurdities that underlie the principle counter-argument against food sovereignty - 
‘food safety:’  
to say with a straight face that it’s more dangerous to look your farmer in the eye 
and buy some food produced a mile down the road from them than buying 
packaged, processed, preservative-laden, sugar and salt-filled food that did pass 
muster by the FDA—put it in that light and it doesn’t make sense to me. 
 Such realism should be cultivated in the sense of combining it with the existing industrial 
system. Akin to the flawed thinking of industrial food production that constructs food-borne 
illness as a ‘disorder,’ food sovereignty should not discursively construct industrial food 
production as ‘the problem’ without qualification. In other words, there should be attention paid 
to defining the problem and focusing on the nuances.  
 Laclau’s discussion on combinatory or equivalential logic helps work through such an 
approach. Indeed, I think that food sovereignty’s discourse already adopts a syntagmatic tactical 
rhetoric. For example, Renee and other advocates combine concerns for environmental 
protection with the need for economic security and preservation of tradition: “It’s a combination 
of arguments—environmental arguments, tradition arguments, [and] economic arguments.” 
Rather than articulating food sovereignty discourse as a paradigmatic shift or ‘battle’ against the 
dominant system, syntagmatic discourse uses what arguments have been sustained by this very 
system to strengthen its own case for change.  
 Such an approach enables one to draw systemic connections between the aspirations of 
localized and deregulated food systems and the sense that ‘this is how we have always been.’ 
With such combination, a wider audience can identify than only those who may have found a 
specific argument appealing. Affective appeal—the ways in which ‘we’ sustain ourselves—helps 
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to lubricate the political friction between groups identifying as oppositional in the past, notably 
between groups that advocate for economic progress as opposed to those who advocate for 
environmental protection.  
Conclusions: Inoculation via the Vernacular 
 Jeff’s metaphor of ‘inoculation’ provides an appropriate way to conclude this analysis. 
By inoculating the disciplinary discourse of industrial food production with the affective 
relationships and face-to-face economics of food sovereignty, this subjugated discourse effects a 
parasitic yet fruitful change to the rhetorical landscape of food systems thinking. To extend this 
metaphor, I suggest that such inoculation serves as a precursor to a mycelial network of 
vernacular values430 and the maintenance of agrarian traditions as a means to further socio-
ecological resilience through vernacular law.  
 Invoking a metaphor of mycelium points to the “subtle, yet intentional network of ideas 
and values” that compose the food sovereignty discourse.431 Furthermore, mycelial bodies form 
dense meshworks that feed off the rigid structures surrounding them; indeed, as a cultivator of 
mushrooms, I know that the wider the diameter of a log, the longer I will be able to harvest 
mushrooms, as the mycelia will have more lignin-rich substrate to feed off over time. There is 
plenty of rigid industrial substrata for food sovereignty to grow upon and fruit off.  
 Similarly, to conceive of food sovereignty as a mycelial network focuses on the various 
practices composing its discourse. In this sense, Stengers’ perspective of an “ecology of 
practices”432 as the basis of diplomacy offers a fruitful place to end. An ‘ecology of practices’ 
                                                          
430 See Ivan Illich. “Vernacular Values.” Philosophica, 26 (1980): 47-102. 
431 Marianne LeGreco and Dawn Leonard. “Building Sustainable Community-Based Food Programs: Cautionary 
Tales from The Garden.” Environmental Communication 5,3 (2011): 356-362. 
432 Isabelle Stengers,  “Including Nonhumans in Political Theory: Opening Pandora’s Box?” In Political Matters: 
Technoscience, Democracy, and Public Life. Ed. by Bruce Braun and Sarah J. Whatmore. University of Minnesota 
Press: Minneapolis (2010): 3-27. 
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focuses critique on the relations between institutionalized practices (e.g. law or medicine) and 
“empowered minorities who have become collectively able to object, question, and impose” 
otherwise neglected ways of knowing.433  
 The grassroots diplomacy of food sovereignty practices the syntagmatic logic that an 
ecology of practices requires. Rather than demanding deregulation of agricultural production, it 
advocates for exemption from licensure and inspection in order for small-scale farmers to exist. 
Recognizing nuance in this way speaks to the importance of belonging and how it differs from 
identity.  
 Namely, belonging points to the social obligations that constitute the affective relations 
fundamental to food sovereignty; identity points to a fixed set of rules or norms that would 
effectively negate the legislative goals of the ordinances to recognize and pluralize authority at 
the municipal level. Obligations act as limits to the ‘juridical’ excesses of the corporate-state. 
They “entail that a new practical ethos…is a creation, not a change.”434 The invention of food 
sovereignty’s discourse draws distinctions between the habits of small-scale farming and the 
rules that the state seeks to enforce. These agrarian practices, the ethos of food sovereignty, 
cannot be separated or displaced from their respective places without losing their character and 
their potential for radically changing the ways we institute our social selves. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
433 Ibid., 27. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Food sovereignty both uses and develops what Isabelle Stengers’ calls “tools for 
thinking.”435 Whether invoking home rule as the basis of municipal authority or crafting 
ordinances that pass unanimously at town meeting, advocates understand how these tools 
enhance their ability to actualize power for a particular purpose. Tools for thinking compel us to 
make and deploy poetic ‘terministic screens’436—they tell us what should happen, how we 
should direct our capacities. They lie in distinction to “scientistic”437 screens that describe what 
is and is not, or how to interpret questions of fact. Under scientistic screens, however, questions 
of fact transform into statements of truth that develop into a discourse of belief, or poetic terms 
that dictate what should happen. Coupled with power, such a discourse de-legitimizes non-
believers as a means to maintain control.  
 This study argues that industrial food production operates through such a discourse and 
de-legitimizes small-scale agricultural practices in the process. Food sovereignty advocates for 
the legitimacy of those whose ways of living under a globalized, industrial regulatory system are 
defined as ‘disorderly’ or dangerous to public health. These definitions emerge from a discursive 
construction that emphasizes standardization, mechanization, and commodification of 
agricultural practices.  
 More specifically, I argue that the discourse of food sovereignty moves beyond a simple 
critique of industrial food systems and begins the work of worldly composition out of what 
remains of the rural traditions in Maine. Not only is this work hopeful, it is also pragmatic in that 
                                                          
435 Stengers. “Ecology of Practices,” 185. 
436 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, 44-45. Burke actually describes these as “dramatistic” screens. I use 
‘poetic’ for its accessibility.  
437 Ibid.  
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it requires us to think about the nuances of everyday life. Such discernment troubles factual 
discourses when the ‘facts’ fail to accommodate idiosyncratic patterns of experience. 
 I do not mean to suggest that food sovereignty peddles in ‘alternative facts,’ or any other 
disingenuous euphemism that describes an abuse of power and open deceit.  Rather, I point to the 
prescient observations of Latour when he observed in 2010 that “facts have become issues,”438 
when scientific discourses fail to acknowledge the disputability of their claims to truth. Such a 
failure emerges from the ‘reductionism’ of expertise—of highly-trained and hyper-specialized 
skillsets that are then deployed through power structures whose effects manifest in places like 
rural Maine.  
 The pragmatism of food sovereignty disobeys “the power of some more general 
reason,”439 opting instead for the obligatory attachments that foster a sense of belonging to 
community. ‘Grassroots diplomacy’ grows from this particular belonging and does not need to 
agree with the industrial discourse to have its desired effect of gaining legitimacy. As Stengers 
emphasizes, diplomacy actually depends on an acceptance of disagreement on the part of 
diplomats.  
 Differing practices should complement each other in their weaknesses rather than seeking 
compliance to a ‘stronger’ point of view or ‘better’ pattern of experience. As a “social 
technology,”440 grassroots diplomacy relies on the creative impulses that I have outlined as 
fundamental to the vernacular basis of food sovereignty for their legal and cultural ‘innovation.’ 
From this perspective, heterogeneous agrarian values and ecological methods of food production 
                                                          
438 Latour, “Compositionist Manifesto,” 485. 
439 Stengers, “Ecology of Practices,” 189. 
440 Ibid, 195. 
142 
 
 
have as much currency and validity as the homogeneous values and standardized production of 
industrial agriculture.441  
 Food sovereignty gathers small-scale farmers, local consumers, and legislators in Maine 
together to explore what can happen when a community allows for constrained practices to 
“unfold their own force.”442 Such an unfolding holds potential for resilience and cultural renewal 
in the face of an unpredictable and worrying future. The compositional force of food sovereignty 
shifts the epistemic spaces of our culture away from the laboratory and courtroom into the fields 
and forests of rural Maine.443 We need to know ourselves and our homes before we can share 
these in common with others.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
441 A different way of characterizing this might be to place William H. Major’s characterization of agrarianism’s 
“secular grace” in distinction to Kenneth Burke’s characterization of law as a form of “secular prayer” through its 
capacity to codify social customs.  
442 Stengers, “Ecology of Practices,” 195. 
443 It should be noted that food sovereignty is not only a rural phenomenon. In the U.S., for instance, it has taken 
root in numerous urban spaces as a way to create oases in ‘food deserts.’ See Daniel Block, Noel Chávez, Erika 
Allen, and Dinah Ramirez. “Food sovereignty, urban food access, and food activism: Contemplating the connections 
through examples from Chicago.” Agriculture and Human Values 29 (2012): 203-215. See also Meleiza Figueroa. 
“Food Sovereignty in Everyday Life: Toward a People-centered Approach to Food Systems.” Globalizations 12, 4 
(2015): 498-512. 
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APPENDIX B: 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
Project Title: Rhetoric of Food Sovereignty in Maine 
You are invited to participate in a research project that is part of my study as a graduate student 
in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of Maine. The purpose of 
the research is to understand the rhetoric of Maine’s food sovereignty movement. Dr. Bridie 
McGreavy, Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication and Journalism, is my 
faculty sponsor for this project. You must be at least 18 years of age to participate. 
 
What Will You Be Asked to Do? 
You will be asked to participate in an interview that will ask you about your experiences in the 
food sovereignty movement. If you decide to participate, I will ask you questions about your 
experience related to farming or local food systems in Maine and the influence that agricultural 
practices have on your participation in the food sovereignty movement. Questions include: How 
did your involvement in the food sovereignty movement in Maine begin? In your opinion, does 
food sovereignty, as a concept, align with certain agricultural practices more than others? What 
does using rights-based language to describe food sovereignty do that other forms of language 
cannot do?  
The interviews will be audio recorded. Interviews will take between 30 minutes to 2 hours of 
your time.  
 
Risks 
Except for your time and inconvenience, there are no risks to you from participating in this 
study.   
 
Benefits  
Although the project will not benefit you directly, the research expects to contribute to a better 
understanding of Maine’s local food system, its community dynamics, and its influence on state 
policy. 
 
Confidentiality 
If given permission, I will audiotape the interview. If I use any quotations in publications your 
name will not be connected to those statements. This interview will last anywhere from 30 
minutes to 2 hours, depending on what topics you would like to cover.  
Care will be taken to protect the confidentiality of the interview. Your name or other identifying 
information will not be reported in any publications. Your name will be removed from notes and 
replaced with an identifier. The key linking your name to the identifier will be written in a 
notebook that will remain in in John Welton’s locked office. Only John Welton will have access 
to the notes, which will be stored on a password protected computer. Hardcopies will be stored in 
a locked office. All recordings will be kept on John Welton’s password protected computer until 
the completion of the project. After the project is completed the key notes, and all recordings 
from the interviews will be deleted from John Welton’s computer and all hardcopies will be 
destroyed when done with the project, expected to be on or before May 2017. 
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Voluntary 
Your participation is completely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any point. You are 
always free to stop the interview or not answer the question.  
 
Contact Information 
If you have any questions about this study, please contact John Welton at 402 Dunn Hall; 
john.welton@maine.edu. Dr. Bridie Mcgreavy, my faculty sponsor, can be reached at 
bridie.mcgreavy@maine.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research 
participant, please contact Gayle Jones, Assistant to the University of Maine’s Protection of 
Human Subjects Review Board, at 581-1498 (or e-mail gayle.jones@umit.maine.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
158 
 
 
APPENDIX C: 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. I appreciate your willingness to contribute 
your thoughts to this research. This interview is part of a Master’s thesis project focused on the 
food sovereignty movement in Maine. My intent is to better understand how the movement’s 
rhetoric develops from the material conditions (e.g., agricultural practices) of its advocates.  
 
Questions 
Are you a farmer? If so, how long have you been a farmer, and how did you become a farmer?  
Please describe your approach to agriculture. For example, do you follow any specific methods 
of production? Why do you follow these instead of other ways to produce food?  
 
Do your agricultural practices inform your perspective of the food sovereignty movement, or do 
you see these as separate parts of your life?  
 
Is there any one on-farm task or activity that you see as directly linked to food sovereignty as a  
concept? How do you make sense of food sovereignty in terms of the everyday work that occurs 
on the farm?   
 
What has been the extent of your involvement in the food sovereignty movement in Maine?  
Do you know the history of the food sovereignty movement elsewhere, not only in Maine? How 
do you see Maine’s movement connected to the historical movements of food sovereignty 
elsewhere? What is similar? What is different?  
 
In your opinion, how is agriculture as practiced in a ‘food sovereign’ place, as understood in 
your town’s rights-based ordinance, different than agriculture practiced in a conventional (i.e. in 
places without any passed ordinances) place?  
 
What parts of an agricultural lifestyle does food sovereignty affect the most? How does this 
movement and its focus on rights impact non-farmers?  
 
As of summer 2016, seventeen towns in Maine have passed rights-based ordinances related to 
food sovereignty. As a participant in the movement, what do you see as the future of food 
sovereignty in Maine? Is there a “goal” for the movement in Maine?  
 
Is there anyone else you think I should talk to regarding the food sovereignty movement in 
Maine?  
 
Is there anything you would want to offer this conversation that I did not ask about?  
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APPENDIX D: 
 
LOCAL FOOD AND COMMUNITY SELF-GOVERNANCE ORDINANCE OF 2014 
 
AN ORDINANCE TO PROTECT THE HEALTH AND INTEGRITY OF THE LOCAL 
FOOD SYSTEM IN THE TOWN OF (NAME OF TOWN) , (NAME OF COUNTY) 
COUNTY, MAINE. 
 
Section 1. Name. This Ordinance shall be known and may be cited as the “Local Food and 
Community Self-Governance Ordinance.” 
 
Section 2. Definitions. 
As used in this ordinance: 
 (a) “Patron” means an individual who is the last person to purchase any product or 
 preparation 
 directly from a processor or producer and who does not resell the product or preparation. 
 (b) “Home consumption” means consumed within a private home. 
 (c) “Local Foods” means any food or food product that is grown, produced, or processed 
 by individuals who sell directly to their patrons through farm-based sales or buying clubs, 
 at farmers markets, roadside stands, fundraisers or at community social events. 
 (d) “Processor” means any individual who processes or prepares products of the soil or 
 animals for food or drink. 
 (e) “Producer” means any farmer or gardener who grows any plant or animal for food 
 or drink. 
 (f) “Community social event” means an event where people gather as part of a 
 community for the benefit of those gathering, or for the community, including but not 
 limited to a church or religious social, school event, potluck, neighborhood gathering, 
 library meeting, traveling food sale, fundraiser, craft fair, farmers market and other public 
 events. 
 
Section 3. Preamble and Purpose. We the People of the Town of (name of town), (name of 
county) County, Maine have the right to produce, process, sell, purchase and consume local 
foods thus promoting self-reliance, the preservation of family farms, and local food traditions. 
We recognize that family farms, sustainable agricultural practices, and food processing by 
individuals, families and non-corporate entities offers stability to our rural way of life by 
enhancing the economic, environmental and social wealth of our community. As such, our right 
to a local food system requires us to assert our inherent right to self-government. We recognize 
the authority to protect that right as belonging to the Town of (name of town). 
 
We have faith in our citizens’ ability to educate themselves and make informed decisions. We 
hold that federal and state regulations impede local food production and constitute an usurpation 
of our citizens’ right to foods of their choice. We support food that fundamentally respects 
human dignity and health, nourishes individuals and the community, and sustains producers, 
processors and the environment. We are therefore duty bound under the Constitution of the State 
of Maine to protect and promote unimpeded access to local foods. 
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The purpose of the Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance is to: 
 (i) Provide citizens with unimpeded access to local food; 
 (ii) Enhance the local economy by promoting the production and purchase of local 
 agricultural products; 
 (iii) Protect access to farmers’ markets, roadside stands, farm based sales and direct 
 producer to patron sales; 
 (iv) Support the economic viability of local food producers and processors; 
 (v) Preserve community social events where local foods are served or sold; 
 (vi) Preserve local knowledge and traditional foodways. 
 
Section 4. Authority. This Ordinance is adopted and enacted pursuant to the inherent, 
inalienable, and fundamental right of the citizens of the Town of (name of town) to self-
government, and under the authority recognized as belonging to the people of the Town by all 
relevant state and federal laws including, but not limited to the following: 
 
The Declaration of Independence of the United States of America, which declares 
that governments are instituted to secure peoples’ rights, and that government 
derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. 
 
Article I, § 2 of the Maine Constitution, which declares: “all power is inherent in 
the people; all free governments are founded in their authority and instituted for 
their benefit, [and that] they have therefore an unalienable and indefeasible right 
to institute government and to alter, reform, or totally change the same when their 
safety and happiness require it.” 
 
§3001 of Title 30-A of the Maine Revised Statutes, which grants municipalities 
all powers necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the residents of 
the Town of (name of town). 
 
§1-A of Title 7 of the Maine Revised Statutes which states: “The survival of the 
 family farm is of special concern to the people of the State, and the ability 
 of the family farm to prosper, while producing an abundance of high 
 quality food and fiber, deserves a place of high priority in the 
 determination of public policy.” 
 
§ 1-B of Title 7 of the Maine Revised Statutes which states: “...The preservation 
 of rural life and values in the State {is}the joint responsibility of all public 
 agencies, local, state and federal, whose policies and programs 
 substantially impact the economy and general welfare of people who 
 reside in rural Maine, such as the development and implementation of 
 programs that assist in the maintenance of family farms{...}, and improve 
 health and nutrition. The state agencies in addition to the department 
 include, but are not limited to, the Department of Education, Department 
 of Health and Human Services, Department of Labor and the Department 
 of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry. 
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§201-A of Title 7-A of the Maine Revised Statutes which states: “It is the policy 
 of the State to encourage food self-sufficiency for its citizens. The 
 department (Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry) shall 
 support policies that: 
 
1. Local Control. Through local control preserve the abilities of 
communities to produce, process, sell, purchase, and consume 
locally produced foods. 
(…) 
3. Improved Health and Well-Being. Improve the health and well-
being of citizens of this State by reducing hunger and increasing 
food security through improved access to wholesome, nutritious 
foods by supporting family farms and encouraging sustainable 
farming and fishing; 
4. Self-reliance and personal responsibility. Promote self-reliance 
and personal responsibility by ensuring the ability of individuals, 
families and other entities to prepare, process, advertise and sell 
foods directly to customers intended solely for consumption by the 
customers or their families. 
(...) 
 
Section 5. Statements of Law. 
 
Section 5.1. Licensure/Inspection Exemption. Producers or processors of local 
foods in the Town of (name of town) are exempt from licensure and inspection 
provided that the transaction is only between the producer or processor and a 
patron when the food is sold for home consumption. This includes any producer 
or processor who sells his or her products at farmers’ markets or roadside stands; 
sells his or her products through farm-based sales directly to a patron; or delivers 
his or her products directly to patrons. 
 
Section 5.1.a. Licensure/Inspection Exemption. Producers or processors of 
local foods in the Town of (name of town) are exempt from licensure and 
inspection provided that their products are prepared for, consumed, or sold at a 
community social event. 
 
Section 5.2. Right to Access and Produce Food. (name of town) citizens possess 
the right to save and exchange seed; produce, process, sell, purchase, and 
consume local foods of their choosing. 
 
Section 5.3. Right to Self-Governance. All citizens of (name of town) possess 
the right to a form of governance which recognizes that all power is inherent in 
the people, that all free governments are founded on the people’s authority and 
consent. 
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Section 5.4. Right to Enforce. (name of town) citizens possess the right to adopt 
measures which prevent the violation of the rights enumerated in this Ordinance. 
 
Section 6. Statement of Law. Implementation. The following restrictions and provisions serve 
to implement the preceding statements of law. 
 
Section 6.1. State and Federal Law. It shall be unlawful for any law or 
regulation adopted by the state or federal government to interfere with the rights 
recognized by this Ordinance. It shall be unlawful for any corporation to interfere 
with the rights recognized by this Ordinance. The term “corporation” shall mean 
any business entity organized under the laws of any state or country. 
 
Section 6.2. Patron Liability Protection. Patrons purchasing food for home 
consumption may enter into private agreements with those producers or 
processors of local foods to waive any liability for the consumption of that food. 
Producers or processors of local foods shall be exempt from licensure and 
inspection requirements for that food as long as those agreements are in effect. 
 
Section 7. Civil Enforcement. The Town of (name of town) may enforce the provisions of this 
Ordinance through seeking equitable relief from a court of competent jurisdiction. Any 
individual citizen of the Town of (name of town) shall have standing to vindicate any 
rights secured by this ordinance which have been violated or which are threatened with 
violation, and may seek relief both in the form of injunctive and compensatory relief from 
a court of competent jurisdiction. 
 
Section 8. Town Action against Pre-emption. The foundation for making and adoption of this 
law is the peoples’ fundamental and inalienable right to govern themselves, and thereby secure 
their rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Any attempt to use other units and levels 
of government to preempt, amend, alter or overturn this Ordinance or parts of this Ordinance 
shall require the Town to hold public meetings that explore the adoption of other measures that 
expand local control and the ability of citizens to protect their fundamental and inalienable right 
to self-government. 
 
Section 9. Effect. This Ordinance shall be effective immediately upon its enactment. 
 
Section 10. Severability Clause. To the extent any provision of this Ordinance is deemed 
invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, such provision will be removed from the Ordinance, 
and the balance of the Ordinance shall remain valid. 
 
Section 11. Repealer. All inconsistent provisions of prior Ordinances adopted by the Town 
of (name of town) are hereby repealed, but only to the extent necessary to remedy the 
inconsistency. 
 
Section 12. Human Rights and Constitutionality. Nothing in this ordinance shall be construed 
as authorizing any activities or actions that violate human rights protected by the U.S. 
Constitution or the Constitution of the State of Maine. 
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